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ABSTRACT 
Crime control through housing management 
Neil Anthony Cobb 
M.Jur Thesis 
2005 
Over the last decade the management of social housing in England and Wales has 
extended to the formal control of bad behaviour. This thesis charts the political 
development of this increasingly important function and the legal infrastructure within 
which it operates. Part one explores the development of the crime control function of 
social landlords over the last decade within its political, social and economic context. 
Part two then provides a critique of the resultant emphasis upon public protection 
within housing policy by identifying the conflicts and tensions this has created with the 
competing discourses of legal due process and welfarism. 
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Part I 
AN OUTLINE OF THE DEVELOPING CRIME CONTROL 
FUNCTION OF SOCIAL LANDLORDS 
This first part explores the development of the crime control function of 
social landlords over the last decade within its political, social and economic 
context. It sets out a brief history of council housing in England and Wales and 
the recent rise of the registered social landlord as an equal, if not superior, 
partner in social housing provision. It explains too the process by which social 
housing has become residualized, marginalised and consequently stigmatised 
as 'inherently criminogenic' within political discourses, making it a focus for 
government intervention. It then outlines the controversial legal sanctions now 
available to social landlords to manage crime and disorder around their 
housing stock and assesses the discourse of public protection used to justify 
them. Finally, it notes tl1e recent creation of the section 218A duty on social 
landlords to prepare and publish policies and procedures on anti-social 
behaviour, drawing out the implications of this particular development for the 
contemporary role of housing management in policing bad behaviour. 
Chapter 1 
A BRXJEJF JLJEGAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY 
1. Social housing provision in England and Wales 
From the end of the First World War and Lloyd George's promise of 'Homes 
Fit for Heroes' the state, through local government, has to a greater or lesser extent 
taken a hand in the provision of rented residential housing.l However, in the 
immediate period following the Second World War the council sector bore little 
resemblance to its counterpart today. Although still the predominant element of 
the social rented sector, it has decreased greatly in size. Whilst it provided 30 per 
cent of all housing in the United Kingdom at its peak in 1971, it consists of just 14 
per cent today.2 As explored later in this thesis, the demographic of council 
residents has also altered considerably; from affluent working-class householders 
to a sector accommodating concentrations of the poor and socially excluded. 
The security of tenure of local authority tenants is governed by statute. Prior 
to 1980, council tenants, unlike their counterparts in the private rented sector, 
enjoyed almost no statutory protections vis-a-vis their landlord. 3 Local housing 
authorities, as public authorities, were deemed responsible landlords and therefore 
appropriately regulated by political rather than legal mechanisms.4 However, this 
has now changed. Under the Housing Act 1985 council tenants are predominantly 
"secure" tenants.s A secure tenancy provides strong security of tenure, enabling 
landlords to regain possession of the property in only limited circumstances. It also 
allows tenants to exit the sector by purchasing their property under the 'right to 
buy' scheme. Furthermore, the allocation of council housing is also now regulated 
by statute. Councils must give reasonable preference to certain categories of 
1 D Hughes and S Lowe, Public Sector Housing Law (London: LexisNexis, 2000), Ch I. 
2 Office of National Statistics, Living in Britain: the 2002 General Household Survey (London: HMSO, 
2004). 
3 Aside from the notice requirements imposed by the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. 
4 A Stewart, Rethinking Housing Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), Ch 4. 
5 Although the introductory and demoted tenancies, introduced specifically to tackle crime and disorder, are 
of increasing importance. 
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vulnerable household, and must also provide short-term accommodation to the 
homeless.6 
Whilst the council housing sector continues to contract, the growth of housing 
associations; private, often charitable, not-for-profit organizations providing 
homes for low-income households in general or more specifically particular 
vulnerable groups such as the mentally-ill or homeless, has increased 
exponentially in recent years. Registered social landlords (RSLs) are those housing 
associations registered with the Housing Corporation, a non-departmental public 
body that provides investment but also regulates the organizations they fund. 
RSLs have become increasingly institutionalized. Lately perceived by government 
as an answer to social housing provision beyond the state, they have taken control 
of large quantities of council stock through Large-scale Voluntary Transfers 
(LSVTs), often set up by councils themselves for this purpose.? There has been a 
concentration too of public funding for new housing in the RSL sector. Housing 
associations and RSLs now make up a total of six per cent of all housing in the 
United Kingdom.s 
Though often functioning in a manner indistinguishable from local housing 
authorities, housing associations work within a substantially different legal 
framework. Their tenants are subject to an alternative statutory regime to those 
within the council sector. The Housing Act 1988 provides them with the same 
protections afforded to private rented sector tenants; either relatively high security 
under the assured tenancy or extremely low security under the assured shorthold 
tenancy. Only guidance and regulation by the Housing Corporation ensures that 
RSLs at least predominantly provide fully assured tenancies to their tenants. 
Unlike local housing authorities, housing associations are under no direct 
obligation to house vulnerable households. However, registered social landlords 
6 See Chapters VI and VII of the Housing Act 1996. 
7 Transfers are directed particularly towards the government's "decent homes" standard, under which all 
social housing should be of a reasonable standard of repair by 20 I 0, as registered social landlords, outside 
public sector controls, are able to raise private finance. 194 LSVTs by local authorities have now been 
approved, involving nearly 850,000 dwellings in England. 
8 Office of National Statistics, above n 2. 
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are under a statutory duty to provide reasonable assistance to councils to enable 
them to fulfil their welfare role.9 
There remains considerable confusion as to whether housing associations 
constitute public bodies with respect to their amenability to judicial review and the 
provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.10 It appears from case law that 
associations are not subject to judicial review when exercising "their normal and 
essential functions as landlords", even when they receive public funds.11 However, 
it is arguable that this conclusion, established over 25 years ago, reflects an 
outdated source-based approach to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. 
The more recent function-based analysis looks not to the origin of a body's power -
in this case that the landlord-tenant relationship derives from private law - but to 
whether that power is exercised in support of a public function,l2 
The status of housing associations for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 
1998 is also uncertain. Whilst RSLs are not "core" public authorities for the 
purpose of section 6 of the 1998 Act, they may still be subject to the legislation in 
particular situations if found to have engaged in "functions of a public nature" in 
accordance with section 6(3)(b). The decisions in Poplar Housing & Regeneration 
Community Association Ltd v Donoghue13 and R (on the application of Heather) v 
Leonard Cheshire Foundation14 illustrate the case-by-case approach taken by the 
courts; housing associations can constitute public authorities, but only when 
carrying out functions "enmeshed" with those of the state.15 Relevant factors 
include the extent of public funding of the activity, whether the body was taking 
9 Housing Act 1988, s 170. 
10 J Morgan, 'The Alchemists' Search for the Philosophers' Stone: The Status of Registered Social Landlords 
under the Human Rights Act' (2003) 66(5) MLR 700. 
11 Peabody Housing Association Ltd. v Green (1978) 38 P&CR 644. In this case the particular function was 
the service of a notice to quit. 
12 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin pic [ 1987] QB 815. Indeed, there has been a more 
recent suggestion that the situation could be different if an association takes over all the council stock in an 
area: R v West Kent Housing Association, ex p Sevenoaks District Council (1994) 'Inside Housing' 28 
October, p 3. C.f. R v Servile Houses, ex p Goldsmith [2001] LGR 55. 
13 [2002] QB 48. 
14 [2002] 2 All ER 936. 
15 Poplar Housing & Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2002] QB 48. 
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the place of a public authority, whether the body was provided with statutory 
powers and whether it exercised those powers in carrying out the activity.16 
Social housing at the start of the 21st century is thus marked by considerable 
heterogeneity. The organisations operating within the sector are highly diverse, 
both in size, objectives and operational culture. They extend from the large, 
democratically-elected metropolitan councils to small housing associations 
providing supported housing for a particular vulnerable group. However, the 
growing importance of registered social landlords in the provision of mainstream 
social housing may soon lead to a degree of legal convergence within the sector. In 
2002 the Law Commission published its proposals for the reform of the legal 
regulation of rented housing provision in England and Wales.17 A key theme of the 
consultation paper was the drawing together of the different statutory security 
regimes protecting the tenants of local authorities and registered social landlords. 
It suggested the creation of a single social tenancy regulating both types of social 
landlord to reflect the developing role of RSLs as equal partners to councils in the 
provision of housing services.18 It also argued that registered social landlords 
should be deemed by statute to be public authorities for the purposes of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, in relation to their not-for-profit housing activities.19 
2. A developing crime control function 
16 R (on the application of Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2002] EWCA Civ 366. For more recent 
cases on the meaning of"functions of a public nature" not directly concerning registered social landlords see 
Aston Cant/ow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37 and R 
(on the application of Beer t/a Hammer Trout Farm) v Hampshire Farmers Markets Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 
1056. 
17 Law Com 162, Renting Homes (1): Status and security (London: HMSO, 200 I); Law Com 168, Renting 
Homes (2): Co-occupation, transfer and succession (London, HMSO, 2002). 
18 The Scottish Executive has already implemented an almost identical scheme through the Scotland 
(Housing) Act 200 I. 
19 Law Com 162, above n 17, para 5. 77. This has received a frosty reception from registered social landlords 
themselves who argue that such a status could have far-reaching consequences in terms of funding 
arrangements and their status for the purposes of European Community law. Though note that the European 
Commission has recently argued that RSLs should be deemed public authorities for the purposes of directives 
on procurement, strengthening the case for general public authority status: Legal Action, October 2004, p 25. 
5 
Social housing management has always entailed an element of informal social 
control, operating through the dual processes of allocation and eviction.20 
However, the extent to which providers have adopted an interventionist role and 
sought to modify the behaviour of their tenants differs both between local 
authorities and housing association sectors and at various points in history.21 
Octavia Hill, the late-Victorian philanthropist and representative of the early 
housing association movement, was quick to exclude those tenants who failed to 
uphold her own rigorous moral standards.22 Local authorities, on the other hand, 
have generally preferred to manage property not people, taking interest only in 
traditional management issues such as rent collection and disrepair.23 
In the past decade, however, commentators have noted the development of 
an explicit and co-ordinated crime control function for social landlords stretching 
beyond informal social control. 24 These landlords have adopted the techniques and 
strategies of policing such as surveillance25 and witness protection,26 and more 
importantly (and controversially) are now armed with a raft of formal policing 
tools with which to manage problem behaviour in and around their housing stock. 
This has led Cowan to conclude that "housing and its management has become a 
crucial part of the crime control industry; housing departments have become the 
intermedia tors in the new criminal justice system". 27 
How then have housing officers come to play such a key part in national 
policing strategies? Jacobs et al. have recently posited three conditions that must be 
met in order for a particular problem to be constructed and acted upon within 
20 E Burney, Crime and Banishment (Winchester: Waterside Press, 1999). 
21 D Clapham, 'The social construction of housing management' ( 1997) 34(5-6) Urban Studies 761-774. 
22 Burney, above n 20. 
23 A Power, Property before people (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987). This has not always been the case. The 
"laissez-faire" approach to housing management reflects the eras in which local government provided housing 
for relatively affluent householders. During the 1930s, on the other hand, when it took on responsibility for 
those made homeless by slum clearance, the interventionist approach temporarily rose to the fore: Clapham, 
above 21. 
24 D Cowan, Housing Law and Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); D Cowan and C Pantazinis, 'Social 
landlords as crime control' (2001) 10(4) Social and Legal Studies 435-457; D Clapham, above n 21. 
25 See Martin v United Kingdom (63608/00), 19 February 2004 for a challenge before the ECtHR of a local 
authority's surveillance operation against an alleged 'nuisance neighbour'. 
26 See Chapter 2. 
27 Cowan, above n 24, p 492. 
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housing policy: the creation of a convincing narrative, the construction of a 
"coalition of support" and the subsequent implementation of institutional 
measures to address the issue.28 The particular narrative around which the crime 
control function of social landlords has developed in recent years is the now 
ubiquitous problem of "anti-social behaviour", discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 2 outlines the raft of legal tools that constitute the institutional 
response. At this point, however, it can be noted that a coalition of support has 
developed between central government and certain social landlords as a result of a 
confluence of concern about increasing levels of crime and disorder within certain 
'problem estates'. 
(a) National government 
At the start of the 21st century vast socio-economic inequality still exists in the 
United Kingdom. This polarisation is spatially-defined, with the existence of 
pockets of severe social exclusion and deprivation throughout the country. 
Residents in these areas suffer from a series of intrinsic problems: unemployment, 
discrimination, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime, ill health and 
family breakdown, creating a vicious cycle of deprivation.29 It is a particular 
concern of the current Labour government, which has made a specific commitment 
to addressing the problems of these communities as part of its wider agenda to 
reduce social exclusion. It is for this purpose that it established the Neighbourhood 
Renewal Unit, as part of its Social Exclusion Unit, which recently published a 
National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal.3° 
It is notable, however, that over the last decade, successive governments have 
directed their work on neighbourhood renewal narrowly towards a number of 
predominantly inner-city local authority housing estates, a move that has led 
consequently to a tenure-based association between social exclusion and council 
28 K Jacobs, J Kemeny and T Manzi, 'Power, discursive space and institutional practices in the construction of 
housing problems' (2003) 18(4) Housing Studies 429-446. 
29 J Pitts and T Hope, 'The Local Politics oflnclusion' (1997) 31(5) Social Policy & Administration 37-58. 
30 SEU, A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal: A National Strategy Action Plan (London: HMSO, 
200 I). See also www.neighbourhood.gov.uk. 
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housing. This association is not without justification. Throughout the latter half of 
the 20th century, public sector accommodation experienced increasing 
"residualization" and the socio-economic marginalisation of many of its 
residents.31 Successive government policies, particularly but not solely as a 
consequence of Conservative ideology, have resulted in the progressive 
dismantling of the council sector. Tenants have been encouraged to exit the tenure 
through the right to buy legislation and the promotion of home ownership, whilst 
the building of local authority stock has ground to a halt. In addition, this 
decreasing council stock has been used to house greater numbers of vulnerable 
households, many of whom have crossed tenures from a declining private rented 
sector: as we have seen, under homelessness legislation and the regulation of 
general allocation procedures, local authorities have been subject to a specific duty 
to house certain vulnerable homeless households unable to obtain accommodation 
in the private market.32 The ultimate consequence of these processes is that in 
certain areas of council housing, older established high-income households 
vacated these neighbourhoods leaving in their place concentrations of children, 
young single adults, lone parents, single elderly people and immigrant families. 
Council housing has established itself as a safety-net tenure providing 
accommodation to households without alternatives.33 
It was this association between social exclusion and deprivation in areas of 
council housing that led to national strategies focusing upon neighbourhood 
renewal through intensive social housing management. For instance, the 
implementation of both the Priority Estates Project (PEP) and Housing Action 
Trusts (HATs) during the 1970s and 1980s focused upon 'problem' council estates 
31 A Murie, 'Linking Housing Changes to Crime' (1997) 31(5) Social Policy & Administration 22-36. 
32 Structured allocation procedures for homeless applicants were originally implemented by the Housing 
(Homelessness) Act 1977. The relevant legislation is now Part VI of the Housing Act 1996 (as amended by 
the Homelessness Act 2002). Note that s 170 of the Housing Act 1996 places an obligation on registered 
social landlords to co-operate to such extent as is reasonable in the circumstances in offering accommodation 
to people with priority under a local authority's allocation scheme at that authority's request. 
33 A Murie, 'The social rented sector, housing and the welfare state in the UK' ( 1997) 12 Housing Studies 
437. 
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and identified housing providers as the agencies best able to provide solutions.34 
The PEP was set up by the Labour government in 1979 as a five-year experiment to 
tackle problems through housing management, and now operates as an 
independent, self-financing company. HATs were introduced by the 
Conservatives. The Housing Act 1988 made provision for the creation of these 
quango landlords to aid in the regeneration of some of the most deprived local 
authority areas in the country.35 Six HATs were created under the 1988 Act. 
Currently five are still operating. Section 63(1) of the Housing Act 1988 sets out 
their four primary objectives: to repair and improve their housing stock; to manage 
that stock effectively; to encourage diversity of tenure; and to improve the social, 
environmental and living conditions of their areas. 
However, more important for our purposes is that one of the key components 
- arguably the key component- of national strategies on neighbourhood renewal 
has been the effect of crime and disorder on urban regeneration: the product, 
arguably, of crime's general contemporary political salience. As part of its National 
Strategy on Neighbourhood Renewal, the Labour government sought advice from 
a number of Policy Action Teams, in particular on the destructive effect of so-
called "anti-social behaviour" on these neighbourhoods: a politically constructed 
category of problem conduct to which we return later in this chapter.36 The 
continued focus upon areas of council housing resulted in the construction of the 
tenure not only as a concentrated site of social exclusion but as 'inl1erently 
criminogenic'.37 Using the terminology of Nikolas Rose, social housing was 
identified within political discourse as a 'marginal space' containing 'anti-citizens' 
34 DoE, Priority estates project 1981: improving problem council estates (London: HMSO, 1981 ). For an 
assessment of the PEP, suggesting that housing management was of only limited value as a source of 
neighbourhood renewal, see J Foster and T Hope, Housing, Community and Crime: The impact of the Priority 
Estate Project (London: HMSO, 1993). 
35 The first HAT, in North Hull, ceased operation in March 1999. The remaining five HATs are in Liverpool, 
Castle Vale (Birmingham), and the London boroughs of Waltham Forest, Tower Hamlets and Brent 
(Stone bridge HAT). 
36 SEU, Policy Action Team 8: Report on Anti-social Behaviour (London: HMSO, 2000). 
37 Cowan, above n 24. 
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incapable of regulating their behaviour and thus requiring particular 
intervention.38 
(b) Social landlords 
However, the focus upon housing management as a solution to neighbourhood 
disorder is not simply the product of an independently-developed central 
government agenda. In fact, early pressure for an increased housing management 
role in tackling crime and disorder came not from within government but from 
social landlords themselves; more specifically the housing departments of a 
number of the larger metropolitan local authorities, such as Manchester, Newcastle 
and Liverpool. From the mid-1980s many of these councils were already 
informally engaged in crime prevention measures under the more general 
'community safety' banner.39 However, it was housing managers in particular who 
began to place emphasis upon the need to adopt a co-ordinated crime control 
function in tl1e areas in which they operated. 
These council landlords had two objectives.40 First, they sought to respond 
effectively to the increasing complaints of their tenants. Prior to the development 
of organised community policing strategies within police departments, there had 
been a "policing vacuum" within many of the most vulnerable estates.41 In 
neighbourhoods consisting predominantly of social housing, social landlords were 
therefore often treated as the 'official' presence in the community and the first 
point of call for complaints about the behaviour of others.42 Even in the case of 
criminal activity, tenants might expect solutions from social landlords rather than 
the police.43 Second, these landlords were desperate to respond to the problem of 
38 N Rose, 'Government and Control' (2000) 40 Brit J ofCrim 321-339. Note, however, the conflict between 
this construction of the social tenant and the competing construction presenting him as capable of choice and 
requiring empowerment: J Flint, 'Housing and Ethnopolitics: constructing identities of active consumption 
and responsible community' (2003) 32(3) Economy and Society 611-629. 
39 A Crawford, The Local Governance a/Crime (Oxford: OUP, 1997), p 35. 
4
° Cowan, above n 24. 
41 Clapham, above n 21, p 770. 
42 Cowan and Pantazinis, above n 24. 
43 Hughes suggests that some neighbourhoods, notably northern mining communities whose relationship with 
the police is still defined by the strikes of the 1980s, turned to social landlords as a consequence of their 
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difficult-to-let estates, found particularly in the North of England.44 Whole 
neighbourhoods of council housing existed with reputations so bad that it was 
almost impossible to recruit new tenants. Concern was arguably intensified by 
central budgetary mechanisms that penalised void stock, and the pressures of Best 
Value management principles, which demand greater efficiency in modern 
housing provision. 45 
In 1995, a number of these social landlords joined together to form the Local 
Authority Working Group on Anti-social Behaviour, subsequently renamed the 
Social Landlords Crime and Nuisance Group (SLCNG). To achieve these objectives 
the organisation has sought to increase the legal powers at the disposal of housing 
managers to both protect and control their tenants through the co-ordinated 
lobbying of government ministers. Notably, its mission statement highlights its 
aim to ensure the prioritisation of anti-social behaviour in discourses on 
neighbourhood renewal: "We are committed to keeping crime and nuisance as a 
high profile issue". 46 More specifically, however, the importance of this particular 
professional dynamism in ensuring the continued focus of government policy on 
crime control through housing management in particular should not be 
underestimated. 
(c) The dangers of unitenurialism 
The focus of policy upon the criminology of council housing has long concerned 
housing commentators. They accept that the pronounced social exclusion 
experienced by the residents of many of these areas is paralleled by high rates of 
crime and anti-social behaviour.47 However, they warn that the unitenurial debate 
distrust of the police: D Hughes, 'The use of the possessory and other powers of local authority landlords as a 
means of social control, its legitimacy and some other problems' (2000) 29(2) Anglo-Am LR 167-203. 
44 A concern shared by central government: see SEU, Policy Action Team 7: Report on Unpopular housing 
(London: ODPM, 1999). 
45 Cowan and Pantazinis, above n 24. See also Local Government Act 1999, Part I and the Best Value in 
Housing and Homelessness Framework (BVHH). Local authorities are required to secure continuous 
improvement in the way in which they exercise their functions, having regard to a combination of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness. Best value does not apply to RSLs, but the Housing Corporation demands the 
same principles. 
46 
www.slcng.org.uk 
47 Murie, above 31. 
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that has emerged fails to appreciate that deprived neighbourhoods are not limited 
to areas of social housing, nor is social housing intrinsically linked to such 
deprivation. Both social exclusion and concomitant problems of crime and disorder 
are just as prevalent, if not more so, around areas of private housing and owner-
occupation.48 Indeed, even council estates themselves are no longer unitenurial 
neighbourhoods. The right to buy and large-scale voluntary transfers have resulted 
in local authority districts transformed into a multiplicity of owner-occupied, 
private rented and housing association accommodation.49 
The current Labour government explicitly accepts that neighbourhood 
deprivation and associated problems of crime and disorder are in no way limited 
to social housing. It notes that whilst many of these areas are dominated by local 
authority and housing association properties, there are many other areas, 
including private rented housing, suffering from low demand and serious social 
problems. so It is for this reason that its recent legislative initiatives have sought to 
adopt a tenure-neutral approach to the problem. Key to this approach is the 
increased focus upon the strategic role for local authorities qua local authorities 
rather than landlords. 51 Together with the police, they are at the heart of Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) established by the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 which formalise developing multi-agency approaches to crime control. 
Indeed, it is within this broader network that many of the new dedicated Anti-
social Behaviour Units have been established, rather than housing departments. 
Whilst analysis of the powers now available to respond to neighbourhood 
disorder, particularly under the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, is beyond the 
48 Take for example the case of the North-west of England. Government data indicates that here 
neighbourhood deprivation is actually most acute around areas of private rented housing: SEU, above 30, para 
1.8. 
49 Page notes that tenants of housing associations are of a similar socio-economic profile to council tenants: D 
Page, Building for Communities: a study of new housing association estates (London: JRF, 1993). 
50 SEU, above 30, para 1.5. 
51 See ODPM, Tackling anti-social behaviour in mixed tenure areas (London: HMSO, 2003). 
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scope of this paper, the creation of the tenure-neutral anti-social behaviour order is 
of particular interest and considered further below.s2 
However, despite these efforts there continues to be a focus upon crime 
control through housing management. For example, the first consultation paper 
released by the current government on the management of anti-social behaviour 
was entitled Tackling Anti-social Tenants.s3 Whilst noting that neighbourhood 
disorder was not limited to rented housing, the document focused exclusively on 
proposals to modify and extend the legal powers of social landlords. Subsequently 
the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 has introduced a new duty on social landlords 
alone to publish policies and procedures on anti-social behaviour.54 Yet this is 
understandable. The move towards a tenure-neutral, strategic role for local 
authorities and the police was unlikely to preclude the continued operation of 
crime control processes now well-established within many housing departments, 
and the continued lobbying of the SLCNG in particular has ensured that housing 
management remains a focus of the government despite its acceptance that the 
problem extends beyond the social rented sector. 
3. Conclusions 
Over the past decade social housing management has become part of the 
burgeoning crime control industry in the United Kingdom. This development 
reflects the particular association in political discourse between areas of social 
housing and neighbourhood disorder. For central government, tackling the 
problem is central to its wider objective to engineer the renewal of deprived 
communities. Although it accepts that crime and anti-social behaviour are not 
concenh·ated solely in and around areas of social housing, many social landlords 
have proved motivated and enthusiastic agents of crime control. As such there has 
been a continued focus upon solutions through housing management. 
52 The most recent initiative is the regulation of private rented housing in areas experiencing high levels of 
anti-social behaviour in an effort to tackle irresponsible landlords that fail to control their tenants' behaviour: 
Housing Act 2004, Part 3. 
53 DTLR, Tackling Anti-social Tenants (London: HMSO, 2002). 
54 ibid. For a discussion of this duty, see Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 2 
THE lLEGAlL 'f001L§ 
Throughout the early 1990s, housing officers complained that their legal 
powers were too limited to meet the demands of their new policing role.1 The 
first major piece of legislation to establish an explicit crime control component 
for social housing management was Chapter V of the Housing Act in 1996 
enacted by the then Conservative government. The 1996 Act introduced a series 
of mechanisms founded in civil rather than criminal law: the introductory 
tenancy, a statutory housing injunction and extended grounds for possession 
for nuisance under the assured and secure tenancy regimes. Since 1997, 
however, the Labour government has accelerated the development of these 
powers. Over the last seven years, the demands of the SLCNG have been met 
through a raft of legislative measures contained in the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998, the Police Reform 2002, the Homelessness Act 2002 and the Anti-social 
Behaviour Act 2003. This body of legislation amends the injunctions provided 
under the Housing Act 1996, strengthens the power of landlords to evict 
recalcitrant tenants, and perhaps most controversially, gives social landlords 
the power to impose anti-social behaviour orders. It has also restructured the 
allocation of council housing. Yet the initiatives continue. Further relevant 
reforms are likely to hit the statute book when the Housing Bill, currently 
before Parliament, is enacted. 
The following section sets out the legal infrastructure behind these tools. 
The tools are considered under two broad categories: first, the inherent power 
of a landlord to allocate and evict; and second, forms of ancillary statutory 
injunctive relief. 
1. Property-based powers 
Allocation and eviction are inherent to the housing management function 
of social landlords and have always enabled them to exercise informal social 
1 They were supported in this conclusion by academic writing: see D Hughes eta/, 'Neighbour Disputes, 
Social Landlords and the Law' (1994) JSWFL 201-228. 
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control over their tenants. However, in recent years the legal regulation of these 
processes has been reconstructed to support a broader policing role. 
(a) Allocation of council housing 
Since the first homelessness legislation in 1977 the law has regulated the 
allocation of local authority housing, prioritising certain categories of 
vulnerable applicant and resulting in an established welfarist role for council 
housing. Today, Chapters VI and VII of the Housing Act 1996 regulate, 
respectively, the provision of short-term accommodation to the homeless and 
the prioritisation of certain categories of household under general allocation 
lists for long-term renting. These obligations do not extend to registered social 
landlords; however, RSLs are under an obligation to co-operate with a local 
housing authority in discharging these functions to such extent as is reasonable 
in the circumstances.2 
The primary duty under the homelessness legislation is to provide short 
term housing for a minimum of two years to applicants found to be a) 
homeless, b) eligible, c) in priority need and d) unintentionally homeless. The 
original Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 first introduced the concept of 
intentional homelessness to deter individuals making themselves homeless in 
order to gain easier access to social housing. A person is to be treated as 
intentionally homeless if he or she has ceased to occupy accommodation as a 
consequence of a deliberate act or omission on his or her part. Whilst the 
concept was not specifically designed to target those with histories of anti-social 
behaviour, local housing authorities were clearly able to exclude those evicted 
from previous accommodation for nuisance behaviour on this basis. However, 
in line with current concerns about anti-social behaviour this is now explicitly 
sanctioned by the latest homelessness Code of Guidance issued to local housing 
authorities. 3 
A council is only obliged to provide long-term accommodation through 
their general allocation lists to applicants it deems 'qualifying persons' .4 It must 
2 HA 1996, ss 170 (general allocation) and 213 (homelessness duty). 
3 ODPM/DoH, Homelessness Code ofGuidance (London: ODPM, 2002), para 7.14. 
4 HA 1996, s 161. 
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then give 'reasonable preference' and in certain circumstances 'additional 
preference' to a number of categories of particularly vulnerable applicant.5 
Once again, whilst not explicitly designed to allow the exclusion of those with a 
history of anti-social behaviour from social housing, the discretion afforded to 
local housing authorities to decide whether an applicant is a qualifying person 
for the purpose of the duty has allowed exclusion on grounds of past behaviour 
to occur in practice.6 However, the Homelessness Act 2002 recently modified 
the duty by imposing three layers of explicit restrictions on the provision of 
housing to such people? First, section 160A(7) allows exclusion from general 
allocation lists for past anti-social behaviour. It introduces the concept of 
'eligibility' to replace that of 'qualifying persons' and provides that an applicant 
should be treated as ineligible if a local housing authority is satisfied that he, or 
a member of his household, is guilty of 'unacceptable behaviour' serious 
enough to make him or her unsuitable to be a tenant. The test here is whether 
the behaviour would have entitled the authority to a possession order if, 
whether the case or not, the applicant had been a secure tenant.s The 2002 Act 
additionally enables an authority to accept as eligible those households guilty of 
unacceptable behaviour but either refuse to give them preference in their 
allocation scheme9 or give greater priority to others without such a history.10 
(b) Possession of assured and secure tenancies 
The tenants of councils and the tenants of registered social landlords enjoy 
different statutory protections from eviction. The former are secure tenants 
under the Housing Act 1985 whilst the latter are (predominantly) assured 
tenants under the Housing Act 1988. Both the secure and assured tenancy 
5 HA 1996, s 167(2). Reasonable preference must be given to those living in unsatisfactory housing 
conditions; those in temporary or insecure housing; families with dependent children; households 
containing a pregnant woman; individuals with a particular need for accommodation on medical or 
welfare grounds; and those unable to access secure housing as a result of their socio-economic 
circumstances. 
6 D Cowan et al, 'Risking Housing Need' (1999) 26(4) Journal of Law and Society 403-26. 
7 E Laurie, 'The Homelessness Act 2002 and Housing Allocations: All Change or Business as Usual?' 
(2004) 67(1) MLR 48-68. 
8 HA 1996, s 160A(8). 
9 HA 1996, s 167(28) and (2C). 
10 HA 1996, s 167(2A). 
16 
regimes demand that a social landlord may only retake possession of a tenant's 
home with a court order. 
To gain such an order, the social landlord must first show the court that 
one of a number of grounds for possession is satisfied. One ground under both 
systems is that the tenant has breached a term of his tenancy agreement. 
Landlords increasingly include terms prohibiting specific forms of anti-social 
behaviour, for example racial harassment, and bring claims for possession on 
this basis. However, a specific discretionary ground for possession allowing 
eviction of "nuisance" tenants has existed since the first housing statute was 
enacted at the very start of the 20th century.11 The Housing Act 1996 amended 
both the 1985 and 1988 Acts and significantly expanded this ground. Possession 
may now be granted under Ground 2, Schedule 2 of the HA 1985 or Ground 14, 
Schedule 2 of the HA 1988 if the tenant, or a person residing in or visiting the 
property: 
1) has been guilty of conduct causing or likely to cause a nuisance or 
annoyance to a person residing, visiting or otherwise engaging in a lawful 
activity in the locality, or 
2) has been convicted of 
i) using the property or allowing it to be used for immoral or illegal 
purposes, or 
ii) an arrestable offence committed in, or in the locality of, the property. 
The second requirement is that the court must be satisfied that it is "reasonable" 
to order possession. Even if this requirement is satisfied, however, the court has 
a further discretion to stay or suspend the order, or postpone the date of 
possession.12 The development of this broad judicial discretion is considered 
further in the context of a landlord's crime control function in Chapter 3. 
(c) Introductory tenancies 
The introductory tenancy set out in Part V of the Housing Act 1996 was 
one of the early successes of the SLCNG lobby.13 It enables a local housing 
11 Section 5(b) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920. 
12 See HA 1988, s 9. 
13 HA 1996, ss 124 to 143. However, it is questionable whether the scheme is actually used as a tool to 
tackle anti-social tenants. In fact, most tenants (68 per cent) are evicted under an introductory tenancy for 
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authority, if it so wishes, to operate an inh·oductory tenancy regime. If the local 
authority decides to exercise this power all new tenancies it grants will begin as 
introductory, rather than secure, tenancies. An introductory tenancy lasts for 
twelve months (unless possession is granted) at which point it becomes secure. 
An introductory tenant enjoys weaker rights than a secure tenant: for example, 
he cannot exercise the right to buy. More importantly, however, the tenant has 
extremely low security of tenure. If a local housing authority wishes to evict an 
introductory household, a court must grant possession if it is satisfied that the 
authority has complied with the necessary notice requirements.14 A tenant has 
the right to seek an internal review by a senior member of the local housing 
authority of the decision to seek possession.15 If, however, the original decision 
is upheld on review the court has no discretion to refuse possession.16 
The Labour government has proposed to extend the introductory tenancy 
regime. The Housing Bill currently before Parliament, if enacted, will enable 
local housing authorities to extend an introductory tenancy by an additional six 
months. Such an extension does not require a court order: the landlord must 
simply comply with the necessary administrative formalities.17 The landlord 
must serve a notice of extension on the tenant at least eight weeks before the 
original expiry date of the introductory tenancy. A tenant has the right to an 
internal review of the decision to extend the trial period. If the decision is 
affirmed the tenancy is extended. It cannot be subsequently extended by a 
further period. 
Registered social landlords cannot grant introductory tenancies. However, 
since 1998 they have been able to let to their tenants on assured shorthold 
tenancies for the first year: colloquially known as II starter" tenancies. RSLs can 
only use assured shorthold tenancies if II steps are needed to prevent or reverse 
social conditions in an area threatening the housing rights of most residents or 
the value of the stock": i.e. in particular 'problem' estates. Unlike the 
rent arrears. Only 19 per cent were actually evicted for anti-social behaviour: C Hunter et al, Neighbour 
nuisance, social landlords and the law (London: CIH/JRF, 2000). 
14 HA 1996,s 127(2). 
15 The internal review is regulated by the Introductory Tenants (Review) Regulations 1997. 
16 See, however, the decisions in Cochrane [1998] EWCA Civ 1967 and McLellan [2001] EWCA Civ 
1510, discussed in Chapter 4. 
17 Housing Bill, c 146. 
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introductory tenancy regime, use of an assured shorthold tenancy does not 
require the RSL to engage in an internal review of the decision to evict; 
deployment is simply regulated by the Housing Corporation_18 
(d) Demoted tenancies 
The demoted tenancy is the most recent housing management initiative of 
the current government. The idea was originally posited by the Law 
Commission,19 was subsequently adopted by the government,2o and was 
introduced as an amendment to the Housing Act 1996 by the Anti-social 
Behaviour Act 2003. The power of demotion is available to local housing 
authorities, registered social landlords and Housing Action Trusts. It allows a 
landlord to reduce the security of tenure of a secure or assured tenant to that of 
an introductory tenant at any point in the life of a tenancy. To demote a tenant, 
a landlord must apply for a demotion order from the county court. The court 
can only demote a tenancy if it is satisfied that the tenant, another resident or a 
visitor to the property has engaged or threatens to engage in anti-social 
conduct. Anti-social conduct is defined for this purpose as conduct "capable of 
causing nuisance or annoyance to any person and which directly or indirectly 
relates to or affects the housing management functions of a relevant landlord or 
using or threatening to use housing accommodation owned or managed by a 
relevant landlord for an unlawful purpose".21 The court must also be satisfied 
that it is reasonable to make the order. 
The demoted tenancy lasts for twelve months unless the landlord has 
served a notice of proceedings for possession in that time. At this point the 
tenancy is promoted to higher security of tenure: a secure tenancy for a council 
tenant or an assured tenancy for an RSL tenant.22 The process by which a 
18 Housing Corporation, Performance standards- Addendum 4 to the social housing standards for 
general and supported housing: Anti-social behaviour (London: Housing Corporation, 1999). 
19 A form of demoted tenancy was introduced in Scotland by the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, s 35. This 
provision allows demotion of a Scottish secure tenancy to a short Scottish secure tenancy (with low 
security of tenure) if a member of a household has been made subject to an anti-social behaviour order. 
20 Home Office, Respect and Responsibility: taking a stand against anti-social behaviour (London: 
HMSO, 2003), p 60. 
21 This definition ofhousing-related anti-social behaviour is drawn from the Housing Act 1996, ss 153A 
and 1538 implementing the new anti-social behaviour injunctions: see below. 
22 It should be noted that whilst in most cases promotion will return a tenant to the security he enjoyed 
before demotion, this is not always the case. Some tenants of registered social landlords enjoy secure 
19 
demoted tenant can be evicted depends upon the status of the social landlord. 
Once a demoted tenancy has been imposed, a local housing authority can evict 
a demoted tenant under procedures almost identical to those regulating 
possession of an introductory tenancy. It must comply with the necessary notice 
requirements and must provide the tenant with an opportunity to seek an 
internal review of the decision to evict.23 However, registered social landlords 
are under no statutory obligation to offer an internal review. 
2. Injunctive powers 
The injunction is now a key ancillary tool for social landlords. Prior to the 
Housing Act 1996, social landlords were limited to the use of equitable 
injunctions under the common law. Two approaches could be taken. An 
injunction could be sought to prevent breach of a specific nuisance term in a 
tenancy agreement. Further, section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 
provides local housing authorities with a power to enter into legal proceedings 
relevant to their government tasks.24 The statutory anti-social behaviour 
injunction and the controversial anti-social behaviour order, however, are both 
of a different character. Whilst equitable injunctions require a prior cause of 
action in criminal or civil law, these mechanisms create their own statutory 
grounds for intervention.25 
(a) Housing injunctions 
The first statutory housing injunction, available to local housing 
authorities but not registered social landlords, was once again introduced as 
part of the measures in Chapter V of the Housing Act 1996. It has been 
status under the Housing Act 1980. However, they will still become assured tenants on promotion. The 
same problem arises with regard to former council tenants transferred to an RSL landlord under LSVT. 
Their 'preserved right to buy' protected on transfer would appear to be lost on promotion: see H Carr et 
al, The Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 (Bristol: Jordans, 2004). 
23 The internal review is regulated by the Demoted tenancies (Review of Decisions) (England) 
Regulations 2004. 
24 The Court of Appeal has recently confirmed that section 222 can be used to restrain criminal activity 
constituting a public nuisance: Nottingham City Council v Zain [200 I] EWCA Civ 1248. Section 91 of 
the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 now enables social landlords to attach a power of arrest to a section 
222 injunction. 
25 The Harassment Act 1997 also provides local housing authorities with the power to seek injunctive 
relief. Although used by local authorities in response to general anti-social behaviour it will not be dealt 
with in detail as part of this thesis. 
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described as a "swift, inexpensive and effective means of stopping anti-social 
behaviour"26 by government, which particularly favours it as a legal remedy. It 
also appears to be preferred by many social landlords to the anti-social 
behaviour order: it is less resource intensive, and does not involve a mandatory 
consultation process. The Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 has recently extended 
use of the mechanism to registered social landlords, and broadened its ambit 
following a number of restrictive interpretations of the previous law by the 
courts.27 Section 13 of the 2003 Act implements the anti-social behaviour 
injunction (section 153A), the injunction against unlawful use of premises 
(section 153B) and the injunction against breach of tenancy agreement (section 
153D). 
The anti-social behaviour injunction is central to these powers. It can be 
granted at the discretion of the court if two conditions are fulfilled. The first is 
that the person against whom the injunction is sought 'is engaging, has engaged 
or threatens to engage in anti-social conduct'. Anti-social conduct is defined as 
that 'capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person'. Further, this 
conduct must be such that it 'directly or indirectly relates to or affects the 
housing management functions' of the landlord. The second is that the anti-
social conduct is capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to: 
1) a resident of housing owned or managed by the landlord; 
2) a resident of other accommodation in the neighbourhood of the 
landlord's housing; 
3) a person engaged in lawful activity in or in the neighbourhood of the 
landlord's housing; 
4) a person employed in connection with the exercise of the landlord's 
housing management functions. 
The injunction prohibits the defendant from engaging in anti-social conduct as 
defined above. A court can attach an exclusion order and/ or a power of arrest 
to each of the injunctions, where the anti-social conduct involves violence, 
threats of violence or a significant risk of harm to relevant victims.28 Breach of 
26 DTLR, Tackling Anti-social Tenants (London: HMSO, 2002), para I :4.1. 
27 An issue returned to in detail in Chapter 3. 
28 HA 1996, s 153C. 
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an injunction is treated as a contempt of court and punishable by a pnson 
sentence of up to two years. 
(c) Anti-social behaviour orders 
The anti-social behaviour order (ASBO) is perhaps the best known, and 
most controversial, measure of the current government's policies on crime and 
disorder. The order is an injunction issued by a court that can be imposed in 
response to a broad range of anti-social conduct. Rather than being a contempt 
of court, however, breach of the order constitutes a criminal offence.29 The idea 
of II ASBOs" first arose during Parliamentary debates on the original housing 
injunction included in the Housing Act 1996, once again after intensive 
lobbying by the SLNCG. It subsequently appeared as the "community safety 
order" in the 1997 Labour Party manifesto and was finally enacted into 
legislation by section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which came into 
force in April 1999. Whilst the anti-social behaviour order was lobbied for by 
the SLCNG, it was not specifically designed as a housing-management tool. The 
original order was made available to local housing authorities qua local 
authorities3o and the police alone as part of their strategic crime control 
function. Following the Police Reform Act 2002, however, it can now be applied 
for in certain circumstances by registered social landlords and housing action 
trusts.31 
Before applying for an order a social landlord must first consult with other 
local agencies. A local housing authority must consult with the chief of police of 
the area, whilst an RSL must contact both the chief of police and the local 
authority. An order can be made by a magistrates' court against anyone aged 
ten or over if it is satisfied of two conditions: first, that the person has acted in 
an anti-social manner, defined as II a manner that caused or was likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household 
29 The first application of this "hybrid" mechanism was the non-harassment order created by the 
Harassment Act 1997. The ASBO was accompanied in the 1998 Act by the sex offender order which 
operates on identical lines. Since I 998, a number of other injunctive powers have adopted this structure: 
see the Football Spectators Order implemented by the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 and the proposal to 
extend criminal liability to breach of a non-molestation order under the Family Law Act I 996. 
30 Whether district, borough or unitary councils. 
31 Together with English county councils and the British Transport Police. 
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as himself" ;32 and second, that the order is necessary to protect II relevant 
persons" from further anti-social acts. What constitutes II relevant persons" 
depends upon the authority making the application. With respect to social 
landlords it refers either to those within the area of the local housing authority 
or in the case of an application by an RSL or HAT residents those within the 
"vicinity" of the landlord's housing.33 
The terms contained in the order are restricted to those "necessary for the 
purpose of protecting persons (whether relevant persons or persons elsewhere 
in England and Wales) from further anti-social acts by the defendant". 34 They 
can both prohibit specific conduct and bar the defendant entirely from 
particular areas. The order lasts for a minimum of two years but can extend to a 
lifetime. Breach of the order without reasonable excuse is a criminal offence 
punishable by up to five years imprisonment.35 The sentencing judge may not 
impose a conditional discharge.36 
The anti-social behaviour order was designed to respond to the concerns 
of agencies seeking to tackle anti-social behaviour that the housing injunction 
was too limited as a tool of social control. The availability of ASBOs to local 
authorities non qua landlords, and to the police, is an example of the 
government's acceptance that anti-social behaviour is not simply a problem of 
social housing. The ASBO also enables agencies to target minors, against which 
traditional injunctions are unenforceable. Further, the civil nature of the 
application for an order addresses the perceived lack of effectiveness of the 
criminal law in responding to "courses of conduct" and the difficulties of 
proving behaviour to the criminal standard. Though injunctions, both equitable 
and statutory, are an established part of the legal landscape, the anti-social 
behaviour order has commanded a particularly hostile reception from legal 
academics, practitioners and civil libertarians.37 We return to these issues in 
greater detail in Part II. 
32 s 1(l)(a). 
33 s 1(18). 
34 s1(6). 
35 s 1(10). 
36 s 1(11). 
37 A Ashworth et al, 'Neighbouring on the Oppressive' [1998] 16(1) Criminal Justice 7-14. 
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The anti-social behaviour order, the flagship of the government's crime 
and disorder policies, had a surprisingly poor uptake in the years following its 
creation, and the wave of publicity that heralded its arrival threatened to 
become a damp squib. Whilst the government anticipated that 5,000 orders 
would be made each year, by the end of 2001 only 518 had been successfully 
deployed and use of the order was extremely uneven across the country.38 The 
government, which had made considerable political investment in the order, 
was adamant that the ASBO must succeed. The solution was to streamline the 
mechanism to increase its effectiveness. As David Blunkett stated in oral 
questions: "I hope that, by examining any suggestions for slimming down the 
procedures and speeding up the process, we shall be able to persuade local 
authorities and the police to take them up".39 
The ASBO has been modified and extended by the Police Reform Act 2002 
and recently the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003. The Police Reform Act 2002 
enables an agency to secure an order as part of other civil proceedings under 
section 1C of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (amended by the Police Reform 
Act 2002). As such, a social landlord bringing possession proceedings can now 
seek an ASBO simultaneously, thus reducing the delay (and cost) that would 
ensue in having to engage in two separate applications.40 It is also open to a 
court to impose an "interim" ASBO (section 1D) in advance of the main 
proceedings for a full order if it considers it "just" to do so. This is a temporary 
measure which still has the full effect of an ASBO. It can also occur without any 
notice being given to the defendant at the discretion of the justice's clerk. The 
interim ASBO is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. Finally local 
authorities, but not registered social landlords, have been given the power to 
prosecute breaches of ASBOs, reducing their reliance upon the co-operation of 
the police.41 
38 Elizabeth Burney has put forward a number of factors contributing to the reluctance of local authorities 
and police to adopt the tool: see E Burney, 'Talking tough, acting coy: what happened to the anti-social 
behaviour order?' [2002] 41 (5) Howard Journa/469-484. 
39 HC Deb 2 Jul2001 Col 8. 
4° CDA 1998, s I B enables a court to impose an ASBO as part of conviction in criminal proceedings also. 
41 CDA 1998, s I (I 0). 
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The Prime Minister recently announced that 2,600 ASBOs were imposed in 
2003; double the amount of the previous four years.42 The government has also 
heralded the creation of a number of Home Office experts - dubbed "ASBO 
ambassadors" -who will be dispatched to encourage reluctant local authorities 
to make greater use of the order. After seven years and multiple 
reconstructions, use of the anti-social behaviour order is likely to increase 
exponentially. 
3. The discourse of public protection 
The contemporary policing function of social housing management is 
characterised by this constantly-evolving armoury of legal tools, which form the 
subject of Part II. As we shall see, these legislative developments are highly 
controversial, reflecting what many commentators fear is an undesirably strong 
punitive turn in housing policy. This section seeks to answer a more basic 
question: what are the objectives of these tools, and how are those objectives to 
be achieved? It is the contention of this thesis that the law has been justified and 
measured according to a single standard: the effective protection of the public. 
Indeed, in its most recent White Paper on anti-social behaviour, the government 
has made it clear that there was one 'consistent principle' underpinning its 
policies: "that the protection of the local community must come first".43 
The pursuit of public protection is increasingly evident in general political 
discourse on crime and disorder, and should be seen as a reflection of wider 
contemporary concerns with personal insecurity. Security is itself a negotiated 
concept, and clearly certain risks have been prioritised above others. Whilst it is 
accepted that the greatest risks to our physical well-being are accidents, the 
focus of political attention has been directed almost wholly towards the threat 
posed by crime.44 Notably, although crime rates continue to fall in the United 
Kingdom45 the fear of crime is still high and reducing it has become almost 
more important to government than crime control itself. In its most recent 
42 Prime Minister's speech on anti-social behaviour, 28 October 2004. 
43 Home Office, above n 20, para 2.51. 
44 L Zedner, 'The Concept of Security: an agenda for comparative analysis' (2003) 23 Legal Studies 153-
176. 
45 T Dodd et al, Crime in England and Wales 2003/04 (London: HMSO, 2004) 
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Queen's Speech, the government announced a vast array of new legal measures 
directed towards protection of citizens from the tripartite threat posed by 
terrorism, serious crime and anti-social behaviour.46 It is the threat posed by 
anti-social behaviour - low-level neighbourhood disorder - from which 
housing managers are now expected to protect their tenants (and indeed other 
residents of the neighbourhoods in which they operate). 
The discourse has met with considerable cynicism. The reaction of many to 
the Queen's Speech, for instance, is that we are witnessing resort to the "politics 
of fear", as the government manipulates the insecurity of the electorate for 
political gain. As with anti-social behaviour legislation more generally, the 
particular sanctions created for use by social landlords have been viewed as 
nothing more than acting-out by the state in reaction to a constructed "moral 
panic".47 Enacting punitive legislation suggests to the population that 
"something is being done" to increase their security, irrespective of any 
practical benefit provided. Indeed, the recent push to increase the use of the 
"media genic" anti-social behaviour order is seen as key to success in the 
forthcoming general election. 
However, whilst massive political capital has been invested in the current 
government's crime and disorder policies, it would be unfair to view the 
pursuit of public protection solely as a cynical manipulation of the current 
climate of fear. Garland has recently argued that contemporary crime control 
simultaneously evinces two objectives: on the one hand, he accepts that 
increasingly "hysterical punitivism" aims to satisfy the public's fears and re-
establish its faith in the state. However, on the other hand it is directed towards 
the wholly rational, highly calculated objective of ensuring that the public is 
effectively protected in practice.4B Thus, although one can conclude that the 
often hysterical political rhetoric pointing to neighbours from hell, feral 
children and the other members of a threatening urban underclass have 
46 HL Deb 23 Nov 2004 Col I. 
47 See in particular the approach of Professor David Cowan: Housing Law and Policy (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1999), Ch 18. 
48 D Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
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ensured the exaggeration of the size and seriousness of the problem,49 at the 
heart of these initiatives is a justified concern to guarantee the protection of 
those who's lives are genuinely blighted by the effects of neighbourhood 
disorder. 
This thesis therefore considers the policing powers of housing managers as 
rational steps to ensure the protection of communities actually affected by anti-
social behaviour. However, as we shall see in Chapter 5, it also argues that the 
apparent focus upon these powers as some kind of panacea for these 
communities is misjudged and potentially even counter-productive. At this 
stage, though, it is useful to identify exactly how these tools seek to ensure 
practical security. Two broad forms of social control operate through the 
powers: management through discipline, and management through exclusion. 
(a) Management through discipline 
The Prime Minister recently visited Harlow, Essex, to relaunch his policies 
on anti-social behaviour. Whilst there, he made the following pronouncement 
on the efforts of local authorities to tackle anti-social behaviour in the area: 
"what has to happen is that the penalty [the perpetrators] are paying for 
being a nuisance becomes more of a hassle for them then to stop being like 
that. We have to get to a critical mass so people say it is no longer worth 
d . 't "50 omg1. 
This, then, is the disarmingly simple solution underpinning the powers of social 
housing managers: persuading perpetrators to modify their conduct by 
increasing the severity of sanctions for non-compliance. 
The housing injunction and anti-social behaviour order are well-
established forms of targeted restraint through court order backed by 
punishment for breach. The injunction relies upon the impact of a potential 
future fine or imprisonment for contempt of court, whilst the anti-social 
behaviour order has drastically increased the potential penalty for breach: from 
49 Can it really be said that tackling anti-social behaviour is "a war for civilization as we know it"? See F 
Field, Neighboursfi'om Hell (London: Politicos, 2004), p 18. 
50 
'Blair hails crackdown on anti-social behaviour', The Telegraph, 31 August 2004. 
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a maximum two years of imprisonment to up to five years in an attempt to 
intensify its deterrent effect. 51 
What is more interesting, however, is the extent to which access to, and 
continued occupation of, social housing has been fully harnessed for its 
deterrent potential. The government has sought to employ the ontological 
insecurity of tenants in their home as an additional source of social control. This 
insecurity is of course inherent to the landlord-tenant relationship: grounds for 
eviction have always existed for nuisance behaviour. However, recent 
developments - the expanded grounds for eviction under the 1996 Act and the 
introductory and demoted tenancies - have ensured that the threat has 
intensified considerably. Similarly the prospect of exclusion from council 
allocation lists for future rehousing (or at least reduced priority) for past 
conduct is an attempt to encourage individuals to align themselves with the 
constructed behavioural norms of housing managers. In particular, these 
measures are explicitly aimed at preventing what the government sees as the 
cycle of eviction and automatic rehousing of those anti-social households with 
priority need.52 It argues that the deterrent value of eviction is lost if 
perpetrators know they are assured new accommodation from the local 
housing authority. 
Cowan posits what he calls a "responsibility thesis" to describe these 
developments in social housing provision. The right to your home, or to future 
allocation of social housing, is now dependent upon your continued 
responsibility towards your landlord and, more importantly, your 
community.s3 However, this argument is not limited to social housing policy. 
Under the current Labour government, the welfare state as a whole has become 
a key front from which to control recalcitrant individuals. Social security has 
been reconstructed as subject to the terms of a communitarian social contract: a 
move towards benefit conditionality. As Anthony Giddens proclaims, the Third 
51 The courts appear to be taking breaches of ASBOs extremely seriously: seeR v Braxton [2004] EWCA 
Crim 1374 and R v Thomas [2004) EWCA Crim 1173. 
52 Home Office, above 20, para 4.41. 
53 Cowan, above 4 7. 
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Way seeks to invoke "no rights without responsibilities" as a "prime motto of 
the new politics" .54 
The current government has extended and intensified the assault on all 
forms of social security. For instance, the Child Support, Pensions and Social 
Security Act 2000 now enables local authorities to deny the right to social 
security to convicted criminals who breach a community sentence.ss The 
Government has made it known that it is considering the withdrawal of the 
universal child benefit from the parents of persistent truants and offenders. It 
has also recently consulted on a proposal to remove housing benefit from 
tenants where they or a member of their household are deemed guilty of 
persistent anti-social behaviour, although this was subsequently dropped after 
considerable protest. Even now, the Housing Bill currently before Parliament 
proposes revoking the right to buy and consent to mutual exchange of anti-
social secure tenants. In each case, the emphasis upon the responsibility a 
welfare recipient owes towards the state that supports him is expected to 
encourage his "remoralization" and consequent self-regulation. 
(b) Management through exclusion 
Whilst the primary focus of these legal powers is their capacity to change 
behaviour, they also evince an ancillary objective: expulsion and exclusion of 
recalcitrant perpetrators of anti-social behaviour. The most important example 
of an exclusionary technique exercised by housing managers is of course 
restricted access to social housing. Restrictive allocation policies operate not 
only as a deterrent, but as a form of risk management to insulate social housing 
from those deemed potentially troublesome.56 The introductory tenancy 
extends this process for the first year of the tenancy to filter out anti-social 
households before they gain secure status: "[p]roviders accept that, at the point 
of allocation, it is not possible (or perhaps socially desirable) to weed out all 
who potentially might commit anti-social behaviour. Therefore, the risk of such 
an eventuality can be further minimized by the ability to evict the household 
54 A Giddens, The Third Way: the Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p 65. 
55 Social Security (Breach of Community Order) Regulations 200 I. 
56 D Cowan et al, 'Risking Housing Need' (1999) J of Law and Soc 26(4) 403-26. 
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within a short period, and subject to minimum safeguards".57 However, if risk 
management at point of entry is unsuccessful eviction, from secure and assured 
tenancies, or more easily from demoted tenancies, enables social landlords to 
remove recalcitrant tenants at a later stage. 
The exclusionary component of injunctions and anti-social behaviour 
orders should also be noted. Both mechanisms enable a social landlord to expel 
an individual not simply from a tenure but from entire areas of public space. 
The injunction requires that the conduct involve the use or threatened use of 
violence or significant risk of harm to the victim or victims. The anti-social 
behaviour order does not require any such threat, but exclusion must be judged 
necessary to prevent further acts of anti-social behaviour. 
4. Conclusions 
The controversial solution to problems of anti-social behaviour advocated 
by both government and housing managers is the use of increasingly punitive 
civil law sanctions by which perpetrators are controlled through discipline and 
exclusion. This chapter has set out the main examples in some detail: the power 
of eviction, intensified by the introductory and demoted tenancy regimes; 
restrictions on the allocation of social housing to those with histories of bad 
behaviour; and anti-social behaviour injunctions and orders. It has noted too 
that the overarching justification for these measures is the protection of the 
public. Whilst on the one hand this particular discourse has been misused as a 
component of the new 'politics of fear', it has been suggested that the 
government, and social landlords themselves, genuinely believe that these legal 
powers are an efficacious response to the very real concerns of residents of 
deprived communities. 
57 Ibid. The introductory tenancy has been criticised for assuming that anti-social individuals can be 
identified within the first year of a tenancy. There is no evidence to suggest that problems usually emerge 
during this period. This is the reason why the Housing Bill will enable a landlord to extend the tenancy 
for a further six months. Further, the demoted tenancy now enables easy eviction at any point during the 
life of the tenancy. 
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Chapter 3 
THlE SECTJION 218A DUTY 
Over the last seven years Parliament has concentrated upon the creation and 
modification of legal sanctions with which social housing managers might manage 
anti-social behaviour in and around their housing stock. Whilst the 2003 Anti-
social Behaviour Act has certainly been part of that process, it has also introduced 
another important measure. Section 218A of the Housing Act 1996, inserted by 
section 12 of the 2003 Act, imposes a new statutory duty on social landlords. It 
demands that local housing authorities, housing action trusts and registered social 
landlords must, within six months of the commencement of section 12, prepare 
and publish a policy and procedures on the management of anti-social behaviour.1 
The objectives of the section 218A duty are twofold. On the one hand the 
documentation that social landlords release is expected to promote clear norms of 
behaviour so that residents are aware of their responsibilities. On the other, it aims 
to increase the political accountability of landlords to those affected by anti-social 
behaviour. As the government stated in Tackling Anti-social Tenants, where the duty 
was originally proposed, it "would open the landlord to scrutiny with regard to 
the adequacy of the procedures and also as to whether they had followed their 
own procedure in any particular case. Whilst this would not have the specific force 
of a duty it would increase the landlord's accountability in this area of housing 
management" .2 
The creation of the section 218A duty illustrates a number of novel 
characteristics of the current government's approach to crime control through 
housing management. These characteristics are as follows: the duty has made 
explicit the link between the crime control function of social landlords and the 
particular political discourse of anti-social behaviour; it has finally formalised the 
policing role of social housing managers; and it extends equal responsibility to 
1 s 12 only extends to England and Wales. It came into force in England on June 30 2004: Anti-social 
Behaviour Act 2003 (Commencement No 3 and Savings) Order 2004/1502. Commencement in Wales is 
subject to Order of the Welsh Assembly. 
2 DL TR, Tackling anti-social tenants (London: HMSO, 2002), p II. 
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both local housing authorities and registered social landlords. Finally, this chapter 
explores the deliberate decision not to impose on landlords a specific, legally 
enforceable duty to protect those affected by anti-social behaviour - perhaps the 
most controversial aspect of section 218A. 
1. The ambit of a landlord's policing function: "housing-related anti-
social behaviour" 
Whilst this thesis has brought the contemporary policing function of housing 
managers within the general rubric of crime control, the section 218A duty dictates 
that landlords are formally responsible for the management of "anti-social 
behaviour" in their area. Anti-social behaviour has been given a statutory 
definition for the purpose of the duty, drawn from the definitions used for the 
purpose of the new anti-social behaviour injunctions set out above. It has two 
limbs. It refers on the one hand to conduct which "consists of or involves using or 
threatening to use housing accommodation owned or managed by a relevant 
landlord for an unlawful purpose". However, it also extends, more broadly, to 
conduct which is "capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person, and 
which directly or indirectly relates to or affects the housing management functions 
of a relevant landlord" .3 This definition raises two important questions. First, what 
is meant generally by anti-social behaviour; and second, to what extent are 
landlords only responsible for conduct that is "housing-related"? 
(a) The uncertain meaning of" anti-social behaviour" 
The concept of anti-social behaviour is currently ubiquitous in the United 
Kingdom. Adopted by tl1e current government as a central plank of its crime and 
disorder policies, and promoted heavily by the media, it has entered public 
consciousness and colloquial expression, particularly in relation to use of the anti-
social behaviour order. Yet to what conduct does the term refer? Though promoted 
3 HA 1996, s 218A(8). The definitions are drawn from the HA 1996, ss 153A and s 1538 anti-social 
behaviour injunctions. 
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as an objectively definable category of behaviour, its ambit is on closer analysis 
extremely unclear. The definition for the purpose of the section 218A duty 
illustrates this: its broadest element refers simply to the responsibility of social 
landlords to manage conduct "which is capable of causing nuisance or annoyance 
to any person". This phrase has been drawn from the nuisance grounds under the 
secure and assured tenancy regimes, so does have a clear legal meaning. 
"Nuisance" need not amount to a tortious nuisance and "annoyance" constitutes a 
broader alternative limb including any behaviour which "disturbs [the] reasonable 
peace of mind" of another person.4 Yet even so, it provides little guidance as to the 
kind of behaviour that has been targeted. This lack of conceptual clarity is 
paralleled in political discourse. Whilst the term has gained common political 
currency, academic commentators have criticised its inherent ambiguity: it "lacks 
definition and theoretical rigour" .s Notably, policy literature has been singularly 
unhelpful in providing anti-social behaviour with a clear definition. The most 
recent White Paper on the subject simply concludes that "[a]nti-social behaviour 
means different things to different people" .6 
The absence of a prescriptive definition of the types of behaviour legitimately 
dealt with under the rubric of "anti-social behaviour" is a deliberate move to allow 
social landlords, and other agencies engaged in community crime control, to 
construct local behavioural norms relevant to their particular neighbourhoods. 
This argument is substantiated by the draft guidance on the duty. On setting out 
the definition of anti-social behaviour the document adds: "[t]his description is 
wide enough to encompass most landlords' own understanding of antisocial 
behaviour" .7 Rather than central government defining the crime control function of 
4 Tod-Heatly v Benham (1889) LR 40 Ch D 80. The definition supersedes the legal definition previously 
employed by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998; conduct that causes others 'alarm, harassment or distress', 
lifted from the Public Order Act 1986. 
5 S Matthews, 'Enforcing respect and reducing responsibility' (2003) 2( 4) Community Safety Journal 5-8. 
6 Home Office, Respect and Responsibility (London: HMSO, 2003), para 1.6. 
7 ODPM, Anti-social behaviour: policy & procedure- draft statutory code of guidance (London: HMSO, 
2004) para 2.3. 
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social landlords they have been provided with the capacity to problematize 
conduct as they see fit.B 
However, policy documents do suggest examples of common anti-social 
conduct. The draft guidance on the section 218A duty, for instance, puts forward 
the following non-exhaustive list: "noise nuisance; intimidation and harassment; 
the fouling of public areas; aggressive and threatening language and behaviour; 
actual violence against people and property; hate behaviour that targets members 
of identified groups because of their perceived differences; and using housing 
accommodation to sell drugs, or for other unlawful purposes". 9 
This list provides some idea of the general focus of the term. It is clearly a 
concept aimed at redirecting attention to "quality of life" issues affecting the day-
to-day experiences of residents within their neighbourhoods. What is noticeable, 
however, is the broad range of conduct it targets. Academic commentators have 
sought to unravel the political rhetoric and identify the sub-categories of behaviour 
covered by the concept. Scott and Parkey, for instance, point out that these issues 
actually consist of three inter-related problems: neighbour disputes; 
neighbourhood problems; and crime.1o Neighbour disputes involve personal 
altercations between households over nuisance behaviour, particularly noise, 
children, pets or boundaries.n It encapsulates concerns about so-called "nuisance 
neighbours" focused upon in particular by the media. 
Neighbourhood problems on the other hand are environmental issues 
experienced more generally within neighbourhoods. Examples include litter and 
graffiti and young people "hanging about" on street corners. Neighbourhood 
problems are the focus of the government's neighbourhood renewal strategy. This 
political interface between low-level disorder and community degeneration is 
8 Although social landlords also have a responsibility to consult with their tenants: see s I 05, HA 1985 and s 
137, HA 1996. See also Draft guidance (London: HMSO, 2003), ibid., paras 2.11-2.14. 
9 ODPM, above n 7, para 3.2. 
10 S Scott and H Parkey, 'Myths and realities: anti-social behaviour in Scotland' ( 1998) 13(3) Housing Studies 
325. See also the alternative approach taken byE Burney, Crime and Banishment (Winchester: Waterside, 
1999). She suggests three overlapping concepts: nuisance, neighbours and crime. The worst forms of anti-
social behaviour, she argues, are those involving all three components. 
11 Research indicates that the majority of complaints from residents concern noise: P Papps, 'Anti-social 
behaviour strategies: individualistic or holistic?' ( 1998) 13(5) Housing Studies 639-656. 
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explicitly in line with the demands of Wilson and Kelling's influential "broken 
windows" thesis,12 Litter and graffiti and other negative characteristics of public 
spaces are seen as deterring residents and visitors from neighbourhoods through 
the fear of crime, leading to their decline and the rise of more serious criminal 
activity. 
However, both neighbour disputes and neighbourhood problems can also 
involve criminal activity, particularly if they escalate into violence or intimidation. 
A good example is drug-dealing. The presence of a "crack house" is a clear 
neighbourhood problem, and also criminal. It is this type of serious anti-social 
conduct that tends to feature in both government rhetoric and media reportage. 
Anti-social behaviour thus stretches from minor incivilities to serious criminal 
behaviour. This gives rise to two issues. First, the problem with this lack of clarity 
is that it obfuscates the need for different solutions to the various problems that fall 
within its ambit. For example, neighbour disputes might be better resolved 
through mediationB whilst criminal activity often requires a more drastic 
response, potentially involving legal sanctions. This is particularly worrying given 
the broad definition of anti-social behaviour adopted for the purpose of legal 
sanctions. It was the view of the Law Commission that a social landlord should 
have to prove that it was dealing with serious anti-social behaviour before being 
able to access its new legal procedures.14 This has not occurred in practice, 
however, and as such hypothetically, subject to the discretion of the court, legal 
sanctions can be imposed for a wide range of minor offences. 
The second problem is an apparent conflict of interest between social 
landlords and the police. We saw in Chapter 1 that the police have tended to avoid 
the most deprived estates, leaving crime control to social landlords. However, to 
what extent is it more appropriate that criminal activity at least remains the 
preserve of the police?IS An immediately obvious issue is whether a clear divide 
12 1 Wilson and G Kelling, 'Broken Windows', Atlantic Monthly, March 1982. 
13 See A Brown et al, The Role of Mediation in Tackling Neighbour Disputes and Anti-social behaviour 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2003). 
14 Law Com 162, Renting Homes (1): Status and Security (London: HMSO, 200 I), para 13.38. 
15 P Papps, above n II. 
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between the crime control function expected of social landlords and that of the 
police can be established. In the absence of an inherent quality to anti-social 
behaviour, especially one that delineates it from criminal activity, social landlords 
are left with a lack of clarity regarding ownership of the problem at the crime end. 
Whilst developed partnership working between the two organisations may result 
in organised division of labour, the broad definition of anti-social behaviour in the 
statutory definition does nothing to resolve the problem formally. 
(b) "Housing-related": from housing management to strategic management? 
The definition of anti-social behaviour adopted by the section 218A duty is 
limited by an additional, important requirement: that the conduct must be 
housing-related. Social landlords are clearly not expected to take on a general 
policing role. As such, the link established by the duty between their crime control 
function and the accommodation they manage seeks to establish a legitimate ambit 
for their powers of social control. This concept has been defined in two ways. First, 
social landlords are responsible for illegal behaviour that actually occurs on their 
premises. The concern here is with the management of housing itself; for instance 
prostitution and drug-dealing occurring on the property. This is a relatively 
uncontroversial concern of housing management given that the behaviour is 
directly connected with the use of the landlord's own stock. 
However, the second limb of the duty is potentially more controversial. It 
constructs a policing role for social landlords extending far beyond concerns with 
conduct within the home: conduct that directly or indirectly affects their housing 
management function. According to draft guidance on the section 218A duty, this 
"housing management function" includes directly "any activity that the landlord 
would undertake in the day to day and strategic management of the stock 
[including] tenant and community participation, maintenance and repairs, rent 
and rent arrears collection, neighbourhood management and dispute resolution", 
and indirectly "social care and housing support, environmental health and refuse 
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collection and other services provided that enable the efficient operation of the 
landlord function" .16 
The section 218A duty therefore posits an expansive policing role for social 
landlords extending beyond the control of conduct within the home itself. What is 
particularly interesting is that social landlords are expected to respond to 
behaviour that affects what has been termed the "strategic management" of their 
housing stock. Anti-social behaviour that takes place in public spaces around social 
housing inevitably impacts upon basic housing management. As we have seen, 
social landlords have found themselves having to confront the problem of low-
demand for their housing. Lack of demand is founded upon the reputation of 
entire estates. The need to tackle general anti-social behaviour affecting these areas 
such as street drug-dealing and prostitution, begging and gang violence directly 
affects attempts to instigate renewal of these localities, and consequently the task 
of reducing void stock. As such, social landlords are under pressure to diversify 
into general wardens of entire districts. 
The broad interpretation of housing-related anti-social behaviour contained in 
the section 218A duty provides an interesting backdrop to an assessment of recent 
reforms to the nuisance grounds for eviction and the housing injunction. The law 
regulating these powers has not always provided such an expansive approach to 
social control. Originally, the focus of the tools was very much upon restraint of 
behaviour occurring on premises. However, over the years they have been 
resb·uctured to reflect the strategic, neighbourhood management role now 
promoted by section 218A. The pressure for these changes has come from two 
sources. First, judicial dynamism has tended to push for expansive interpretations 
of statute in an effort to provide effective relief for petitioning landlords. Second, 
where this has proved impossible Parliament has ultimately responded with direct 
statutory reform to facilitate the broader role increasingly sought by housing 
managers. The following section charts these developments. 
16 ODPM, above n 7, para 2.5. 
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(i) The nuisance grounds for possession 
Prior to their modification by the Housing Act 1996, the original nuisance 
grounds under the 1985 and 1988 Housing Acts were structured in order to restrict 
the policing function of social landlords to the control of conduct taking place on 
the premises. They enabled a social landlord to evict a tenant in two situations: 
first, if the tenant was found to have made immoral or illegal use of the premises in 
which he lived, and second, on grounds of conduct by the tenant or another 
resident of the property affecting either "adjoining occupiers" under the 1985 Act 
or "neighbours" under the 1988 Act. The first part of the ground directly focused 
upon the use of property, whilst the second almost certainly assumed that conduct 
affecting adjoining occupiers or neighbours must emanate from the property itself. 
However, as council landlords began to develop their formal crime control 
functions it became clear that this structure hampered the effective operation of a 
broader strategic management role. The case of Northampton Borough Council v 
Lovatt,17 decided under the unamended provisions of the 1985 Act, illustrated the 
limitations of the ground for social landlords wishing to take on such a role. The 
council had sought possession of Mrs. Lovatt's home on the grounds of nuisance 
behaviour caused by both her and her sons. However, it relied upon anti-social 
conduct, including burglary and assault, which had taken place in various 
locations around the Spencer Estate in which they lived. The landlord argued that 
although the conduct at issue must affect an adjoining occupier, it need not 
emanate from the property itself. The tenant countered that this was not the case, 
and that it was inappropriate to use the Housing Acts as a general tool of social 
control beyond the restraint of conduct directly connected with the use of demised 
premises. 
In fact the ground itself did not as a matter of construction require a 
connection between the conduct affecting neighbours and use of the premises.18 
Instead, the judgment turned on the assessment of the court as to the legitimate 
17 (1998) 30 HLR 875. 
18 The decision in Lovatt did little to clarify the ambit of the nuisance grounds. The Spencer Estate was a 
clearly demarcated area. It would have been difficult to know exactly what would be "fairly regarded" as the 
extent of a Council's legitimate housing management function. 
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policing role of social landlords. For Pill LJ, on the one hand, a broader strategic 
approach was out of the question. He was adamant that Ground 2 of the Housing 
Act 1985 did not have as its purpose general social control but was instead solely 
concerned with bad behaviour taking place on the premises themselves. The Act, 
he remarked, "demonstrates a Parliamentary intention to protect people living 
near the premises who are likely to be adversely affected by activities carried on 
there. I can find no broader social purpose either for the protection of other 
interests of the landlord or general neighbourhood protection against bad 
behaviour by a tenant or resident" ,19 
However, recognition of the developing crime control function of social 
landlords persuaded the majority to adopt an expansive interpretation of the 
statute. It was held that the conduct on the Spencer Estate did indeed fall within 
Ground 2 of the 1985 Act. For the majority the Acts appropriately extended to 
allow for possession for behaviour affecting "neighbours" that took place within 
the Estate. As Chadwick LJ held, "The conduct against which Ground 2 must have 
been intended to provide the Council with some protection is not confined to what 
is being done by its tenants and those residing with them on the demised property 
itself; but extends to what is being done within the area in which persons affected 
may fairly regard the Council (as local housing authority and landlord) as 
responsible for the amenities and quality of life, including freedom from 
harassment, enjoyment of which they are entitled to expect" .20 
The decision of tl1e majority in Lovatt may well have been influenced by the 
fact that the Housing Act 1996 was in force at the time of the decision. 21 Parliament 
has affirmed the judiciary's attempt to broaden the application of the nuisance 
grounds. The 1996 Act now makes absolutely clear that social landlords are to use 
eviction as a policing tool for conduct both in and around the home by extending 
the grounds to include conduct affecting a person "residing, visiting or otherwise 
19 ( 1998) 30 HLR 875 at 888. 
20 (1998) 30 HLR 875 at 895. 
21 D Hughes, 'The use of the possessory and other powers of local authority landlords as a 
means of social control, its legitimacy and some other problems' (2000] 29(2) Anglo-Am LR 167-203. 
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engaging in a lawful activity in the locality" of a landlord's housing. Moreover, the 
Court of Appeal has subsequently interpreted the concept of "locality" to widen 
considerably tl1e range of victims of anti-social behaviour on behalf of whom a 
social landlord can intervene.22 The term "is an ordinary, readily understood 
English word without specialised or refined meaning. The operation of the section 
is flexibly linked to a geographical place" .23 Its ambit is ultimately a question of 
fact for a judge according to the particular facts of a case.24 The examples given of 
the potential ambit were as follows: "That area may be the part or the whole of a 
housing estate. It may sh·addle parts of two housing estates or include local shops 
serving the housing estate but within its boundaries". As such, the current grounds 
for eviction are now far better equipped to support the strategic management of 
the estates and neighbourhoods surrounding a landlord's housing stock. 
(ii) The housing injunction 
Similar judicial developments have occurred with respect to housing 
injunctions, although greater difficulties have arisen for the courts. Prior to the 
Housing Act 1996 social landlords were limited to the use of equitable injunctions 
which enabled only the restraining of breaches of the tenancy agreement. The 
statutory injunction created by the Housing Act 1996 continued this association 
with tl1e direct management of housing stock. It focused upon the use of the home 
by proscribing illegal or immoral use of the property. It also went further to 
include behaviour affecting an individual "residing in, visiting or otherwise 
engaging in a lawful activity in residential premises to which this section applies 
or in the locality of such premises". 
The Court of Appeal in Enfield Borough Council v DB25 was required to 
interpret the phrase. The decision established two important points, which 
22 Manchester City Council v Lmvler ( 1999) 31 HLR 119. 
23 Ibid. per Judge LJ. Note that Lmvler was concerned with the use of the word "locality" in the context of the 
s !52 injunction. But the concept if of equal applicability to the nuisance grounds for possession: see Ward LJ 
in Nottingham City Council v Thames [2002) EWCA Civ I 098 at [17]. 
24 Ibid., per Butler-Sloss LJ. 
25 [2000) I WLR 2259. 
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themselves highlight again the reluctance of certain members of the judiciary to 
countenance a broad policing function for social landlords. First, extended 
protection for those "in the locality" of local authority premises extends only to 
those engaged in lawful activity there, not to residents or visitors. The two judges, 
Waller and Buxton LJJ, differed in their approach to the interpretation of the 
legislation. Waller LJ held that, as a matter of statutory construction, the phrase did 
not allow grammatically for the protection of either residents or visitors in the 
locality of residential premises owned by the landlord. Whilst Buxton agreed that 
the concept of 'visitors in the locality' was nonsensical, he believed that the 
wording of the statute did extend to residents in the locality of local authority 
premises. However, he was clearly concerned that it could not have been the 
intention of Parliament to allow a local authority to intervene under a Housing Act 
to protect residents who were not themselves council tenants.26 
Second, the Court held that there must additionally be a "connection", "link" 
or "nexus" between a person in the locality affected by conduct and the residential 
premises. Examples of such a connection provided by Waller LJ were employees 
visiting the residential properties: milkmen, gas men and water board officials. 
Once again, this was explicitly a policy-based restriction of the statute. The concern 
was that without this association, a landlord could inappropriately intervene to 
protect anyone who, however accidentally, was affected whilst in the vicinity of 
local authority housing. This was obviously seen as an inappropriately broad 
policing role for social landlords. 
Two consequences of the decision in Enfield for strategic neighbourhood 
management are as follows. In Enfield itself, the authority sought an injunction in 
response to threats of violence by a local authority tenant against staff in a social 
services office in the locality of local authority housing. It was held that there was 
no nexus between the lawful activities engaged in by the staff and the residential 
26 Waller LJ's linguistic interpretation was favoured over Buxton LJ's purposive approach by Ward LJ in 
Nottingham CC v Thames [2002] EWCA Civ 1098. 
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housing.27 The second consequence is that the Court of Appeal has refused to 
extend protection to owner-occupiers affected by anti-social behaviour living in the 
locality of local authority housing. As we have seen, Enfield prevents landlords 
from seeking an injunction to protect residents in the locality of local authority 
premises. However, in Manchester CC v Lee28 the claimant sought to argue that the 
owner-occupier affected was engaging in lawful activity in the locality. It was held 
by the Court that whilst this was the case, the victim did not have the requisite 
nexus with the residential premises simply as a result of his proximate owner-
occupation. This decision would clearly also extend to victims housed within the 
private rented sector or by registered social landlords in the locality of local 
authority premises.29 
However, in parallel with the development of the crime control function of 
social landlords, the Court of Appeal in later cases clearly wished to move towards 
a more expansive interpretation of the legislation. The Court in Enfield were intent 
on securing a restrictive interpretation of section 152(1)(a) for fear that it would 
extend the legislation beyond the ambit appropriate for a Housing Act. However 
two years later, Ward LJ in Nottingham CC v Thames3o was extremely reluctant to 
follow the ratio of that case. He saw the section 152 injunction as "a remedy 
designed for the council for the good management of their housing estate rather 
than for the protection of a particular tenant of council accommodation" .31 He 
therefore argued that if he had been able to approach the question of nexus afresh, 
he would have imposed a far-reaching test: "was the threatened/ assaulted person 
engaging in some lawful activity in the locality of council housing?" He suggested 
that it would then be open to the discretion of the judge to ensure that the local 
authority had the necessary interest in restraining the conduct in pursuit of the 
good management of the estate. 
27 This conclusion was confirmed by Ward LJ on similar facts in Nottingham CC v Thames [2002] EWCA 
Civ 1098. 
28 [2003] EWCA Civ 1256; [2004] I WLR 349. 
29 See Pill LJ in Manchester CC v Lee [2003] EWCA Civ 1256 at [12]. 
30 [2002] EWCA Civ 1098. 
31 Ibid. at [5]. 
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Similarly, Pill LJ in Manchester City Council v Lee32 explicitly noted the problem 
of anti-social behaviour on estates that the Housing Act 1996 seeks to address, and 
concluded that "I would approach the section and decided cases on the basis that 
too restrictive an interpretation is, if possible, to be avoided" .33 However, he 
concluded in that case that the approach preferred by Ward LJ in Tlzames was 
inappropriately wide, implicitly unwilling simply to rely upon the discretion of the 
judge to resh·ict injunctions to those necessaty for the good management of estates. 
Instead, Pill LJ reaffirmed the requirement of a connection between the anti-social 
conduct and a landlord's residential premises. 
However, once again Parliament has intervened where the Court of Appeal 
has felt unable. The new anti-social behaviour injunction created by the Anti-social 
Behaviour Act 2003 now explicitly protects (a) anyone with a right (of whatever 
description) to reside in or occupy other housing accommodation in the 
neighbourhood of a council or RSL's housing, (b) a person engaged in lawful 
activity in or in the neighbourhood of such housing and (c) a person employed 
(whether or not by the relevant landlord) in connection with the exercise of a 
landlord's housing management fm1ctions. Furthermore, it is irrelevant where the 
conduct actually occurs, although it must still directly or indirectly affect the 
housing management function of the landlord. 
The term "neighbourhood", although sometimes used as a synonym for 
"locality", may well support an even wider spatial area within which a social 
landlord can impose injunctions. Further, within that area the new definition now 
extends protection to both residents of other tenures excluded by Lee and housing 
officers refused protection under Thames. The irrelevancy of the location of the 
anti-social behaviour enables a landlord to respond to an altercation between two 
neighbours that takes place away from their homes. However, there is no explicit 
rejection in the legislation of the Enfield decision that lawful activity in the 
neighbourhood of housing must have a nexus with tl1e landlord's housing stock, 
32 [2003] EWCA Civ 1256. 
33 Ibid. at [24]. 
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and it is possible that such a limitation may be assumed by the Court of Appeal 
again. 
2. Formalization of the crime control function of social landlords 
The legislative developments of the last decade are the consequence of the 
active lobbying of certain social landlords, most notably the larger metropolitan 
councils operating through the SLCNG. Although the last Conservative 
government provided social landlords, or more specifically local housing 
authorities, with legal powers under the Housing Act 1996, it was responding to 
the demands of those landlords who had decided independently to incorporate 
crime control processes into their housing management operations. 
The section 218A duty, it is submitted, reflects a new approach by 
government towards the role of social housing management in controlling anti-
social behaviour. The duty now formally recognises the primary responsibility of 
all social landlords for disorder in the areas within which they operate. By co-
opting the sector as a whole and institutionalizing its policing tasks, the duty 
demands action from those social landlords who have not, as yet, independently 
developed their own crime control processes. Commentators have suggested that 
the development of legal powers for social landlords is evidence of what David 
Garland calls a "responsibilization strategy", whereby organizations beyond the 
formal criminal justice system are drawn by government into crime control 
processes.34 However, in truth, previous legislation merely responded to the 
petitions of self-responsibilized social housing providers. The section 218A duty, 
on the other hand, is perhaps a more fitting example of responsibilization, for it 
entails a proactive move to harness the resources of housing management to meet 
national priorities. It should be noted of course that there has been movement by 
the majority of social landlords away from what Scott and Parkey term a 
"negligible" approach towards the management of anti-social behaviour,35 with 
34 D Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford: OUP, 2001). See, for example, D Cowan and C Pantazinis, 
'Social landlords as crime control' (200 1) 1 0( 4) Social and Legal Studies 435-457. 
35 Scott and Parkey, above n 10. 
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most engaged in at least some level of crime control. However, certain of the 
smaller local authorities and registered social landlords are still failing to take 
action.36 For those reluctant to take on this responsibility as part of their housing 
management function the section 218A duty will no doubt encourage greater 
responsiveness. 
This development arguably illustrates the changing approach of central 
government towards the role of official agencies in the management of 
neighbourhood disorder. In an attempt to relieve itself of the problems of 
vulnerable areas, the Conservative party placed ultimate responsibility for crime 
and disorder upon the residents of affected neighbourhoods.37 Rather than 
providing agencies with legislative powers to respond to anti-social behaviour, it 
sought to appeal to community and 'active citizens' as a solution.38 Consequently it 
blamed residents themselves for their failure to exact informal social control over 
troublemakers. To an extent, the Labour party has adopted the same approach as a 
component of its own policies on civic renewal. Drawing upon the work of Etzioni 
it has argued that every citizen owes responsibilities to govern both themselves 
and their communities.39 
However, in a recent article Flint notes that the government has increasingly 
reduced its reliance upon the ability of vulnerable neighbourhoods to regulate 
themselves.40 Instead, it has transferred responsibility from individual citizens 
back to the "direct role of the state as an 'official' presence in the governance of 
neighbourhood disorder".41 He argues that this is the consequence of an 
acceptance that the neighbourhoods most in need of help are those least able to 
36 C Hunter and J Nixon, Social Landlords' Responses to Neighbour Nuisance and Anti-Social Behaviour: 
From the Negligible to the Holistic?' (200 I) 27(4) Local Government Studies 89-104. The authors posit three 
reasons for this: the absence of formal monitoring of the nature and scale of the problem in their areas; 
difficulties in developing partnerships with other agencies and the obviously interrelated problem of 
insufficient resources. 
37 A Crawford, The Local Governance of Crime ( 1997). 
38 J Flint, 'Social housing agencies and the governance of anti-social behaviour' (2002) Housing Studies 17( 4) 
6 I 9-637. 
39 See, for example, David Blunkett's active civil renewal agenda: D Blunkett, Civil Renewal: a new agenda, 
The CSV Edith Kahn Memorial Lecture, I Ith June 2003. 
40 J Flint, 'Return ofthe Governors: the new governance of neighbourhood disorder in the UK' (2002) 6(3) 
Citizenship Studies 245-264. 
41 Ibid. 
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draw upon the social capital required to exact informal social control upon 
recalcitrant individuals. Thus, its appeals to 'community' and the 'active citizen' 
are replaced by the encouragement of increased intervention by state institutions. 
The recently intensified role of social landlords fits Flint's model. Rather than 
relying predominantly upon the exercise of informal social control by 
communities, the section 218A duty reflects the central importance now placed 
upon official intervention by social landlords, reinforcing their position as Flint's 
formal state" governors". 
3. Registered social landlords as equal partners 
Chapter V of the Housing Act 1996 concentrated attention predominantly 
upon solutions targeting anti-social tenants of local authorities. The legislation 
created an array of policing tools for council landlords to control behaviour. Whilst 
it extended grounds for eviction for nuisance to all social housing providers, it 
granted use of the introductory tenancy regime and the statutory housing 
injunction to local housing authorities alone. There are two potential reasons for 
this early differentiation between council and registered social landlords. First, in 
the mid-1990s, it was still predominantly local authorities at the heart of the 
SLCNG, lobbying for greater powers. Few registered social landlords had yet 
sought to engage in crime control processes. However, a second possibility is that 
in any case the government may well have deemed the extension of policing 
functions to registered social landlords as inappropriate, given their quasi-private 
nahue. 
The section 218A duty, imposed equally upon registered social landlords and 
local housing authorities, reflects the government's appreciation of the exponential 
increase in the growth of the RSL sector, particularly through the transfer of 
council stock under LSVTs. RSLs are an increasing presence in deprived 
neighbourhoods: the early focus upon council housing alone failed to reflect the 
tenure diversification of many estates where RSLs are now major housing 
providers. Furthermore, a number of the larger RSLs are now core members of the 
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SLCNG and have lobbied alongside local housing authorities for greater powers. 
The equal duty has been paralleled by the extension to RSLs of many of the legal 
sanctions previously restricted to local authorities. They now have access to 
demoted tenancies and the new anti-social behaviour injunctions created by the 
Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003. Further, they are able to impose anti-social 
behaviour orders under the Police Reform Act 2002. 
It is worrying that little debate has occurred as to the legitimacy of this parity 
of role between local housing authorities and registered social landlords. This 
development is a pragmatic step; the result of an acceptance that deprived estates 
are increasingly managed either in whole or part by registered social landlords. 
However, this does not of itself justify shared policing responsibilities. The quasi-
private nature of RSLs raises questions about the appropriateness of an extended 
policing function beyond control of the use and occupation of actual housing 
premises. 
Three concerns might be raised about the extended policing function of 
registered social landlords. First, unlike councils, RSLs do not enjoy a democratic 
mandate. They are unelected and therefore, arguably, an illegitimate provider of 
formal crime control. Of course, they are overseen by the Housing Corporation 
which does ensure close regulation of their activities. However, this still does not 
enable direct participation from local residents. Take for instance the duty to 
publish policies and procedures on the management of anti-social behaviour. If a 
council landlord fails to adhere to this document, residents can respond through 
the ballot box. Registered social landlords, on the other hand, are free from such 
scrutiny. 
Second, it is questionable whether organisations operating according to 
corporate principles can be trusted to adhere to principles of social justice to the 
same degree as local authorities. It is true, as we have seen, that local housing 
authorities have found themselves subject to "Best Value" considerations and are 
therefore themselves sensitive to corporate processes. Conversely, many RSLs have 
been established with clear welfarist aims: for example, those providing housing 
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for vulnerable groups. However, other registered social landlords, particularly 
those set up under LSVTs, are arguably concerned solely with the efficient 
provision of social housing, albeit not for profit. Compared to these organisations 
local government still retains an arguably more appropriate welfarist ideology, 
operating according to the needs of the social rather than mere financial 
considerations, although clearly further empirical work would be necessary to 
assess exactly how RSLs diverge from councils in their crime control practices. 
The final concern is that as private sector organisations RSLs continue to 
operate largely outside the bounds of public law and the Human Rights Act. 
Disciplinary and exclusionary crime control necessarily involves serious intrusions 
into the lives of those targeted by legal sanctions, but RSLs are currently able to 
carry out this function free from these basic forms of legal scrutiny. However, it is 
arguable that in fact the crime control function of RSLs should be treated as a 
public function for these purposes. As noted in Chapter 1, it is the 'normal and 
essential' functions of a landlord that are excluded from the ambit of judicial 
review. A public function under section 6 of the HRA has been held by the courts 
as one that is 'enmeshed' with the functions of the state through, in particular, the 
positioning of the body in the shoes of a public authority and the availability and 
use of statutory powers for the purpose of the relevant activity.42 It is submitted 
that under either system crime control through the operation of statutory sanctions 
should be deemed capable of scrutiny by the administrative courts.43 The section 
218A duty itself reinforces this claim. Social landlords are no longer concerned 
merely with housing management, but the broader strategic management of entire 
neighbourhoods in line with national policing policies. 
4. Liability of a social landlord to the victims of anti-social behaviour 
42 See Chapter 1. 
43 See, for instance, the argument of Holbrook and Underwood that the operation of the demoted tenancy 
regime by RSLs should be deemed a public function for the purpose of both judicial review and the HRA: 
Legal Action, October 2004, p 23. 
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During the 1990s Mal Hussain and his wife ran a small shop on the Rylands 
Estate in Lancaster. For years they were subjected to the worst possible kinds of 
racial harassment: the shop was targeted by racists with graffiti, bricks through the 
windows, fire-bombings and other arson attacks, death threats and violent 
assaults, alongside constant verbal abuse. However, whilst a number of the 
perpetrators were eventually prosecuted for a series of minor criminal offences, the 
Hussains were desperate for those who were tenants of the council to be evicted. 
Yet Lancaster City Council, even after considerable pressure from the household, 
failed to take any action for possession of the properties. The experience of the 
Hussains, one that made the national newspapers,44 illustrates that empowering 
social landlords does not automatically ensure the ultimate protection of those 
affected by anti-social behaviour. The legal tools available to them are 
discretionary, and as such they are free to refuse to take action. 
Such a situation is increasingly unlikely to arise, as more and more social 
landlords are responsibilized into engaging in co-ordinated crime control practices. 
As Hunter notes in recent research, although social landlords may differ in their 
approach they have almost all moved from a "minimalist" or "negligible" 
approach to the management of anti-social behaviour.45 In any case, the section 
218A duty will likely increase the political accountability of social landlords to 
residents affected by the bad behaviour of others. Yet political accountability is still 
of limited value to an individual victim. If a council landlord fails to take action 
against a particular perpetrator of anti-social behaviour, the victims of that 
behaviour can turn to the democratic process to press their demands for relief. 
Individual grievances might also lie with complaints to the Housing Corporation, 
Independent Housing Ombudsman or Local Authority Ombudsman which 
provide another layer of regulatory control over the practices of council and RSL 
landlords. However, these are relatively indirect and blunt tools with which to try 
and change local government policies, and there is no certainty that they will lead 
44 
'How racists forced storeholder to shut up shop', The Independent, I 0 August 2004. 
45 Hunter and Nixon, above n 36. 
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to a response in particular circumstances. As such, attention has been drawn to 
possible sources of legal remedy against social landlords. 
(a) Public law 
An individual affected by anti-social behaviour may well be able to pursue a 
remedy against a local housing authority in public law. From the outset, however, 
under current case law this limits the capacity of an affected individual to seek 
relief from a registered social landlord. Bright and Bakalis suggest a number of 
routes by which a victim might potentially be able to enforce a response from a 
council landlord. 46 A victim could seek judicial review of the decision not to act 
based on the general expectations arising from the availability of legal sanctions 
such as eviction and injunctions with which to respond to the problem. Liability 
might also arise from expectations based on specific assurances to the particular 
victim, frustration of which could amount to an abuse of power. 47 It might stem 
further from the statutory duty on local authorities to consider the crime and 
disorder implications of their actions as imposed by section 17 of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, although this is limited by the difficulty in enforcing general 
duties of this kind under administrative law. Finally, Bright and Bakalis argue 
duties could be constructed as a result of the positive obligation of public 
authorities to protect Convention rights, most notably Article 8 (right to respect for 
private life) and, in the most serious cases, Article 2 (right to life).48 
As Bright and Bakalis accept, each of these public law routes is likely to suffer 
from the "balancing exercises and constitutional hazards" inherent in such 
actions.49 On the one hand, a number of procedural hurdles (in particular time 
limits and standing) are imposed on those wishing to bring actions under judicial 
review or the Human Rights Act. Further, an applicant suffers from the "hands-
off" approach to issues of housing policy adopted by the courts in their review 
46 S Bright and C Bakalis, 'Anti-social behaviour: local authority responsibility and the voice of the 
Victim' [2003] 62(2) CLJ 305-334. 
47 See for instance R (Bibi) v Newham LBC [2002] I WLR 237. 
48 Kroon v Netherlands [ 1994] 19 EHRR 263; Botta v Italy [ 1998] 26 EHRR 241. 
49 Bright and Bakalis, above n 46 
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capacity. The High Court is particularly loath to involve itself in too intrusive an 
assessment of decision-making constituting questions of social policy.so Even when 
the review involves questions of human rights breaches, judicial deference to 
executive decision-making in areas of housing policy in particular has been made 
explicit51 and the balancing process inherent in Article 8 is likely to involve 
consideration not only of the victim but of the perpetrators too. As such, the courts 
will be reluctant to interfere. Finally, even if a review is successful the most likely 
outcome is for the court to order a landlord to make the decision again 
compliantly, which on public law grounds will not necessarily result in a response 
to the bad behaviour. 
One recent successful public law challenge is that of Donnelly, Re Application 
for Judicial Review.s2 In that case the Gambles, tenants of the Housing Executive of 
Northern Ireland and known to be associated with terrorist paramilitary activity, 
had engaged in extremely serious intimidation against their neighbours, the 
Donnellys. The Executive, however, failed to apply its own procedures for dealing 
with anti-social behaviour and instead offered to rehouse the victim. The Housing 
Executive gave a number of reasons for doing so, including concerns about the risk 
to the health and safety of its own staff. Applying for a judicial review, it was 
argued that the Housing Executive acted unlawfully and that failure to take action 
was in breach of Article 8 and Article 1, Protocol 1.53 The application was 
dismissed by Weatherup J, who found that the risk to personal safety was not an 
irrelevant consideration. Further there had not been a breach of Article 8 as the 
Executive 'had achieved a fair balance between the appellant's rights and the 
public interest in an effective public housing system'. The infringement of the 
Donnellys' rights under Article 1, Protocol 1 was justified in the same way. The 
decision was also not Wednesbury umeasonable. 
50 R v DPP, ex p Kebifene [2000] 2 AC 326 at 381 per Lord Hope. 
51 Southwark LBC v Tanner [2001] I AC I at 8 per Lord Hoffman. 
52 [2003] NICA 55. 
53 Articles 2, 3 and 6 were held by the judge to not be engaged. This was subsequently confirmed by the Court 
of Appeal. 
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The subsequent appeal was upheld. In its ruling the Court of Appeal agreed 
with Weatherup J that the risk to the personal safety of Housing Executive staff 
was a relevant consideration. However, it held that the Housing Executive had not 
discharged its duty to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the 
victim's rights and that refusing to commence proceedings for possession was in 
breach of Article 8 and Article 1, Protocol 1 of the Convention. Yet the reason for 
this conclusion was not substantive but procedural. It was held that the Executive 
had failed to provide the court with the necessary information from which it could 
reach a conclusion as to its justifications for the breach.54 The court required 
sufficient information to be made available to allow it to judge whether or not a 
decision which interferes with rights is necessary and proportionate. It held finally 
that an appropriate remedy was for the Executive to reconsider its decision in 
compliance with the Convention. 
The decision illustrates the demands that the Human Rights Act 1998 now 
places on public authority landlords to provide adequate evidence to the court as 
to why their decision not to take action against anti-social behaviour by their 
tenants complies with the European Convention. However, the decision does not 
establish judicial review as a particularly valuable route for victims of anti-social 
behaviour. It is still likely that a public landlord that provides the court with such 
information will easily satisfy the demands of both public law and the Convention, 
given the courts' reluctance to interfere in political decision-making. Moreover, it 
should be noted that the ultimate outcome of the challenge for the Donnellys was 
not action to remove the Gambles, but merely an order by the court that the 
Executive should reconsider its original decision. 
(b) Private law 
It is arguable therefore that only when social landlords are held accountable 
to victims in private law for the behaviour of their tenants can individuals like the 
Hussains ensure they are adequately protected. In particular a private law right is 
54 [2003] NICA 55 at [II]. 
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not subject to the cautious, hands-off approach taken by the courts to scrutiny of 
decision-making under administrative law. If established a private law right is also 
specifically enforceable, ensuring that social landlords can be made to remedy the 
problem. However, whilst actions in private law have been actively pursued by 
victims in recent years, this route has ultimately failed to provide them with the 
necessary platform. Most notably, challenges to the failure of a social landlord to 
conh·ol the anti-social behaviour of its tenants through the tort of nuisance have 
failed, given the considerable hurdles a claimant must overcome to establish 
liability. 55 
It is well-established that actions in nuisance are limited by the rule that a 
landlord is only liable for the behaviour of its tenant if he or she has expressly or 
impliedly authorised the behaviour about which the complaint is made. 56 It is clear 
that mere inaction is not enough to establish implicit authorisation. Instead the 
nuisance caused must be an inevitable consequence of the demise of the leasehold 
to its creator. In Smith v Scott57 a household's history of anti-social behaviour prior 
to their rehousing beside the claimants was held not to constitute sufficient 
evidence of an inevitable future nuisance, particularly as such behaviour was 
specifically prohibited by the tenancy agreement. In addition, claimants are 
restricted in their actions by the rule that acts of nuisance must emanate from the 
property itself. In the case of Mr. Hussain, the attacks had taken place instead from 
the public highway.5s In fact, the claimants would have been better off the 
perpetrators had not been tenants of the local authority: the cases of Page Motors59 
and Winch v Mid-Beds6D extend liability to nuisances emanating from trespassers if 
the landowner has knowledge of the behaviour and simply allows it continue. 
55 For analysis seeM Davey, 'Neighbours in law' [2001] Conv 31 and J Morgan, 'Nuisance and the Unmly 
Tenant (200 I) 60(2) CLJ 382. 
56 Smith v Scott [I 973] Ch 314; Hussain v Lancaster City Council [2000] QB I. This position has not changed 
following the Human Rights Act 1998: see Mowan v Wandsworth [2000] EWCA Civ 357. 
57 [1973] Ch 314. 
58 Although arguably given that the local authority controlled these areas under the Highways Act 1980 it was 
an occupier of those parts and thus subject to the "adoption" rule in Sedleigh-Denjield v 0 'Callaghan [1940] 
AC 880: seeD Collins [2002] Lmv Teacher 241. For a general criticism of the "emanation" mle: Morgan 
(2001) 60(2) CLJ382. 
59 Page Moters Ltd v Epsom and Ewell BC ( 1982) 80 LGR 337. 
60 Winch v Mid-Bedfordshire DC [2002] AllER (D) 380. 
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Whilst recent attempts by the victims of anti-social behaviour to force social 
landlords to take action against their tenants on tortious principles have failed, 
Bright and Bakalis have explored other routes by which a local housing authority 
might be made liable in private law to a victim of anti-social behaviour for the 
behaviour of others. Liability could arise, for instance, from expectations arising 
from the landlord-tenant relationship when both the perpetrator and victim are 
occupiers of the landlord's housing. In particular, the authors argue that remedies 
could follow moves by the judiciary towards a more expansive interpretation of 
the duty not to derogate from grant, in the context of assurances contained in 
published policies and procedures published under the 218A duty. 
What is more interesting, however, is that both the government and the Law 
Commission have sought to respond to the difficulties faced by victims wishing to 
hold landlords responsible in law for the anti-social behaviour of their tenants by 
proposing the creation of a statutory duty on social landlords to take action against 
such conduct.61 The government did not set out the exact form that such a duty 
would take. However, the Law Commission suggested that the duty should take 
effect in contract as a mandatory term of a social tenant's tenancy agreement. This 
would specify "that the landlord should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the 
occupier should be able to occupy the home unaffected by anti social behaviour by 
other occupants of other premises owned by the landlord" .62 Damages, and more 
importantly injunctions enforcing the term, could be sought by the victim if a 
landlord failed to respond to the anti-social behaviour of their tenants. 
However, the government ultimately dismissed the possibility of such a duty. 
Instead, it chose an alternative, procedural, duty on social landlords to simply 
publish policies and procedures on the management of anti-social behaviour, 
which subsequently became section 218A of the Housing Act 1996. The Law 
61 DL TR, Tackling Anti-social Tenants (London: HMSO, 2002); Law Com 162, Renting Homes (1)" Status 
andsecurity(London: HMSO, 2001), para 13.33. 
62 Ibid. 
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Commission's proposal has been similarly shelved.63 Lawyers often assume that 
legal rights are the most appropriate way in which to ensure just and efficacious 
solutions to social problems. However, the reluctance of the government to 
provide victims with a legal "voice" through statutory intervention, and its 
preference for the section 218A duty, is a clear indication that the private law 
liability of social landlords, whether founded upon tort, contract or a statutory 
duty, has proved a problematic proposal. 
(c) Accountability of social landlords in private law: an inappropriate remedy? 
An initial criticism of the proposal for a specific statutory duty on social 
landlords put forward by Andrew Ashworth is the doctrinal difficulty with 
vicarious liability in law: "in principle we should each be treated as an 
autonomous human being, responsible for our own conduct but not for the 
conduct of other autonomous beings" .64 It is submitted that this caution towards 
vicarious liability is not particularly persuasive given that social landlords are 
instih1tions not individuals. As such, their autonomy is more justifiably infringed 
for the social good. However, even if one adopts this utilitarian analysis, it is still 
questionable whether imposing liability on social landlords in this way will 
actually result in a desirable overall outcome in an area of such complex social 
policy. 
The governinent's own utilitarian justification for rejecting its proposal for an 
enforceable statutory duty was made explicit in its consultation paper and was 
echoed in the Law Commission's report. It was the desire "to avoid the kind of 
canvassing for legal work which has happened in disrepair claims".65 This distrust 
of the profession permeates other government policies: in particular, with respect 
to immigration appeals.66 There is an implication here too that providing victims 
63 Law Com Rep 284, Renting Homes (2004), para 15.18. 
64 A Ashworth, 'Social control and "anti-social behaviour": the subversion of human rights?' [2004] 120 LQR 
263, 270. 
65 DTLR, Tackling Anti-social Tenants (London: HMSO, 2002). See also Law Com, above 63, paras 15.18 
and 15.19. 
66 See also the recent White Paper on organised crime in which the government asks for views "on how else 
defence tactics simply to frustrate the trial process can most effectively be tackled would be most welcome": 
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with the power to sue a social landlord for its failure to take action to combat anti-
social behaviour will have negative implications for resource allocation. Opening 
up social landlords to the risk of litigation for their failure to comply with the duty 
could channel funds to individual complainants that could be better spent 
elsewhere. 
However, there are two additional issues not mentioned in the government 
assessment of equal importance. First, vicarious liability of social landlords should 
be approached with caution because it will involve the courts in the delicate 
balancing of competing policy issues. In considering whether reasonable steps 
have been taken to bring an end to anti-social behaviour it is not enough simply to 
demand that a social landlord takes legal action against the perpetrator. In Chapter 
5, this thesis examines the criticisms of commentators that the emphasis placed by 
the government upon injunctions, ASBOs and eviction is an inappropriate and 
unsustainable way in which to tackle such conduct. Instead, a more holistic 
approach tackling the causes as well as the symptoms of this behaviour is often 
required. To demand that a court oversee such complex and political decision-
making is inappropriate. The specific statutory duty could even lead to a litigious 
environment around the crime control function of these organisations, resulting 
instead in an increased resort to legal sanctions (particularly eviction) which are 
clearly indicative of "action" as a risk aversion strategy. The Law Commission 
touches on this problem by proposing that its contractual duty would be drafted in 
such a way as to not affect the allocation decision-making of the local authority.67 
The suggestion here is that providing housing to an individual with a history of 
bad behaviour would otherwise be viewed as a breach of the contractual term by 
the courts. 
Secondly, social landlords do not have clear ownership of the control of crime 
and anti-social behaviour carried out by their tenants. In the case of serious 
criminal activity such as that experienced by the Hussains, it seems inappropriate 
Home Office, One Step Ahead (London: HMSO, 2004) Cm 6167. The creation interim ASBO was also 
partially justified as preventing delaying tactics by defence lawyers: see Chapter 4. 
67 Law Com 162, Renting Homes(/). Status and Security (London: HMSO, 2001), para 13.5. 
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to empower a victim to seek relief from a landlord alone when the police clearly 
have a responsibility to take action in response to that behaviour too. Indeed, the 
management of anti-social behaviour increasingly involves co-operation between 
various local agencies.68 Actions against individual landlords will likely impinge 
upon the effective operation of such multi-agency strategies. 
Notably, these utilitarian concerns appear to have informed the decision of 
the Court of Appeal not to extend liability to social landlords for nuisance caused 
by their tenants. In the eyes of Sir Christopher Staughton the decision in Mowan 
was a "deplorable result" and ostensibly the courts in both Hussain and Mowan 
simply felt tied to century-old case law. However, it is arguable that although it 
was possible to extend the law in these case, the Court of Appeal was concerned 
ultimately to ensure local authority immunity on these public policy grounds.69 
Bright argues for instance that the court was indeed concerned to avoid intruding 
upon the difficult decision-making demanded of a social landlord by deciding 
whether a landlord has taken reasonable steps to end a nuisance caused by its 
tenants.7° Moreover, there is a clear appreciation of the complexity of the fight 
against anti-social behaviour in Thorpe LJ's warning that "the wrongs which the 
plaintiffs have suffered must be fought by multi-disciplinary co-operation and not 
by civil suit against one of the relevant agencies" .71 
4. Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that the recently imposed section 218A duty to 
publish policies and procedures on the management of anti-social behaviour 
provides evidence of important changes in the contemporary policing role of social 
landlords. The focus upon anti-social behaviour ties social landlords to tackling a 
potentially vast range of bad behaviour occurring across entire neighbourhoods 
68 Anti-social Behaviour Units are increasingly set up as pa1i of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships 
formed between local authorities and the police rather than housing departments. 
69 For an assessment of the broader approach taken by the Australian and US courts, which emphasises the 
capacity of a landlord to take action to remedy a nuisance rather than its authorisation seeD Collins [2002] 
Law Teacher 241. 
70 S Bright, 'Liability for the Bad Behaviour of Others' (200 I) OJLS 21 (2) 311 at 317. 
71 [1999] 4 AllER 125 at 148. 
57 
within which they operate. Adopting a crime control function is also no longer a 
choice for housing managers: the sector has been formally responsibilized and all 
organisations are expected to engage in control processes. Registered social 
landlords are to be h·eated as equal partners to local housing authorities, reflecting 
the increasingly important role they play in modern housing provision, though 
whether private companies make legitimate policemen is open to question. 
However, importantly the duty stops short of providing the victims of anti-social 
behaviour with an actionable legal remedy against a recalcitrant landlord on clear, 
and understandable, public policy grounds. 
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Part II 
PUBLIC PROTECTION AND HOUSING MANAGEMENT: 
SOME CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS 
Underpinning the new crime control function of social landlords is a new 
rationale: securing for individuals and communities effective protection from 
bad behaviour. Social landlords have been armed accordingly with a raft of 
legal tools with which to effect that protection: increased powers of eviction, 
housing injunctions and the controversial anti-social behaviour order. The 
following chapters take a closer look at the impact that this protectionist 
rationale has had on the structure of these tools, and the extent to which 
competing discourses have tempered that overriding objective. 
Chapter 4 highlights the success of protectionist arguments in persuading 
government to reduce the due process rights of defendants. Concerns raised by 
social landlords about delay and uncertainty of outcome in legal proceedings, 
and the problem of witness intimidation, have had a huge impact on recent 
reforms. The chapter looks at two in effects in particular: the replacement of 
juridified security of tenure for social tenants with a form of internal 
administrative review, and the creation of the "hybrid" anti-social behaviour 
order. In each case it examines the effect of (predominantly unsuccessful) 
challenges to these developments in the courts, most notably under Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 then focus upon the conflict between the protection of 
the public through punitive sanctions and the welfare needs of often extremely 
vulnerable perpetrators. Chapter 5 focuses upon the political criticisms of this 
approach. It notes the concern of commentators that the use of disciplinary and 
exclusionary legal sanctions by social landlords can provide only limited 
protection for communities, whilst exacerbating the social exclusion already 
experienced by targeted individuals. It then assesses the extent to which 
government and social landlords have begun to develop a more holistic 
approach to the problem of neighbourhood disorder, focusing upon support 
not punishment. 
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Chapters 6 and 7 go on to explore whether and to what extent the 
operation of the legal tools available to social landlords to protect the public 
have been tempered by welfarist legal discourse. Chapter 6 looks at the 
development of the legal tools themselves. It notes in particular that the concept 
of reasonableness in possession proceedings under the assured and secure 
tenancy regimes has been reconstructed by the Court of Appeal in line with 
protectionist objectives to prevent consideration of the welfare of the defendant 
or his household. Chapter 7 then examines the interface between these tools and 
other welfarist legislation. It explores the unexpected impact of the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 on legal proceedings by landlords against the mentally 
ill, and the use of various manifestations of the welfare principle to protect child 
perpetrators in ASBO proceedings. 
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Chapter 4 
DISPENSING WITH DUE PROCESS: PROBLEMATIZING COURT 
PROCEDURES 
There is a perception amongst social landlords that court procedures weaken 
their efforts to protect the public from anti-social behaviour. Two interrelated 
strands of criticism have emerged: first, that the trial process provides insufficient 
speed and certainty of relief for the community; and second, that it has been 
undermined by the intimidation of witnesses. Recent legislative initiatives have 
consequently sought to "re-align" the legal system in favour of the interests of 
victims of anti-social behaviour (and thus the landlords seeking to protect them). 
This has occurred, however, at the expense of the procedural rights of defendants, 
who have become increasingly passive participants in legal proceedings. 
This chapter looks more closely at two particularly controversial 
consequences of this problematization. First, it notes the reduction in due process 
rights of council tenants in possession proceedings through the expansion of 
internal review processes in the place of traditional, juridified forms of security of 
tenure. Second, it assesses the constitutional implications of the "hybrid" anti-
social behaviour order, with its pragmatic manipulation of the civil-criminal 
distinction. In both cases, the chapter focuses upon recent challenges to this legal 
infrash·ucture under Article 6 of the European Convention, which has been 
invoked to counter these developments and reinstate the procedural rights of 
defendants, with varying degrees of success. 
1. Perceptions of social landlords: delay, uncertainty and witness 
intimidation 
The criminal justice system involves constant negotiation between the 
competing discourses of crime control and due process.l Whilst the system is the 
cornerstone of formal state-sponsored social control in western liberal 
1 H Packer, The Limits qfthe Criminal Sanction ( 1969). 
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democracies, this function has been tempered by the development of procedural 
rights for defendants, reflecting historical, constitutional concerns about the 
potential of the state to exercise oppressive power over the citizemy. One 
manifestation of the politics of security, and concomitant demands for measures to 
ensure greater public protection, is increased incursion into these rights. This is 
perhaps most noticeable in the current reaction to the threat of international 
terrorism. However, it extends also to general criminal activity. The current 
government's policies on crime and disorder have focused upon ensuring more 
guilty defendants are punished through the reduction in their due process rights. 
As it states in its recent White Paper Justice for All: "our programme of reform is 
guided by a single clear priority: to rebalance the criminal justice system in favour 
of the victims and the community so as to reduce crime and bring more offenders 
to justice" .2 
Whilst the policing function of social housing management operates outside 
the formal criminal justice system, it also reflects a move towards reduced due 
process rights for defendants in pursuit of more effective protection from anti-
social behaviour. Many social landlords, particularly those lobbying from within 
the SLCNG, have consistently complained to the government that their ability to 
effectively protect residents is frustrated by three aspects of the court process. 
First, they have experienced delays in the application for legal remedies. 
Eviction, injunctions and ASBOs are employed in response to persistent anti-social 
conduct rather than single, isolated acts of bad behaviour: social landlords are 
concerned not with past offences but with on-going courses of conduct. They 
therefore engage with the court processes that regulate the use of these sanctions 
against a backdrop of continuing problem activity and as such the speed with 
which a court deals with an application for relief is brought into sharp focus. 
2 Home Office, Justice For All (London: HMSO, 2002). See the critique of Ashworth ('Criminal Justice 
Reform: Principles, Human Rights and Public Protection' [2004] Criminal Law Review 516) who argues that 
the government has problematized the wrong issue. Rather than seeing due process as the problem it should 
focus upon increasing the extremely low detection rates of the police. 
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Second, social landlords are also concerned at the uncertainty of outcome of 
applications. As we have seen, the law regulating possession of secure and assured 
tenancies and applications for anti-social behaviour orders and injunctions 
provides the courts with a broad discretion.3 Landlords argue that judges have 
failed to appreciate the seriousness of the problem of anti-social behaviour and too 
often use this discretion to refuse applications for relief. They suggest that failure 
to secure a particular sanction enables persistent conduct to continue unabated, 
fails to protect those affected and suggests to the perpetrator that he or she can 
continue to behave badly with impunity. However, failure is presented as having 
further, far-reaching consequences. It can also have a systemic impact, as victims 
and witnesses become disillusioned with the inability of social landlords to 
successfully negotiate the court process and thus refuse to participate in future 
applications. The message to both the landlord and the community is that the 
courts are unwilling to help in resolving these problems. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, landlords are worried that the court 
processes fail to support vulnerable witnesses. The government has taken the issue 
extremely seriously with respect to the mainstream criminal justice system. 4 The 
problem has been particularly associated, however, with the forms of crime and 
disorder brought within the rubric of anti-social behaviour.s Such conduct is 
usually engaged in by members of the same neighbourhood as the victims,6 and 
consequently the parties are far more likely to know each other. Recent research 
shows that in just under half of ASBO cases perpetrators have used threats, and in 
over a third actual intimidation against witnesses.? Witness intimidation operates 
3 The "reasonableness" requirement under the nuisance grounds for eviction; the "necessity" component of 
the anti-social behaviour order; and the residual discretion afforded to the court on applications for an anti-
social behaviour injunction. 
4 Home Office, Witness Intimidation.· Strategies for Prevention (London: HMSO, 1997); CPS, No witness-
no justice. towards a national strategy for witnesses (London: HMSO, 2003); Audit Commission, Victims 
and Witnesses- providing better support (London: HMSO, 2003). 
5 1 Nixon and C Hunter, 'Taking a stand against anti-social behaviour? No, not in these shoes' Housing 
Studies Association Conference, Spring 2004. 
6 Indeed, they are often neighbours. 
7 S Campbell, A review of anti-social behaviour orders: Home Office Research Study No. 236 (London: 
HMSO, 2002). See also 1 Nixon et al, The use of legal remedies by social landlords to deal with neighbour 
nuisance. CRESR Paper H8 (Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam University, 1999). 
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both outside and inside the courtroom. Outside, it can be exacerbated by delay and 
the prospect of a failed application for legal relief, which place pressure on 
landlords trying to support vulnerable witnesses. Inside, the prospect of having to 
give evidence before a perpetrator can be too much for many witnesses who may 
ultimately refuse to participate in proceedings. 
The tripartite problem of delay, uncertainty and witness intimidation, and the 
threat it poses to effective protection of communities from anti-social behaviour, 
has had important consequences for the development of the law. Whilst we shall 
see that empirical research has tended to refute much of the anecdotal evidence of 
lobbying social landlords, the government has actively engaged with these issues 
in its policy-making. The following sections look at two of these policies in 
particular. The first is the increasing use made of internal review procedures under 
the introductory and demoted tenancy regimes to replace the broad judicial 
scrutiny employed by the 1985 and 1988 Housing Acts. The second is the creation 
of the "hybrid" anti-social behaviour order, with its controversial use of civil 
proceedings on application with criminal sanctions on breach, and the recent 
development of the interim ASBO. 
2. Possession proceedings and internal review 
Over the years a number of relatively uncontroversial procedural reforms 
have helped to ensure that possession proceedings provide more effective 
protection for the victims of anti-social behaviour. First, the government has 
increased the speed with which claims for possession for anti-social behaviour 
reach the courts.s Under the assured and secure regimes, a social tenant must 
generally be given a minimum of two weeks' notice of the bringing of proceedings 
for possession. 9 Chapter V of the Housing Act 1996, however, has amended the 
Acts to allow expedited notice for possession under the nuisance grounds. 
Although a landlord must still serve notice on a tenant it no longer requires a 
8 See DTLR et al, Getting the best out of the court system: information for local authorities and other social 
landlords (London: HMSO, 2002). 
9 HA 1988, s 8; HA 1985, s 83. 
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notice period before the issuing of possession proceedings. More recently, the 
current government has also modified the Civil Procedure Rules to enable 
accelerated applications for possession in cases involving threats to person or 
property.10 
Attempts have been made also to increase the certainty of outcome of 
possession proceedings. The Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 now makes it a 
statutory requirement for judges to take into account the effect of anti-social 
behaviour on victims when considering the reasonableness of possession of an 
assured or secure tenancy.11 In deciding whether to order possession a court must 
now consider in particular the effect that the nuisance or annoyance has had on 
persons other than tl1e person against whom the order is sought; any continuing 
effect the nuisance or annoyance is likely to have on such persons; and the effect 
that the nuisance or annoyance would be likely to have on such persons if the 
conduct is repeated. 
Measures have also improved tl1e protection of vulnerable witnesses. Since 
1994 it has been a criminal offence to intimidate witnesses in criminal 
proceedings.12 However, the development of an increasing array of new civil 
sanctions led the government to extend this offence to civil proceedings also.13 
Further, a now well-established characteristic of the sanctions employed by social 
landlords is the right to use professional witnesses such as housing or police 
officers in court proceedings. The nuisance ground under the assured or secure 
tenancies includes behaviour "likely to cause a nuisance or annoyance". 
Accordingly, evidence can be presented by those not actually affected by the 
conduct, allowing vulnerable witnesses to avoid appearing in court altogether.14 
The primary focus of this section, however, is upon a far more controversial 
incursion upon the due process rights of social tenants. Increasingly households 
have found themselves occupying their home under statutory tenancies providing 
10 Part 55, introduced in October 2001. 
II HA 1988, s 9A; HA 1985, s 85A. 
12 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 51 
13 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, ss 39 and 40. 
14 Of course, the upshot ofthe definition is that there need not actually be a victim at all. 
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minimal security of tenure. As set out in Chapter 2, since 1996 the introductory 
tenancy regime has enabled local housing authorities to restrict temporarily the 
security enjoyed by social tenants under the Housing Act 1985. A court must grant 
a possession order of an introductory tenancy to a claimant landlord if he has 
complied with the necessary notice requirements. The only protection afforded to 
the tenant is the right to seek an internal review of the original decision carried out 
by a senior employee of the authority. The current government has extended use of 
the introductory tenancy procedure. It has created the demoted tenancy enabling 
temporary reduction to this level of security at any point during the life of a secure 
tenancy at the discretion of the court. Further, the current Housing Bill provides 
for an administrative procedure by which a landlord can extend an introductory 
tenancy for a further period of six months. 
There is nothing new in the use of internal administrative review rather than 
independent judicial scrutiny of executive decision-making in housing 
management: for instance it regulates local authority decision-making with respect 
to homelessness applications.15 What is noticeable, however, is the extent to which 
it has become a key part of policies on anti-social behaviour. The nature of the 
introductory and demoted tenancies is explicitly a response to the particular 
concerns voiced by social landlords about the effect of delay, uncertainty and 
witness intimidation on effective public protection. As the Conservative 
government made clear when presenting its proposals for the introductory 
tenancy: 
"the way in which the courts work results in difficulties in following through 
possession cases quickly because of delays in getting the cases before the 
court; inconsistency over what is regarded as acceptable evidence, wib1ess 
intimidation exacerbated by delays in court hearings, and what authorities 
see as their difficulty in convincing the courts of the serious nature of the 
nuisance caused by the tenant."l6 
15 HA 1996, ss 202-204. 
16 DoE, Anti-Social Behaviour on Housing Estates: Consultation Paper on Probationmy Tenancies (London, 
HMSO, 1995). 
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In effect, the absence of a full judicial hearing on the merits of the case (i.e. the 
establishment of the necessary ground for eviction and whether it is "reasonable" 
to order possession) enables social landlords to take greater control over the pace 
of proceedings, ensures the success of an application to the court and prevents the 
need for witnesses to appear in court. 
(a) Public protection vs. public law 
Whilst satisfying the dominant discourse of public protection the internal 
review process has worrying implications for the rights of social tenants. For those 
occupiers faced with the prospect of summary eviction the loss of recourse to an 
independent tribunal is of clear concern.17 It was therefore predictable that 
challenges would be brought by defendants against the system. Two important 
cases decided before the Court of Appeal sought to raise public law and human 
rights defences in possession proceedings under an introductory tenancy on the 
grounds that the internal review had not been carried out appropriately. As a 
result of these challenges, the Court of Appeal has modified the structure of the 
scheme in such a way as to partially defeat its protectionist objective. 
(i) The Cochrane procedure 
The first challenge, on general public law principles, occurred in 1999 in the 
case of Manchester City Council v Cochrane.18 The claimant council sought 
possession of a home let under an introductory tenancy. The defendant tenant had 
appealed against the original decision to evict and, following an internal review, 
the council reaffirmed its intention to retrieve the property. In the county court, the 
defendant sought to defend the action on public law grounds, following the 
decision in Wandsworth BC v Winder.19 He argued that the council had failed to 
comply with the procedures set out in the Introductory Tenants (Review) 
17 The socio-Jegal issues arising from internal review are considered further, below. 
18 [I 999] L&TR I 90. 
19 [1985]AC461. 
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Regulations 1997 and, further, that the conduct of the review failed to satisfy the 
requirements of natural justice. 
At first instance the district judge held that the county court had the 
jurisdiction to entertain a public law defence to the proceedings. The Court of 
Appeal however refuted the claim. Sir John Knox, providing the main judgment, 
accepted that the conduct of the internal review was clearly subject to scrutiny 
under public law. However, he provided two reasons why a finding of illegality 
could not, as a matter of law, be used as a private law defence. First, the structure 
of the introductory tenancy regime provides the county court with absolutely no 
discretion to refuse possession in such circumstances. The illegality of an internal 
review on public law principles does not affect the right of the landlord to 
possession. Provided that the council has complied with the notice requirements 
set out in section 128, section 127(2) of the 1996 Act makes possession mandatory. 
Secondly, the judge noted that the Housing Act 1996 had not provided the county 
court with the necessary jurisdiction to entertain judicial review,2o whilst by virtue 
of section 38(3) of the County Court Act 1981 the county court did not have 
residual jurisdiction to enter into judicial review. Sir Jolm Knox was additionally 
concerned by the policy implications of such an outcome. Even if the county court 
had jurisdiction he noted that a finding of illegality in such circumstances would 
force the court to decide the proceedings in favour of the tenant, potentially 
resulting, perversely, in his conversion to a secure tenant before the claimant could 
bring a further action. 
However, rather than dismissing the application outright, the judge forged a 
compromise. He held that if the county court is satisfied that a tenant has a real 
chance of obtaining leave to bring proceedings for judicial review of the internal 
review, it can temporarily adjourn possession proceedings pending an application 
to the High Court. In this way the original possession claim remains 
undetermined, preventing conversion to a secure tenancy in the interim. 
2° Cf the jurisdiction provided under Chapter VII of the HA 1996 with respect to appeals of homelessness 
applications. 
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Critically, both Sir John Knox and Judge LJ complained in the final paragraphs of 
the decision that they had been forced to resort to judicial review as a scrutinising 
mechanism due to poor legislative design. They pointed out that under Part VII of 
the Housing Act 1996 dealing with homelessness decision-making, the county 
court had been provided by statute with the necessary jurisdiction to entertain 
public law challenges to administrative decision-making. However, this was not 
the case with respect to the introductory tenancy. As Sir John Knox concluded: 
"I am unpersuaded that proceedings by way of judicial review coupled with a 
stay of county court proceedings for possession could properly be regarded as 
anything other than a slow and cumbersome process. Indeed it is to my mind 
regrettable that Parliament should have given only such minimal powers to 
the county court by section 138(1) of the Act, when read with section 127(2), 
but for the reasons which I have given that does appear to be the clear effect 
of those provisions. This sits ill with the tendency evinced by Part VII of the 
Act to confer upon the county court powers wide enough to enable it to deal 
with public law defences in cmmection with proceedings under the Housing 
Acts. It would of course be necessary to confer the necessary flexibility to 
avoid introductory tenancies becoming secure tenancies where such a result 
was undesirable. These are however matters with which the legislature will, if 
it thinks fit, no doubt deal."21 
It is submitted that neither landlords nor tenants really benefited from the 
decision in Cochrane. On the one hand it had the potential to undermine the 
objective of speed sought by the framers of the introductory tenancy. Given that 
the purpose of the regime is the swift and certain eviction of nuisance tenants, the 
"slow and cumbersome" judicial review process, if entered into by a defendant, 
will clearly delay eviction. However, on the other hand the adjournment procedure 
ensured only weak protection for tenants from abuse of the internal appeals 
process. Unlike a private law defence, permission must be granted by the court 
under Order 53, and in any case an application for judicial review, even if granted, 
is also a difficult and expensive route for a defendant to take. Furthermore, even if 
the internal review was subsequently found to be illegal it would be open to the 
council to simply repeat the process compliantly. The court would then be obliged 
21 [1999] L&TR 190 at 204. 
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to issue a possession order under the original, adjourned proceedings. On balance 
then, at least at this stage in the judicial development of the introductory tenancy 
regime, it was defendants to possession proceedings who still found themselves in 
the weaker position given the considerable procedural hurdles they would have to 
surmount to exercise their limited public law rights. 
(ii) Compatibility with Article 6: the decision in McLellan 
Soon after the compromise reached in Cochrane, the introductory tenancy was 
once again challenged, this time under the Human Rights Act 1998. In R (on the 
application of McLellan) v Bracknell Forest Borough Council22 the system was attacked 
on two grounds. First, it was argued that (in the words of Waller LJ, at the "macro" 
level) the statutory system was incompatible with Article 8. However secondly it 
was contended that as the granting of a possession order constituted the 
determination of a tenant's civil rights and obligations, he was owed a fair trial and 
that the internal appeals process, coupled with the Cochrane procedure, did not 
amount to a satisfactory system for this purpose. In particular, it did not provide 
adequate protection at the "micro" level for an individual tenant's Article 8 rights. 
Waller LJ concluded, nonetheless, that in both cases the introductory tenancy 
regime was compatible with the European Convention. 
At the "macro" level, Waller LJ pointed out that the jurisprudence of the 
European Court provided Parliament with a broad margin of appreciation when 
consb·ucting legislation implementing social policy initiatives.23 With this in mind, 
he concluded that whilst the introductory tenancy regime triggered Article 824 it 
was necessary and proportionate given the interest of both council tenants and 
their landlords in effectively tackling anti-social behaviour. In particular, the 
scheme contained a number of important safeguards for the tenant as part of the 
internal review. A landlord must give reasons for seeking the termination of the 
tenancy, whilst the tenant can make oral or written representations, call witnesses, 
22 [200 I] EWCA Civ 1510. Note also further refinements post-McLellan in Forbes v Lambeth LBC [2003] 
EWHC 222 and Cardiff City Council v Stone [2002] EWCA Civ 298. 
23 See Donoghue v Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd [200 I] EWCA Civ 595. 
24 Lambeth London Borough Council v Howard (200 I) 33 HLR 58. 
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seek legal representation and cross-examine any person giving evidence for the 
landlord. If the local authority landlord decides after the review to pursue the 
termination, it must again provide reasons. 
Waller LJ assessed the second part of the challenge; the "micro" level, against 
the legal backdrop of the decision of the House of Lords in Alconbury.2s This 
important case concerned the compatibility of Article 6 with an administrative 
power by which the Secretary of State, who was clearly not an independent and 
impartial tribunal, determined the defendant's civil rights and obligations under 
planning law. Waller LJ held that Article 6 was indeed engaged as a landlord's 
decision to seek possession of an introductory tenancy constituted a determination 
of a tenant's civil rights and obligations. However, drawing on European 
jurisprudence, notably Albert and LeCompte v Belgium,26 Waller LJ held that even if 
the administrative decision does not satisfy the requirements of Article 6, it might 
be compatible in aggregate if recourse is available to a judicial body with "full 
jurisdiction"; not full decision-making power, but a degree of scrutiny necessary 
"to deal with the case as the nature of the decision requires" .27 In Alconbury, 
judicial review was found to constitute full jurisdiction. Waller LJ concluded that 
although the introductory tenancy system did involve a determination under 
Article 6, it was compatible overall with the Alconbury standard given the 
availability of the Cochrane procedure by which a tenant could seek judicial review 
of the landlord's decision to evict. 
Central to this conclusion was the fact that the appeal did not involve 
disputes over primary facts.28 As such, a more intensive form of scrutiny was 
deemed unnecessary. In order to satisfy this requirement, Waller LJ finally 
reconfigured the objectives of the internal review as follows: 
25 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and Regions, ex p Alconbury Developments 
Limited and conjoined appeals [200 I] UKHL 23. For further developments with regard to compliance of 
Article 6 with homelessness applications under the 1996 Act see Begum (Runa) v Tower Hamlets LBC [2003] 
UKHL 5. 
26 (1983) 5 EHRR 533. 
27 McLellan [2001] EWCA Civ 1510 at [87]. 
28 B1yan v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 342. 
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"If the council in providing reasons alleges acts constituting nuisance, and if 
the allegations themselves are disputed that at first sight seems to raise issues 
of fact. But under the introductory tenancy scheme it is not a requirement that 
the council should be satisfied that breaches of the tenancy agreement have in 
fact taken place. The right question under the scheme will be whether in the 
context of allegation and counter-allegation it was reasonable for the council 
to take a decision to proceed with termination of the introductory tenancy. 
That is again a matter which can be dealt with under judicial review either of 
the traditional kind or if it is necessary so to do intensified so as to ensure that 
the tenant1s rights are protected."29 
As explained here, the substantive judicial review demanded by Article 6 was to be 
of a more intensive degree than that available under traditional public law. In 
addition to review on Wednesbury grounds, Waller LJ held that scrutiny should 
extend to assessment of the compliance at the "micro" level of the decision with a 
tenant's Article 8 rights with which any decision of a public authority to seek 
possession of a residential property will interfere.30 He advocated, in line with 
Lord Slynn in Alconbury,31 the incorporation of the principle of proportionality into 
the judicial review process.32 He emphasised, however, that this did not amount to 
a reassessment of the merits of the original decision. Finally, this assessment of a 
tenant's Article 8 rights by the county court did not depend upon the tenant 
having sought an internal review of the original decision, although this fact might 
be relevant to any assessment. 
In summary, under the Cochrane/ McLellan procedure the county court may 
now adjourn proceedings for the possession of an introductory tenancy to enable a 
tenant to seek relief in public law before the High Court. Two forms of relief are 
29 McLellan [2001] EWCA Civ 1510 at [97]. 
30 Lambeth London Borough Council v Howard (2001) 33 HLR 58. The recent decision of the House of Lords 
in Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004) 1 AC 983 has limited the capacity of a court to refuse a possession order on 
Article 8 grounds when a tenant has no contractual or proprietary interest in his or her home. However, it is 
submitted that this does not overrule the decision in McLellan as the decision itself of a local authority to evict 
an introductory tenant is still subject to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and adjournment of 
possession proceedings for judicial review does not provide a defence to those proceedings. What it does 
seem to overrule however is Waller LJ's assumption ([2001) EWCA Civ 1510 at [ 42]) that even if the 
landlord was not a public body (for example a registered social landlord) the court as a public body would 
have to consider the compliance of a possession order with Article 8(2): see [2004) I AC 983, paras 142-144 
per Lord Scott. 
31 [2001) UKHL 23 at [51]. 
32 See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Daly [200 I] UKHL 26. 
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available. First, the tenant may challenge the operation of the internal review of the 
original decision to seek possession on general public law grounds of illegality or 
impropriety. Second, the tenant may challenge not only the operation of the 
internal review but the decision of the council landlord to seek possession as 
contravening his Article 8 rights. The court itself can also instigate this human 
rights review of its own accord. Given the potential interference with a 
fundamental right, the standard of review is that of intensified, sub-Wednesbury 
reasonableness, or 'anxious scrutiny' .33 Although this standard does not involve a 
full merits-based assessment by the High Court, it still provides a broader platform 
for the county court to process substantive challenges to a particular application 
for possession; a concern which was made explicit by counsel for the local 
authority.34 The McLellan decision has therefore increased to some (unpredictable) 
degree the possibility that the county court may grant a defendant tenant access to 
the Cochrane procedure, with inevitable consequences for effective public 
protection. It is probable that in most cases challenges will be ultimately 
unsuccessful, given the "hands off" approach taken by the courts even in cases 
involving fundamental human rights. Yet even if this is the case, the delay 
inevitable in an application to the High Court will ensure prolonged suffering for 
the community affected by the particular anti-social behaviour. 
However, the law has not stood still. Following the decisions of the Court of 
Appeal, there is evidence that the internal review process is undergoing a process 
of redesign as lawyers attempt to restructure it in such a way as to reduce the risk 
of lengthy review processes undermining the effective protection of affected 
communities, whilst ensuring compatibility with both public and human rights 
law. 
(iii) The structure of the demoted tenancy 
The first of these developments can be identified on closer analysis of the new 
demoted tenancy regime. Nominally local housing authorities must follow an 
33 R (Sivasubramaniam) v Wandsworth County Court [2002] EWCA Civ 1738 at [52]. 
34 McLellan [200 1] EWCA Civ 1510 at [36]. 
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identical process for evicting demoted tenants as they do when evicting 
introductory tenants. They must comply with statutory notice requirements under 
section 143E and carry out a review of the original decision on request. As such 
one might presume that the Cochrane/ McLellan procedure applies in full to such 
possession proceedings. However, section 143D has made an important 
amendment to the structure. Whereas under the introductory tenancy a possession 
order must be granted by the court if the notice requirements have been complied 
with, section 143D provides that it must also be satisfied that the appropriate 
review procedures have been complied with. The effect of this provision is to 
enable a tenant to rely on evidence of failure to follow the review procedure set out 
in the 2004 Regulations as a private law defence, rather than through the Cochrane 
procedure. 
This modification is to be welcomed. The majority of public law challenges 
are likely to be procedural rather than substantive. They are also far simpler for a 
court to adjudicate upon, involving an objective assessment of the steps taken by 
the landlord prior to the possession proceedings. Keeping them in the county court 
will therefore ensure they are dealt with speedily and efficiently. However, the 
government has not yet gone as far as to provide county courts with jurisdiction to 
entertain all judicial review questions relating to the decision-making of the 
landlord, including potential infringements of human rights. Public law issues 
other than a failure to comply with the procedures must still follow the Cochrane 
route. Furthermore, human rights challenges to the original decision must also 
operate through application to the High Court. The decision to retain the 
Cochrane/ McLellan procedure here seems quite rational, however, from a 
protectionist perspective. A private law defence in the county court is a right 
exercisable without the need for prior judicial permission. The government clearly 
hopes to avoid a raft of drawn-out substantive challenges being brought in the 
county court, particularly on the broader Article 8 grounds, by ensuring 
applications in the High Court are subject to the discretion of the trial judge. 
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(iv) The proposals of the Law Commission 
In its consultation paper the Law Commission put forward its own rather 
radical proposals for a probationary-style tenancy to replace the introductory and 
demoted tenancies. Impliedly responding to the concerns of the Court of Appeal in 
Cochrane, and the further difficulties arising after McLellan, the Law Commission 
noted the inadequacy of the modified introductory tenancy procedures. It thus 
proposed two alternatives to the current system which it hoped would redress the 
failings of the introductory tenancy regime whilst satisfying the requirements of 
Article 6. It should be noted that following the consultation period the Commission 
decided to drop the proposals for summary eviction, citing the increased 
bureaucracy they would create and the fear of some respondents that they were a 
disproportionate response to the problem of anti-social behaviour.35 However, the 
plans still provide an interesting example of legal problem-solving. 
Option A for the new tenancy requires only that the social landlord comply 
with relevant notice requirements, once again removing the county court's 
discretion to refuse a possession order. Only after eviction has actually taken place 
can the occupier apply to the court to have the decision reviewed. However, the 
jurisdiction of the court here extends beyond judicial review. It enables an 
assessment of the reasonableness of the eviction, as under the assured and secure 
tenancy regimes, and as such provides the opportunity for a merits- based 
scrutiny by the courts; including the balancing of human rights considerations.36 
Option B on the other hand demands that a social landlord first carries out an 
internal administrative review of the decision as demanded by the current system. 
Once this condition has been satisfied the county court will again be obliged to 
order possession. Following eviction, however, the court will be limited to judicial 
review of the decision to evict. In both cases, if the decision is found to be 
unreasonable under Option A or illegal under Option B, rehousing and/ or 
damages could be awarded. 
35 Law Com Rep 284, Renting Homes (London: HMSO, 2004), para 15.3. 
36 Lambeth London Borough Council v Howard (200 I) 33 HLR 58. 
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Both Option A and Option B share one important characteristic: unlike the 
introductory tenancy judicial scrutiny of the landlord's decision-making only 
occurs after possession has been granted. Thus speed and certainty of action 
against a recalcitrant tenant is ensured. Furthermore, scrutiny of the administrative 
process is the responsibility of the county court not the High Court, ensuring that 
when public law challenges are made they can be dealt with during the same 
proceedings. However, the difference between the two approaches lies in the 
balance sh·uck between administrative and judicial processes in order to comply 
with the Alconbun; balancing-act. In each case the extent of the appellate 
jurisdiction of the court reflects the concomitant degree of administrative scrutiny. 
Under Option A there is no internal review and therefore the county court must 
engage in a full merits-based assessment following eviction. Under Option B, 
however, the internal review is counterbalanced by a weaker judicial review 
procedure. 
In truth, Option A appears of little practical benefit to either landlord or 
tenant. The uncertainty inherent in a merits-based review would likely make the 
risk of future compensation or rehousing too great- better to have the decision to 
evict verified before proceeding with eviction. On the other hand, it is arguable 
that the courts may be more disinclined to find a decision unreasonable ex post 
facto. Option B relies on the internal review procedure to balance the weaker 
scrutiny of judicial review to comply with Article 6 in much the same way as the 
introductory tenancy in McLellan. However, the review process takes place after the 
mandatory eviction of the household, ensuring the absence of any delays in 
securing a possession order from the court. Consequently there is far less risk 
involved for a social landlord of a finding of subsequent illegality. 
(b) The end of security of tenure? 
The creation of the demoted tenancy for council landlords, and the proposed 
reform of the introductory tenancy to allow an extension of the tenancy by up to 
six months, illustrates the increasing reliance upon introductory tenancy-type 
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procedures rather than the intensive judicial scrutiny provided for by the Housing 
Acts. This is the consequence of the perceived need of social landlords for greater 
speed and certainty of relief and improved witness protection. As we have seen, 
the interface between public law rights, particularly human rights, and the internal 
review process, have threatened to undermine the efficacy of this legislative 
structure in ensuring public protection by increasing delay and uncertainty of 
outcome. However, changes to the demoted tenancy and the proposals of the Law 
Commission will likely "design out" this problem. 
The increasing use made of the internal review process raises a question of 
real importance: where will these developments end? Worryingly, there are 
indications that the government is heading towards a controversial conclusion: the 
removal of social tenants' traditional security of tenure entirely as a drastic but 
necessary solution to the "crisis" of anti-social behaviour. The evidence can be 
found in the consultation paper Tackling Anti-social Tenants. Although ultimately 
the consultation led to the creation of the demoted tenancy regime, another 
proposal was posited first in the paper. That proposal was the ability of social 
landlords to apply an introductory tenancy (or starter tenancy) regime to all secure 
or assured tenancies on a permanent basis.37 This proposal brings into stark relief the 
impact that the overwhelming public protection imperatives of Labour's crime and 
disorder policies may ultimately have on housing law. The government's 
prioritisation of crime control could pave the way for a return to the politico-
administrative regulation enjoyed by local housing authorities prior to 1980, 
through the substantial deregulation of social housing tenure. 
In an article written soon after the enactment of the Housing Act 1996 the 
introductory tenancy was presented by Smith and George as part of a "hidden 
agenda" by the then Conservative government to remove security of tenure for 
social tenants through sleight of hand.38 In doing so it sought, first, to make local 
authority housing less atb·active to prospective tenants and, second, in the long 
37 DTLR, Tackling anti-social tenants (London: HMSO, 2002) p 14. This would apply to anti-social 
behaviour alone, rather than both anti-social behaviour and rent arrears. 
38 N Smith and C George, 'Introductory tenancies: a nuisance too far?' ( 1997) 19(3) JSWFL 307. 
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term to deregulate local authority housing provision entirely. In reality, the 
argument is extremely far-fetched. The first objective is counter-intuitive, as the 
ultimate objective of introductory tenancies was a reduction in anti-social 
behaviour around council housing to make council housing more, not less, 
attractive to tenants. Further, the sleight of hand envisaged by the authors whereby 
introductory tenancies were the thin end of the wedge of deliberate deregulation is 
also weak given that it is but one of a series of mechanisms; housing injunctions 
and extended grounds for eviction, which were concerned directly with the 
problems of crime and disorder. 
However, it is now apparent that security of tenure is indeed at risk, not 
through a desire of government to destroy social housing but in order to effectively 
protect its occupants. Arguably, if you were to ask those residents of council 
estates affected by serious anti-social behaviour if they would forgo their own 
security of tenure to ensure the effective eviction of those causing serious harm to 
their communities, one might imagine many agreeing to such a solution. With 
respect to the proposal to extend permanently the self-regulation of the 
introductory tenancy scheme, the government tentatively forsees just such a 
consensus amongst occupants of social housing, arguing that "tenants may be 
prepared to see a reduction in the security of their tenure in return for safety, peace 
and quiet".39 
Is this appropriate? For many housing academics and practitioners, broad 
judicial discretion to prevent abuse by landlords is a vital component of housing 
law and any restriction of that discretion an unjustifiable infringement of the rights 
of tenants. The internal review process has serious implications for the 
accountability of administrative decision-making. As we have seen, the concept of 
reasonableness under the 1985 and 1988 Housing Acts provides the county court 
with extensive discretion under almost every ground for possession. This 
approach, enabling an impartial judge to ensure independently the justice of every 
claim, reflects the inherently adversarial, antagonistic nature of the landlord-tenant 
39 DTLR, above n 37, p 14. 
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relationship presumed by the framers of the legislation. The introductory tenancy 
on the other hand places power wholly in the hands of the local authority landlord. 
Two further factors support a cautious approach. First, the call for further 
reductions in due process rights by social landlords is questionable on practical 
grounds. There is a tendency on the part of government to respond unequivocally 
to the demands of social landlords, suggesting resort to anecdotal and practitioner-
led policy-making. Take for example the concerns of some social landlords about 
the destructive effect of delay and uncertainty experienced when bringing 
possession proceedings for anti-social behaviour. Academic research suggests that 
in fact there was no clear empirical evidence following the reforms introduced by 
the Housing Act 1996 that further modifications to increase speed and certainty 
were required.40 Indeed, we shall see in Chapter 5 that the Court of Appeal had 
already restricted considerably the potential for a tenant to use the reasonableness 
requirement to defend possession actions. What is surprising, however, is that the 
consultation paper Tackling Anti-social Tenants acknowledged this finding, but 
went on to conclude that nonetheless it was necessary to respond to the concerns 
of landlords themselves.41 In practice, it is arguable that those landlords 
advocating the reduction of due process rights of defendants in order to tackle 
delay, uncertainty and witness intimidation could do far more to develop their 
own administrative processes rather than relying on the dismantling of due 
process rights.42 Better relationships with the courts might well help speed up 
trials, without resort to internal reviews or interim ASBOs. Better prepared 
applications are more likely to succeed. Vulnerable witnesses can and should be 
protected without necessarily withdrawing them from the legal process entirely. 
Second, there is evidence of a particular conceptualisation of social housing 
providers in political discourse - that of the "socially responsible landlord" - as a 
result of which reductions in due process rights for defendants in legal 
4
° C Hunter et al, Neighbour Nuisance, Social Landlords and the Lmv (London: CIHIJRF, 2000). 
41 DTLR, above n 37, para 1:3.1. 
42 Hunter et al, above n 40; SEU, Policy Action Team 8: Report on Anti-social Behaviour (London: ODPM, 
2000). 
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proceedings are not seen as of particular concern. There appears to be a common 
assumption in policy discourse that social landlords will seek possession for anti-
social behaviour with caution - the same assumption underpinning the politico-
administrative regulation of the council housing sector prior to 1980. Reliance has 
been placed consequently on best practice rather than judicial regulation. Take for 
example this excerpt from the Law Commission's consultation paper: 
"Their [i.e. social landlords'] desired outcome is not to remove the anti social 
occupier, but to change behaviour. In this connection, we are impressed with 
the success claimed by Manchester City Council for the use of injunctions in 
changing behaviour. Eviction is, in some senses, an admission of failure" .43 
This construction of the social landlord is of course contested. From the perspective 
of those defending possession claims, for example, the relationship between 
landlord and tenant is still understandably perceived as antagonistic. An 
important example can be found in an article by Ben Taylor of the North West 
Housing Law Practitioners Group, a solicitor who defends tenants in possession 
proceedings, who argues that the Government's policies represent a push "to 
remove decision-making from the hands of the courts and place it in the hands of 
decision-makers".44 He contends instead that "any deviation away from the court 
having full discretion whether or not to make an order for possession is a further 
erosion of tenants' rights which can be open to misuse/ abuse by 
unscrupulous/ improperly trained housing officers" .45 
Noting the government's proposal to extend the ambit of the introductory 
tenancy regime, Taylor argues that the internal review procedure provides 
inadequate protection for tenants from such abuse because of the absence of rights 
accorded to those engaged in judicial proceedings. The introductory tenant cannot 
compel witnesses to attend on their behalf and cannot draw on public funding for 
representation and those involved in conducting the inquiry have neither 
impartiality nor the training to deal with conflicting allegations. Indeed, contrary 
43 Law Com 162, Renting Homes(!). Status and Security (2001 ), para 13.7. 
44 B Taylor, 'Tackling anti-social tenants- a different perspective' [2003] JHL 23. 
45 Ibid. 
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to the discourses underpinning anti-social behaviour that those accused are 
objectively culpable, allegations are often the result of feuds, with the landlord 
having sided with the party who complains first. In addition, a recent empirical 
study of internal review procedures suggests that many tenants ultimately fail to 
take up their right to have a decision to evict reviewed by their landlord given 
their perception, inter alia, that it is unlikely to affect the original decision.46 
3. The anti-social behaviour order: an unacceptable hybrid? 
The "hybrid" structure of the ASBO was a predictable development from the 
housing injunctions implemented by the Housing Act 1996. Indeed, it was already 
a characteristic of the restraining order provided for by the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997.47 The public protection objectives of the mechanism were 
clear from the outset. It was designed to take full advantage of the recognised 
procedural benefits of civil mechanisms, whilst harnessing the superior deterrent 
potential of the criminal sanction. As one Minister put it" one of the main reasons 
for introducing the civil tort is to gain access to that lesser test so that more victims 
or potential victims might be protected" .48 
The civil law eases considerably the procedural demands on a social landlord. 
It is perhaps arguable that social landlords, accustomed to the reduced due process 
rights of defendants in proceedings for possession or injunctions, were particularly 
interested in retaining these benefits. An order, in line with other injunctions, can 
be sought on the basis of evidence proved on the balance of probabilities. 
However, given the particular concerns of social landlords, of far greater import is 
the ability of a claimant agency to make use of hearsay evidence under the Civil 
Evidence Act 1995 and Magistrates' Courts (Hearsay Evidence in Civil 
Proceedings) Rules 1999, allowing the withdrawal of vulnerable witnesses from the 
court process. 
46 D Cowan, The Appeal of Internal Review (London: Hart, 2003 ). 
47 For other examples of hybrid injunctions sees 1(1) and ss 13 and 14 ofthe Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986; Public Order Act 1986, ss 14A and 14B and Football Spectators Act 1989, ss 14A 
and 14J. 
48 HC Deb 18 Dec 1996 Col968. 
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This pragmatic approach to the criminal-civil distinction, described as a 
"Trojan horse" application of the civil law, has engendered serious and sustained 
criticism.49 Commentators point to the failure of the mechanism to provide suitable 
procedural safeguards for defendants faced with considerable criminal penalties 
on breach for behaviour which need not constitute a criminal or even civil wrong. 
More interestingly, however, Andrew Ashworth has assessed the ASBO in the 
context of public protection. He suggests, directly in line with the argument of this 
thesis, that the desire for effective public protection at any cost has led to further 
movement from a constitutional to a security state.so He points out that given the 
extreme consequences for defendants, both the penalties on breach and the 
restrictions on otherwise entirely legal conduct (in particular, exclusion from 
public spaces), the government has displayed an unprincipled disregard for the 
basic procedural rights of criminal defendants. In particular, the ASBO allows 
agencies to circumvent the additional protections enshrined as human rights by 
Article 6(2) and (3) of the European Convention. 
Yet criticism has been redirected from the government to the judiciary 
following the decision of the House of Lords in Clingham v Kensington & Chelsea 
RBC and R v Crown Court and Manchester ex p McCann.51 The case confirms that an 
application for an anti-social behaviour order is a civil process under both the 
European Convention and domestic law, although the House imposed the criminal 
standard of proof to reflect the seriousness of the implications for a defendant. 
Criminal lawyers, particularly Andrew Ashworth, seem confident that the decision 
incorrectly applied tl1e jurisprudence of the European Court. Their Lordships were 
explicitly supportive of the protectionist objectives behind the ASBO's "hybrid" 
sb·ucture: in particular the importance placed upon supporting vulnerable 
witnesses through the use of hearsay evidence. 
(a) The House of Lords and McCann: erroneous legal reasoning? 
49 A Ashworth et al, 'Neighbouring on the Oppressive' [1998] 16(1) Criminal Justice 7-14. 
50 A Ashworth, 'Criminal Justice Reform: Principles, Human Rights and Public Protection' [2004] Criminal 
Law Review 516-532. 
51 [2002] UKHL 39. 
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The first part of the challenge, whether the application for an ASBO was a 
civil procedure under domestic law was dealt with perfunctorily by the House of 
Lords. Lord Steyn held that under domestic law criminal proceedings must be 
given its 11 ordinary meaning" .52 As such the House of Lords engaged in a fairly 
superficial assessment of the structure of the order. It paid particular attention to 
the following attributes of the ASBO procedure: that it was initiated by the civil 
process of complaint; it did not charge the defendant with any crime; nor did it 
involve the Crown Prosecution Service. Further, the proceedings did not in 
themselves result in a criminal conviction, did not appear on the defendant1s 
criminal record and resulted in no penalty,s3 and whilst the consequences of the 
order were potentially serious, so were those of other forms of civil injunction. 
However, at the heart of their Lordships' analysis was an assumption that it was 
necessary in principle to view the two stages, application and breach, separately.s4 
Thus, whilst breach proceedings clearly involved criminal punishment, the 
purpose of the order itself was preventative rather than punitive. 
Yet the expectation of commentators,ss and indeed critics within Parliament 
itself during debates on the Crime and Disorder Bi11,56 was that the ASBO would 
inevitably stall when challenged under Article 6 of the European Convention. It 
was thought that the II anti-subversion doctrine" employed by the European Court 
in Engel v Netherlands (No 1)57 would ensure that application for an ASBO, whilst 
ostensibly a civil matter, was classified autonomously under the Convention as a 
criminal procedure, guaranteeing the specific rights contained in Article 6(3) for 
52 Ibid. at [21]. 
53 It was held however that an application for an ASBO was a determination of a defendant's civil rights for 
the purpose of Article 6( I). The terms of an order could forseeably impose restrictions on a defendant that 
interfered with his private life, his freedom to express himself either by words or conduct or his freedom to 
associate with other people. As such, there was an obligation on the court to act with "scrupulous fairness" in 
ASBO proceedings to ensure the defendant suffered no injustice. However, the use of hearsay evidence was 
not itself unfair in this context. 
54 [2002] UKHL 39 at [23]. 
55 Ashworth eta!, above 49. 
56 See for example the concerns of the House of Lords during the passage of the Crime and Disorder Bill at 
HL Deb 30 Apr 1998, Standing Committee B. It was pointed out that the likely challenge to section I of the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 on human rights grounds would be an extremely embarrassing situation for a 
government that had enacted the Human Rights Act in the same year. 
57 ( 1976) I EHRR 647. See 8 Emmerson and A Ashworth, Human Rights and Criminal Justice (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 200 I), ch 4. 
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those against whom an application was brought. In particular, this would 
effectively prevent landlords relying upon hearsay evidence, given its likely 
conh·avention of Article 6(3)(d).ss 
The House of Lords, examining the decision in Engel, considered the three 
criteria for determining whether proceedings involved 'a criminal charge' under 
Article 6; namely the classification in domestic law, the nature of the charge and 
the severity of the penalty. It also accepted the jurisprudence of the European 
Court that whilst it was established that the proceedings were civil under domestic 
law, the latter two components were of far greater import, making the 
classification autonomous. 59 
Whilst commentators have criticised a number of other aspects of the 
decision,60 the controversial crux of their Lordships' analyses of Article 6 was once 
again the ostensibly preventative rather than punitive purpose of the order itself. 
They pointed out that the relevance of this distinction was an established part of 
European case law, citing the Italian "Mafiosi" cases of Guzzardi v Italy61 and 
Raimondo v Italy.62 They argued first that this differentiation meant that the order 
could not constitute a criminal charge and as such the second limb became 
meaningless.63 Further, they similarly refused to interpret the imposition of an 
order as a penalty. The focus of the order was explicitly upon protecting those 
affected rather than punishing the perpetrator. Although a defendant could be 
made subject to greater potential sanctions than he would face for the same 
behaviour under the mainstream criminal law and its potential exclusionary terms 
58 Unte1pertinger v Austria (1986) 13 EHRR 175; Kostivski v Netherlands ( 1989) 12 EHRR 434; Saidi v 
France ( 1993) 17 EHRR 251. 
59 The second limb was wholly irrelevant for Lord Hope, who suggested that the making of an order as a 
preventative measure did not involve a charge of a criminal offence at all. 
60 See for example C Bakalis, 'Anti-social behaviour orders- criminal penalties or civil injunctions?' [2003] 
62(3) CLJ 583-586, in which the author suggests that the House of Lords' disregard for the fact that the 
ASBO was directed at the world at large and could only be brought by a public authority was contrary to 
European case law, citing Ozturk v Germany ( 1984) 6 EHRR 409 and Benendoun v France (1994) 18 EHRR 
54. 
61 (1980) 3 EHRR 333. 
62 ( 1994) 18 EHRR 23 7. 
63 [2002] UKHL 39 at [72]. MacDonald argues that the "Mafiosi" cases were primarily concerned with 
Article 5 not Article 6 and were some of the earliest decisions of the ECtHR: S MacDonald (2003) 66 MLR 
630. 
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could result in a restriction of liberty, they were not a form of punishment and 
therefore did not constitute a penalty.64 
It is submitted that this assessment of the application stage is unimpeachable. 
Section 1(1) demands explicitly that the court must be satisfied that the order is 
necessary to prevent further acts of anti-social behaviour. By focusing solely upon 
the future acts of the defendant, the legislative structure precludes any punitive 
motivation behind an order. The defendants sought to argue, however, tl1at whilst 
the application stage may be wholly preventative the accepted punitive objectives 
of the ASBO at the breach stage should be taken into account under Article 6. Key 
to this argument was the decision of the European Court in Steel v United 
Kingdom,65 cited as indistinguishable from the case before the court. In that case the 
European Court was asked to identify whether the civil procedure of breach of the 
peace was a criminal offence for the purpose of, inter alia, Article 6. It held that it 
was so, because a refusal at that stage to be bound over to keep the peace would 
result in committal to prison. 
There can be little doubt, however, that the decision in Steel was 
distinguishable. The House of Lords pointed out, rightfully, that whilst 
imprisonment for such a refusal was a possible consequence of the same 
proceedings at which breach of the peace was established, punishment for breach 
of an ASBO could only be imposed following a separate, subsequent application to 
the magistrates court: "A conviction and punishment will only be imposed if the 
defendant, by his own choice, subsequently breaches tl1e order and separate and 
distinct proceedings are brought against him" .66 As such, their Lordships failed to 
identify "an immediate and obvious penal consequence" pursuant to the 
application proceedings themselves.67 
Academic commentators, disappointed at the outcome of the McCann 
decision, have tried tl1eir best to identify bases upon which to challenge the House 
64 Ibid. at [75] and [76), per Lord Hope. 
65 ( 1999) 28 EHRR 603. 
66 Ibid. at [94], per Lord Hutton. 
67 Ibid. at [32], per Lord Steyn. See also ibid. at [ 1 07] and [I 08) per Lord Hutton. 
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of Lords' reasoning, focusing almost entirely upon their Lordships' "principled" 
distinction between the application and breach stage of the ASBO process. Their 
argument is that the mechanism should be viewed as a whole, enabling the breach 
stage to be considered in an assessment of the status of the application stage. 
Thornton, in the first place, has made the practical observation that there is a high 
chance that the order will be breached: a concern discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5. As he writes: "[n]o local authority will apply for an order unless the 
defendant has a bad record of misbehaviour, and the defendant is unlikely to give 
up his misdoings at the drop of a magistrates' order. In reality most applications 
will lead first to the making of an anti-social behaviour order and secondly to a 
further order [sic] on a proven breach, with a penalty".68 
However, the likelihood of breach in practice is obviously not itself enough. 
Commentators have therefore put forward a number of European Court 
judgments in favour of treating the two parts as a whole. Ashworth, for instance, 
draws support from the case of Welch v United Kingdom69 in which the European 
Court assessed whether a confiscation order pursuant to conviction for drug 
supply offences was a penalty for the purposes of Article 7. In doing so, it 
explicitly took into consideration the possibility of imprisonment for a future 
breach of the terms of the order, viewing both the order and punishment for 
breach as a whole. MacDonald, on the other hand, points to the cases of Weber v 
Switzerland70 and Bendenoun v France71 concerned directly with Article 6.72 In Weber 
the Court held that a fine imposed upon the defendant for revealing confidential 
information about a judicial investigation amounted to a criminal penalty given 
firstly the high amount for which he was liable, but also because a failure to pay it 
could lead to conversion of the fine into a term of imprisonment. In Bendenoun, a 
case involving the issuing of fines for various customs and tax offences, tl1e Court 
68 P Thornton,' Anti-social behaviour orders are not criminal' (2003) 27 All England Legal Opinion 1. 
69 ( 1995) 20 EHRR 247. 
70 (1990) 12 EHRR 508. 
71 (1994) 18 EHRR 54. 
72 S MacDonald, 'The Nature of the Anti-Social Behaviour Order' (2003) 66 MLR 630. 
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again took into consideration the fact that the defendant could be liable to 
imprisonment for a future failure to pay. 
However, although in each of these cases future punishment for breach was 
seen as a relevant factor in assessing whether the original order was part of 
criminal proceedings, it is submitted that they do not aid in an interpretation of the 
structure of the anti-social behaviour order. In each case these future penalties for 
breach of the order were not enough in themselves to warrant treating the order as 
a penalty: each order was also judged to have punitive elements per se. For 
example, in Welch, the European Court held that its identification of the order as a 
penalty was derived from a combination of factors: in particular, the fact that the 
order itself was directed to the proceeds involved in drug dealing and was not 
limited to actual emichment or profit, and the discretion to take account of 
culpability in fixing the amount of the order, as well as the possibility of 
imprisoning the offender in default of payment. In the same way the Court 
identified in Weber and Benedoun a partially punitive objective to the original fines. 
Whilst it is submitted that these cases do not provide the necessary support, 
one argument by MacDonald is of greater value. He has posited that the two 
components are structurally connected given the intention evinced by government 
that punishment on breach of an order should reflect the impact of the 'course of 
conduct' proved at the application stage. If courts are to punish an individual on 
the grounds of this prior conduct, the two parts of the mechanism must be treated 
as interdependent. MacDonald then goes on to suggest that in fact imprisonment 
for behaviour including not only the act of breach but that conduct giving rise to 
the original application will ultimately breach Article 5 of the Convention (right to 
liberty), given that it fails to fit within any of the categories listed in Article 5(1). In 
particular, Article 5(1)(b) is not satisfied as punishment is exacted not merely for 
breach of the order, but for all the prior anti-social behaviour giving rise to the 
original application. Neither is Article 5(1)(a) satisfied given that this punishment 
is founded upon evidence established in civil proceedings, which cannot constitute 
trial by 'a competent court'. 
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The McCann ruling is currently under appeal to the European Court of 
Human Rights which, according to Ashworth, is likely to view anti-social 
behaviour order in a different light to the House of Lords. A broad consensus 
exists amongst academic commentators that their Lordships failed to properly 
apply established Strasbourg jurisprudence. However, of the arguments proposed 
against the decision only one has particular merit: that the government's objective 
to allow punishment on breach for conduct proved only at the application stage 
establishes an interdependence between the two stages not simply under Article 6, 
but with repercussions also for compliance with Article 5. 
(b) The House of Lords and McCann: politically motivated? 
The House of Lords in McCann arguably had the capacity to interpret the 
application stage for an anti-social behaviour order as criminal proceedings. Yet 
what is most interesting about their Lordships' judgments for the purpose of this 
thesis is the explicit and unflinching political support for the government's 
objectives; in particular the desire to protect vulnerable witnesses through the use 
of hearsay evidence. Lord Steyn, for instance, made clear from the outset that 
without the availability of such evidence "it would inevitably follow that the 
procedure for obtaining anti-social behaviour orders is completely or virtually 
unworkable and useless". He continued: "My starting point is . . . an initial 
scepticism of an outcome which would deprive communities of their fundamental 
rights" _73 He went on that" an extensive interpretation of what is a criminal charge 
under article 6(2) would, by rendering the injunctive process ineffectual, prejudice 
the freedom of liberal democracies to maintain the rule of law by the use of civil 
injunctions" .74 Lord Hutton added: 
"I consider that the striking of a fair balance between the demands of the 
general interest of the community (the community in this case being 
represented by weak and vulnerable people who claim that they are the 
victims of anti-social behaviour which violates their rights) and the 
73 [2002] UKHL 39 at [18]. 
74 Ibid. at [31]. 
88 
requirement of the protection of the defendants' rights requires the scales to 
come down in favour of the protection of the community and of permitting 
the use of hearsay evidence in applications for anti-social behaviour orders" _75 
It has been argued by Andrew Ashworth that the decision to impose a 
criminal standard of proof illustrates the acceptance of their Lordships that the 
ASBO was in truth a criminal procedure, but that the need to secure the use of 
hearsay evidence in these proceedings was overall conclusive of the issue.76 This 
political objective was of greater import in the case than the intricacies of the 
European jurisprudence. It is no surprise, therefore, that their Lordships' legal 
reasoning has been criticised by academic commentators; in particular Ashworth 
who suggests that the government and the House of Lords have colluded in 
breaching the spirit, even if not the letter, of the European Convention. It appears 
that their Lordships were swept away by the political clamour for greater public 
protection without proper consideration of the law. 
If one views the judgments in McCann as predominantly the product of 
political rather than legal reasoning, it is still necessary to question whether there 
really is a clear policy justification for the decision. In fact, it is submitted that the 
House of Lords' assumptions about the importance of maintaining the civil status 
of the application stage is misplaced. The problem with its approach is that it fails 
to appreciate the broad range of behaviour that the anti-social behaviour order is 
used for. By modifying the legal system to allow the use of professional witnesses 
and hearsay evidence in every case, all cases of anti-social behaviour are deemed to 
involve witness intimidation either inside or outside the courtroom. Witness 
intimidation has become an inherent attribute of the concept. Lord Steyn argued 
that "[s]ection 1 is not meant to be used in cases of minor unacceptable behaviour 
but in cases which satisfy the threshold of persistent and serious anti-social 
behaviour"?? Yet in reality the definition of anti-social behaviour, as we have seen, 
75 Ibid. at [113] 
76 A Ashworth, 'Social Control and Anti-social Behaviour: the subversion of human rights?' [2004] 120 LQR 
263-291. 
77 [2002] UKHL 39 at [25]. 
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is wide enough to cover all manner of situations in which witness intimidation is a 
negligible risk. 
It is possible instead to posit a more subtle solution to the problem. It would 
have been open to their Lordships for instance to deem the initial application stage 
criminal and then craft a procedural system whereby hearsay evidence could be 
admitted on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of the presiding judge. Indeed, 
this is tl1e approach now taken by Chapter 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which 
provides the judiciary with the discretion to allow hearsay evidence to be 
presented in criminal proceedings if to do so would be in the interests of justice. In 
doing so they would have at least ensured that the need for hearsay evidence was 
considered afresh in each set of application proceedings. 
(c) The interim anti-social behaviour order 
The section 1D interim anti-social behaviour order, introduced by the Police 
Reform Act 2002, was part of the raft of modifications to the mechanism 
implemented by the government in response to its poor take-up post-1998. It was 
an extension once again consequent to the lobbying of government by local 
agencies, including social landlords. In this case, they had argued that it was a 
necessary expedient to ensure effective public protection through speedier 
resolution of anti-social behaviour. Securing an anti-social behaviour order 
appears to be an extremely slow process.78 According to a recent report on tl1e 
success of the ASBO, on average it took 66 working days Gust over 13 weeks) from 
the date of application to tl1e date of the final hearing to secure an order.79 Notably, 
the obligatory consultation with other local government agencies and the court 
hearing itself meant the eventual remedy might be imposed some months after the 
initial adminish·ative decision to seek it had been made. During this period there 
was also the possibility of witness intimidation. The interim order, on tl1e other 
hand, avoids the need for a full trial on the merits of a decision. Instead, instant 
relief can be sought in advance of the proper hearing with the full deterrent force 
78 And indeed expensive: the average cost of an ASBO is £5,3 50 (Campbell, above n 7). 
79 Ibid., p 10. 
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of an ASBO. In particular, it was suggested by the government that the supposed 
delaying tactics of defence lawyers would be redressed, as defendants would 
proactively seek to have the order overturned as soon as possible. 
Yet as with the other new measures discussed above, there was little actual 
evidence of an overwhelming need for the interim order. Research on use of the 
anti-social behaviour order prior to the 2002 Act suggested that delays in 
application could be adequately dealt with through better administrative interface 
with the court system. Indeed, behind the average were a broad range of times: 
some cases were decided in a little as four working days, whereas the longest took 
173 working days (almost 35 weeks). As the report concluded: "if the primary 
problem was the speed of the application through the system, then this is an issue 
about listings and adjournments ... ASBOs can and do work successfully in areas 
with the motivation and successful procedures in place".so 
The interim order again raises questions about the balance drawn between 
public protection and the procedural rights of defendants. To provide protection in 
advance of the full application hearing authorities can now apply to either the 
magistrates or the county court for an interim order, which the court may grant 
where it considers that it is "just" to make an order.sl The order is for a fixed 
period pending the full hearing and can prohibit the defendant from doing 
anything described in the order.s2 The effect of breach of an interim order is the 
same as for a full ASBO. Furthermore, an application may also be made without 
giving notice to the defendant if the justices' clerk gives leave.83 Leave may only be 
granted if the clerk is satisfied that it is necessary for the application to be made 
without notice. Where an application is granted without notice, the order must be 
served on the defendant as soon as practicable, and does not come into effect until 
it has been served. If a without notice order is not served on the defendant within 
seven days it ceases to have effect. 
8
° Campbell, above n 7, pp 41 and I 04. 
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s 10(2). 
82 
s 10(3). 
83 Magistrates' Courts (Anti-social Behaviour Orders) Rules 2002, rule 5. 
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The use of interim injunctive relief, either with or without notice, is of course 
nothing new. Both equitable injunctions and statutory housing injunctions have 
always been available in such circumstances. However, the interim order threatens 
to bring even more defendants within the ambit of the criminal justice system 
pursuant to even fewer procedural hurdles for social landlords. It was with this in 
mind that the without notice interim order was recently challenged under article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights in R (on the application of M) v 
Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs.B4 The particular order challenged had 
been issued against M as part of a blitz of 66 drug-dealers in the Little London area 
of Leeds by Leeds City Council and West Yorkshire Police. The defendant argued 
that although a civil procedure, the application for such an order did not satisfy the 
requirement of a fair trial under Article 6(1). 
The Court of Appeal ultimately held that the making of an interim ASBO 
without notice is not a determination of civil rights within Article 6, but a 
temporary measure regulating behaviour until the determination of the parties' 
rights at the substantive hearing. The meaning of 'determination' was held by the 
Court of Appeal to be the final point of the legal process. As such, because the 
interim ASBO proceedings were to be followed by the full ASBO proceedings they 
did not fall within the ambit of Article 6. Of course, from the perspective of the 
defendant there is a determination insomuch as breach of the interim order will 
lead to identical consequences to that of a normal ASBO; a point argued by defence 
counsel. However, whilst European jurisprudence allows for consideration of the 
impact on defendants of an interim order when deciding whether interim 
applications engage article 6, it will only be determinative if the remedy causes 
"irreversible prejudice" to the defendant's interests and "drains to a substantial 
extent the final outcome of the main proceedings of its significance" .85 The 
safeguards provided by the legislation further supported the conclusion of the 
Court of Appeal: although there was no provision for an automatic early return 
date, the justices' clerk must be satisfied that it is necessary for the application to be 
84 [2004] EWCA Civ 312. 
85 Markass Car Hire v Cyprus, ECtHR 61h November 2002. 
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made without notice and, moreover, the order can only be made for a limited 
period when the court considers that it is just to make it, and the defendant can 
immediately apply to have it reviewed or discharged. 
The Court of Appeal then went on to argue that if in the alternative Article 6 
was engaged, the interim ASBO should be looked at as a whole, in line with the 
principle in Alconbury, discussed above with respect to the introductory tenancy.s6 
The 'ancillary' interim order when viewed together with the subsequent full ASBO 
hearing was compliant with the Convention.B7 The appellant argued that to ensure 
compliance with Article 6, on an application for an interim ASBO without notice a 
more rigorous test was required than simply whether it was 'just' to order the 
remedy. He cited McCann and the criminal standard of proof demanded by the 
court in that case before it could issue an ASBO. The local authority should thus 
have been required to put forward an extremely strong prima facie case that the full 
application would succeed on its merits. The argument was rejected by the Court 
of Appeal as an unnecessary fettering of the discretion of the magistrates' court. 
The court must, however, consider all relevant circumstances, including the fact 
that the application has been made without notice. 
The Court of Appeal thus attempted to place interim injunctions entirely 
outside the ambit of Article 6, whilst simultaneously holding this legislative 
structure compliant with the article in any case. What is interesting, however, is 
whether the reasoning in M can extend to a situation in which a defendant 
breaches an interim ASBO before the full hearing: a point that was not raised 
during the litigation. In such circumstances, could it not be argued that there had 
been a "determination" under article 6, given that the full hearing was 
consequently drained of its relevance as the defendant would in any case be liable 
to criminal prosecution? Furthermore, would possible sentencing on establishing 
that breach, taking into account all the evidence including that proved only to the 
86 [200 I] UKHL 23. 
87 Even if Article 6 is not engaged the process must still be fair. However, there was no procedural unfairness 
in the making of an interim order without notice, and certainly nothing intrinsically objectionable about the 
power to grant such an order. 
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civil standard on application, satisfy the requirements of a fair trial given that there 
would no longer be a full jurisdiction in line with Alconbury when the proper 
merits of a full order could be heard? 
4. Conclusions 
This chapter has identified and explored the conflict constructed by the 
government and social landlords between public protection objectives and the due 
process rights of defendants. The prioritisation of public protection, as manifest in 
the call for greater speed and certainty of relief together with the protection of 
vulnerable lay witnesses, has led to a recent raft of legislative initiatives. Most 
controversial of these are the internal review procedure adopted by the 
inh·oductory and demoted tenancy regimes, and the civil-criminal law hybrid anti-
social behaviour order. Worryingly, there is evidence in Tackling Anti-social Tenants 
that suggests that the government has seriously considered the sacrifice of security 
of tenure for council tenants altogether, whilst the interim order represents a 
further incursion into the procedural rights of criminal defendants. 
The government is willing to risk forgoing due process rights because of its 
obsession with public protection, arguably at any cost. This reflects a tendency of 
contemporary government to see the threat posed by the criminal as greater than 
the threat posed by the state; in this case the possible misuse of power by social 
landlords. As Garland concludes, "[t]he call for protection from the state has been 
increasingly displaced by the demand for protection by the state ... The risk of 
unrestrained state authorities, of arbitrary power and the violation of civil liberties 
seem no longer to figure so prominently in public concern" .88 This restructuring of 
the balance of power between the state and citizen has been aided considerably by 
the success of the landlord lobby in persuading government, and the Law 
Commission, that it can be trusted to apply sanctions, particularly eviction, with 
restraint. 
88 D Garland, The Culture ofControl (Oxford: OUP, 2001), p 12. 
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What this chapter has also hopefully brought into relief is that the 
requirements of effective public protection have been dictated by social landlords 
themselves. There is a tendency on the part of government to respond 
unequivocally to the demands of landlords rather than objective analysis, 
suggesting resort to anecdotal and practitioner-led policy-making. This has led 
consequently to a focus on reducing legal rights rather than improving 
administrative processes. The evidence suggests, however, that landlords should 
perhaps be encouraged to look more closely at their own administrative processes 
before attempting to dismantle tl1e hard-won security of tenure of social tenants. In 
the same way, the anti-social behaviour order has been justified on grounds of the 
very real difficulties of landlords protecting vulnerable witnesses, but little effort 
has been made to develop co-ordinated administrative working practices to ensure 
their safety. Finally, the development of the interim anti-social behaviour order, 
particularly when employed without notice, is not without difficulty. Crafted in 
response to tl1e failure of local agencies to make great enough use of the original 
order, and pursuant to the demands of only a number of social landlords who 
themselves might be accused of not using the original mechanism effectively, it is a 
politically knee-jerk, "blunderbuss" solution to the problems faced by social 
landlords in ensuring effective public protection. 
The final theme explored in this chapter was the fact that each of these 
reductions in due process rights has been subject to challenge in the higher courts 
under Article 6 of the European Convention. These developments have provided 
an interesting perspective from which to assess the European jurisprudence in tl1is 
area, although the article has had minimal effect in limiting the protectionist 
objectives of the legislation. The civil nature of tl1e anti-social behaviour order was 
confirmed finally by the House of Lords in McCann, much to the chagrin of legal 
academics and, as such, the right of social landlords to present hearsay evidence to 
the courts has been assured. This paper has highlighted the clear political support 
evinced by their Lordships for the protectionist objectives of the legislation, which 
provided an explicit backdrop to their decision-making. However, it has suggested 
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that in any case European jurisprudence did not in fact provide a clear basis for a 
finding in favour of the defendants given the difficulties in forming a conceptual 
link between the wholly preventative application stage and the clearly punitive 
breach stage. The interim order has also sustained an attack under Article 6, 
although here it must be questioned whether the Court of Appeal paid enough 
attention to the implications of a breach of an order before the full ASBO hearing. 
The challenge to the introductory tenancy regime under Article 6, however, 
has met with a greater measure of success. In an effort to satisfy the Alconbunj 
standard establishing an 'aggregate' approach to the compliance of administrative 
decision-making with the article, the Court of Appeal in McLellan expanded the 
Cochrane procedure to enable a more intensive substantive assessment of the 
compliance of possession with Article 8. Thus the originally mandatory grounds 
for a court order for possession under the introductory tenancy have been 
tempered through an interesting private-public law interface. Yet lawyers intent on 
securing the original protectionist objectives of the internal review procedure 
(certainty, speed and witness protection) have sought to restructure the system to 
ensure compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998, as noted on analysis of the 
demoted tenancy and the Law Commission's recent proposals. 
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Chapter 5 
CONSIDERING THE WElfARE OlF THE PERPETRATOR {1): 
SOCIAL POLICY 
The dominant discourse of public protection has directed the attention of 
housing management toward the victim of anti-social behaviour. The 
characteristics of the perpetrator are largely ignored, although many are labouring 
under acute socio-economic problems. This chapter argues that, given these 
problems, the focus upon management of conduct through discipline and 
exclusion can provide only limited protection from anti-social behaviour, and may 
well create more far-reaching difficulties by exacerbating the social exclusion 
already experienced by those targeted. 
1. The dangers of punitive housing management 
Whilst those affected by anti-social behaviour are usually the most 
disadvantaged in society and often clearly in need of protection, troublesome 
households are highly likely to be extremely vulnerable themselves. This is 
particularly true of the residents of social housing. As set out in Chapter 1, housing 
officers have found themselves operating within increasingly deprived 
neighbourhoods, experiencing high levels of structural, socio-economic problems. 
Indeed, their role in tackling crime and anti-social behaviour is a key part of the 
government's commitment to bringing about the renewal of these communities. 
These households, residents of the same neighbourhoods as their victims, suffer 
from the same structural problems of unemployment, poor education and lack of 
opportunities. 
Furthermore, a considerable proportion of those engaging in anti-social 
behaviour experience an array of other difficulties associated with the socially 
excluded. In a recent assessment of the ASBO case files of social landlords, it was 
found that two-thirds of defendants had special needs or other specific problems; 
18 per cent had some form of mental illness; 18 per cent had experience of physical 
or sexual abuse; 9 per cent had a physical disability; drug problems were identified 
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in 12 per cent of cases; alcohol was a problem in 11 per cent of cases; and in 15 per 
cent of cases children were out of control and the parents lacked the skills to cope 
with them.1 
An appreciation of the wide-ranging and often serious social-economic 
problems experienced by many perpetrators is key to constructing sustainable 
solutions to their anti-social behaviour, as this chapter will argue. Yet government 
rhetoric tends to ignore these issues entirely. There are two reasons for this: a 
combination of the influences of protectionist and moralist discourses upon the 
debate on anti-social behaviour. In the first place, the dominant discourse of public 
protection has concentrated attention firmly upon the victims and potential victims 
of crime and disorder. The perpetrator on the other hand is of little interest, aside 
from the threat that he or she poses to others. He is instead constructed as II the 
other"; a deviant minority from whom the majority of II decent, law-abiding 
people" must be protected. 2 This divisive approach, by which perpetrators are 
effectively placed outside a constructed "community", enables political rhetoric to 
gloss over the motivation and causes behind their behaviour. This is notable, for 
example, in the structure of the legal definitions of anti-social behaviour. The 
section 218A duty, together with the nuisance grounds for eviction, the housing 
injunction and the anti-social behaviour order, defines the conduct that warrants 
intervention solely in terms of its effect on others: it must cause 'nuisance or 
annoyance' or 'alarm, harassment or distress' to the victim. The reasons for that 
behaviour, on the other hand, are irrelevant.3 
However, it is interesting to note that even when the difficult circumstances 
of perpetrators are recognised they have been dismissed as irrelevant. This is a 
product of the moralistic foundation upon which the discourse of public protection 
1 C Hunter et al, Neighbour Nuisance, Social Landlords and the Lmv (London: CIH/JRF, 2000). See also S 
Campbell, A review of anti-social behaviour orders: Home Office Research Study No. 236 (London: Home 
Office, 2002): 60 per cent of those accused of anti-social behaviour suffer from mental illness, addictions or 
learning difficulties. 
2 E Burney, Crime and Banishment (Winchester, Waterside, 1999). 
3 See A Brown, 'Anti-social behaviour, crime control and social control' [2004] Howard Journal43(2) 203-
211, who describes the fight against anti-social behaviour as a "triumph of behaviourism" for ignoring 
entirely the motivations and causes behind such conduct. 
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operates. Contemporary political rhetoric increasingly conceptualises offenders in 
simple moral terms.4 Anti-social behaviour in particular is presented as the 
consequence of individual pathology rather than the structural problems faced by 
residents of deprived communities such as poverty, unemployment and substance 
abuse. More specifically, there is an assumption that such conduct is simply the 
result of selfishness on the part of the perpetrator, who is concomitantly 
constructed as a rational, but irresponsible, actor: whatever an individual's 
circumstances he or she can still choose not to behave badly. 
The choice of language within government discourse is revealing here: anti-
social individuals actively "flout" the rules of society;S they must be "brought to 
justice" for their behaviour; the majority must "take a stand" and fight the wrongs 
they have been made to suffer. Indeed, labelling theory has been used to argue that 
the term 'anti-social behaviour' itself presumes fault on the part of the perpetrator.6 
As such, even when it acknowledges that many perpetrators labour under such 
problems the government has made clear that it is unwilling to accept them as 
mitigating considerations. As the White Paper Respect and Responsibility makes 
clear: "Family problems, poor educational attainment, unemployment, alcohol and 
drug misuse can all contribute to anti-social behaviour. But none of these problems 
can be used as an excuse for ruining other people's lives. Fundamentally, anti-
social behaviour is caused by a lack of respect for other people."7 
This discourse of blame and censure provides a justificatory basis for the 
increasingly punitive approach to public protection from anti-social behaviour 
taken by the government. In particular, Haworth and Manzi argue that moralistic 
rhetoric has quickly permeated the practices of social housing management.8 
Housing officers have developed their crime control practices entirely outside the 
formal criminal justice system, with its traditional penal-welfarist approach to 
4 A Haworth and T Manzi, 'Managing the Underclass: Interpreting the Moral Discourse of Housing 
Management' ( 1999) 36(1) Urban Studies 153-165. 
5 Home Office, Respect and Responsibility (London: HMSO, 2003), p 7. 
6 P Papps, 'Anti-social behaviour strategies: individualistic or holistic?' ( 1998) 13(5) Housing Studies 639-
656. 
7 Home Office, Respect and Responsibility (London: HMSO, 2003). 
8 A Haworth and T Manzi, above n 4. 
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criminality through which 'care and control' professionals still seek to understand 
and resolve the causal factors giving rise to deviant behaviour. As a professional 
group social landlords have never had a particular adherence to socio-structural 
explanations of crime and disorder. As such, Alison Brown argues that their 
policing function has developed entirely independently as a 'new site of power 
and knowledge' founded wholly upon moral explanations of bad behaviour.9 
The extent to which behaviour should be seen as the product of individual 
pathology or socio-economic context is a question of aetiology beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Certainly, some forms of anti-social behaviour targeted by the 
government, such as littering, are relatively easy to explain as a lack of respect or 
consideration. Further, one might agree that there is something morally culpable 
about violent, intentional and intimidatory behaviour that cannot be excused by a 
difficult background. However, the expansive definition of anti-social behaviour 
does seem to include categories of individual who could not be presented easily as 
merely selfish or inconsiderate. The notion of rational choice to explain crime and 
disorder has considerable political appeal; allowing blame of perpetrators and 
supporting ever-increasing punitivism.1o Yet can it realistically be said that 
sh·uctural problems have no role to play in causing anti-social behaviour? The 
problems of prostitution and begging; the effect of mental illness on behaviour; 
and --the inability- -of---parents- -to-control-their-e-hild-ren-re-veal-huge-causal __ _ 
complexities hidden behind political rhetoric. 
In summary, the welfare of perpetrators has been largely ignored in official 
discourse. The prioritisation of public protection has directed attention towards 
those affected by crime and disorder, yet even when the government recognises 
the vulnerabilities affecting many perpetrators its adherence to moral explanations 
of anti-social conduct means that in any case it continues to hold them fully 
responsible for their behaviour. Why does this matter? This next section argues 
that the government's reluctance to acknowledge that socio-economic factors are 
the cause of much of the anti-social behaviour dealt with by social housing 
9 Brown, above n 3. 
10 D Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford: OUP, 2001 ), p 13 I. 
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managers has two important consequences. First, it illustrates the dubious value of 
punitive legal sanctions as an effective way to ensure short-term public protection. 
Second, it illustrates the extent to which those sanctions threaten to increase the 
social exclusion experienced by already vulnerable perpetrators. 
(a) Ineffective public protection 
The basic assumption of government is that anti-social behaviour is merely a 
problem of disrespect and irresponsibility. Perpetrators have been conceptualised 
as rational actors that have ultimately chosen to behave as they do. These 
individuals are therefore assumed to adhere to the principles of rational choice 
theory; that their behaviour is "calculated, utility-maximising conduct resulting 
from a straightforward process of individual choice" .11 This explains the emphasis 
placed upon the management of anti-social behaviour through disciplinary 
processes: as rational actors, perpetrators will respond eventually to a great 
enough threat. 
Deterrence of this kind can and does successfully modify behaviour. Yet the 
fact that so many of those now susceptible to sanction have serious problems 
themselves suggests that many individuals targeted by these measures are unlikely 
to respond to the ever-increasing threats to which they are now subject. Effecting 
long term changes in people's behaviour cannot occur simply through ever greater 
threats, as the structural problems they experience are likely to prevent them from 
exercising rational choice. Take, for example, one particular assessment by Jones 
and Segar assessing the impact of anti-social behaviour orders on prostitution.U 
They argue that prostitutes labouring under the demands of their pimps and the 
need to remain close to their homes and children feel obliged to return to the 
localities from which they have been excluded regardless of the consequences. 
Indeed, the ASBO has been shown to be far from infallible. Two recent studies of 
reoffending have shown that around one third of those assessed breached their 
11 Garland, n 10, p 130. 
12 H Jones and T Sager, 'Prostitution and the anti-social behaviour order' [200 I] Crim LR 873. 
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orders.l3 The principles of rational choice theory seem a poor representation of the 
reality for many of those targeted. 
Furthermore, without confronting the causes of anti-social behaviour it is 
unlikely that exclusionary techniques can provide long term solutions to an 
individual's conduct. Sometimes removing an individual from a particular area 
through eviction or exclusionary terms in ASBOs or injunctions can resolve 
problems by allowing the separation of perpetrators from the situations giving rise 
to their behaviour. However, where bad behaviour is the result of more complex 
social causes, displacement is more likely to be the ultimate consequence.l4 As 
commentators consistently point out, eviction in particular simply moves many 
problem households on, sometimes into private rented accommodation in the 
same area where they are less easily subject to surveillance.15 Any sustainable 
solution to anti-social behaviour must confront the root causes rather than simply 
shifting the issue elsewhere. 
(b) Exacerbating social exclusion 
As we have seen, the protection of residents of deprived neighbourhoods 
from the effects of anti-social behaviour is part of a wider commitment by 
government to the renewal of the country's most deprived neighbourhoods. 
Managing disorder is but one component of its desire to address the social 
exclusion experienced in particular on certain inner-city housing estates. 
Neighbourhood renewal is to be achieved not only by tackling crime and disorder, 
but through a range of other measures targeting the long term structural problems 
of these communities: the creation of employment opportunities, improved health, 
better skills, and an improvement in the quality of housing and the physical 
environment.16 
13 C Hunter et al, Social landlords' use of anti-social behaviour orders (Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam 
University, 200 I); Campbell, above n I. 
14 A Crawford, The Local Governance ofCrime (Oxford: OUP, 1997), p 286. 
15 C Hunter et a!, above n I. 
16 SEU, National strategy on neighbourhood renewal (London: ODPM, 2001). 
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It is therefore an irony of the move towards increasingly punitive civil sanctions 
that, whilst designed to help in reducing the social exclusion experienced by 
deprived communities, they have the potential to exacerbate the social exclusion of 
many targeted households. The combination of protectionist and moral discourses 
discussed above has ensured that the perpetrators of anti-social behaviour are 
excluded from efforts to tackle social exclusion. They have been constructed as the 
cause rather than a consequence of that social problem, and are thus placed outside 
the II community" to be protected and renewed. 
One of the most worrying consequences of recent government initiatives is 
the potential for routine exclusion of increasing numbers of households from the 
social housing sector on grounds of behaviour. Ostensibly at least, the allocation of 
social housing has always been guided by the principle of need.17 As increasingly 
limited stock is allocated with preference to the homeless, and other vulnerable 
groups under general allocation lists, the sector has for some time provided a 
safety net for the socially excluded. It appears however that of all the components 
of the British welfare state, the provision of social housing has most often departed 
from the principle of need. Unlike other forms of welfare, local authority housing 
has never been seen as a universal right and has therefore found itself 
II disproportionately prey" to moral debates about the standards of behaviour of 
householders.18 
What we are now witnessing is the inexorable prioritisation of protectionism 
above welfarist considerations, leading to increasingly explicit intrusions upon the 
principle of need. Even before direct attempts by government to harness allocation 
processes as a way to responsibilize recalcitrant tenants, the "conveniently 
indeterminate"19 legislative structure regulating the allocation of council housing 
had been harnessed by local housing authorities to exclude individuals on 
behavioural grounds. Social landlords have been excluding vast numbers of 
households from their allocation lists for bad behaviour for some time. By 2000, 52 
17 D Cowan et al, 'Risking Housing Need' (1999) 26( 4) Journal of Lmv and Society 403-26. 
18 Haworth and Manzi, above n 4. 
19 D Cowan et al, above n 17. 
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per cent of local housing authorities and 46 per cent of RSLs operated exclusion 
policies.2o However, the reforms of the Homelessness Act 2002 are likely to 
intensify this practice. Furthermore, statistics show that the period between 1996 
and 1998 showed a 127 per cent increase in eviction from social housing, blamed 
predominantly upon the implementation of the introductory tenancy regime.21 
It is quite clear that a tension exists between the exclusionary techniques 
employed in response to protectionist concerns and the principle of need that 
should arguably underpin the provision of social housing. Is it really appropriate 
for social housing to be withheld or retrieved in response to bad behaviour, given 
that such sanctions target those often most in need of that support?22 Although 
commentators emphasise that the move away from rights to social housing and 
towards the responsibilities that tenants and their households owe to both their 
landlord and community threatens the ultimate welfare objectives of the sector, the 
debate is complicated by the increasingly limited availability of social housing. It is 
arguable that in areas of high demand, behaviour is a legitimate and necessary 
way in which to distinguish between households in need competing for 
accommodation. However, Cowan notes that in practice regular exclusion tends to 
operate in areas of low-demand, which suffer from the most serious anti-social 
behaviour. As such, landlords have found themselves refusing access to vast 
numbers of applicants whilst simultaneously managing an equally large number of 
void properties. 23 
In addition to the dangers posed by exclusion from social housing, other 
forms of exclusionary technique operated by social landlords may lead to further 
problems. Exclusion from public spaces through an injunction or ASBO, for 
instance, represents a worrying example of extreme risk management in 
conjunction with the increasing banishment of 'undesirables' from quasi-public 
2
° C Hunter et al, above n I. 
21 Ibid. 
22 D Cowan and C Pantazinis, 'Social landlords as crime control' (200 I) I 0( 4) Social and Legal Studies 435. 
Similar concerns are posited by McKeever in the context of the use of social security as a source of social 
control: 'Social security as a criminal sanction' (2004) 26(1) JSWFL 1-16. 
23 D Cowan, Housing Law and Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999). 
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spaces such as shopping malls and the precincts of housing developments.24 
Removing individuals from a particular area not only prevents them from 
breaching the behavioural norms dictated by a social landlord but restricts too 
their capacity to engage in even legitimate activities within the locality. It seeks to 
address the problem by simply removing its source entirely. The consequence for 
the defendant is not simply the threat of sanction for bad behaviour, but their 
arguably disproportionate removal from interaction with civil society.2s 
And finally, the anti-social behaviour order threatens to draw increasing 
numbers of individuals (in particular young people)26 into the net of the criminal 
justice system. The government has professed that the role of the order is 
preventative not punitive: compliance is the objective rather than criminalisation. 
But as we have seen in practice breach is a very real possibility. Recently the 
Guardian engaged in a special investigation about the sudden rise in the number 
of children in custody in the last few years. 27 The article went on to place the blame 
squarely upon the consequences of breach of ASBOs. The number of children jailed 
for such breaches has increased from an average of 2.3 in April 2000 to a staggering 
48.75 by August 2004.28 Incapacitation is unlikely to resolve the long term 
problems faced by many of these individuals and more than likely to do 
considerable harm. Once again, the question is whether increasing the potential for 
imprisonment is a wise strategic move for a government intent on reducing social 
exclusion. 
2. Towards holism? 
In the light of these concerns, academic commentators have consistently 
argued that the only long term solution to the complex factors contributing to anti-
social behaviour is a holistic approach that tackles not only the symptoms but the 
24 Burney, above n 2. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Three quarters of ASBOs issued between April 1999 and September 2002 were imposed on those aged 21 
or under: Campbell, above n I. 
27 N Davies, 'Wasted lives of the young let down by jail system', The Guardian, 8 December 2004. 
28 The article also went on to note that 80 per cent of children that end up in Youth Offender Institutes suffer 
from at least two mental disorders. 
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underlying causes of the problem.29 Without such an approach neighbourhoods 
are unlikely to see sustainable reductions in crime and anti-social behaviour and, 
indeed, the social exclusion of perpetrators may ultimately exacerbate the 
problems of these communities. It has been suggested that a reassessment of 
protectionist discourse is therefore required. Whilst the government has relied 
heavily upon the management of problem populations through discipline and 
exclusion, is not sustainable protection of these neighbourhoods more likely to be 
achieved through greater emphasis upon tackling the causes of anti-social 
behaviour? To reiterate, this thesis does not suggest that there is no place for the 
use of legal sanctions: public protection can sometimes be achieved in the short 
term and can be necessary to prevent the considerable suffering of the victims of 
anti-social behaviour. However, the punitive rhetoric of government has the 
potential to lead to a disproportionate and unworkable reliance on such tools. 
This was the conclusion reached by Policy Action Team 8 of the Social 
Exclusion Unit in its report on effectively tackling anti-social behaviour.30 The 
document strongly advocates a holistic approach to the problem, focusing on a 
"three-pronged" approach. Enforcement through the use of legal sanctions must 
operate within a framework of prevention and resettlement. Prevention can take 
two forms. First, it can seek to provide individual support for perpetrators to 
promote early intervention and prevent escalation of problems. Rather than 
seeking to discipline a perpetrator through the threat of sanction, landlords should 
work with them to tackle the underlying causes of their behaviour. Second, work 
needs to be done to resolve wider societal issues.31 Of course, tackling the 
fundamental underlying problems of the most deprived neighbourhoods, 
unemployment and poverty, is something social landlords cannot hope to solve on 
their own and is instead a national objective. 
29 C Hunter, 'Anti-social behaviour and housing- can law be the answer?' in Cowan and Marsh (eds) Two 
Steps Fmward: Housing Policy into the New Millenium (200 l ); Papps, 'Anti-social behaviour strategies: 
individualistic or holistic?' (1998) 13(5) Housing Studies 639. 
30 SEU, Policy Action Team 8: Report on Anti-social Behaviour (London: ODPM, 2000). 
31 Papps, above n 29. 
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What is surprising is that although the political rhetoric of government 
continues to focus upon the vote-winning formula of greater punitivism, in 
practice there can be found signs of a more balanced understanding of the 
complexities of anti-social behaviour. This arguably illustrates the tension that 
exists within government between the need to secure the support of the electorate 
through populist policy-making and an appreciation of the practical reality of 
sustainable solutions. Most importantly, the government has accepted in full the 
recommendations of PAT 8. Both Tackling Anti-social Tenants and Respect and 
Responsibility touch on the need to engage in preventative measures, but not to any 
great extent. However, draft guidance on the section 218A duty advises that 
rehabilitation of perpetrators is of importance to any long term strategy to manage 
anti-social behaviour. 32 
Perhaps the most important development is the acceptance by government 
that eviction is of little long term value in managing anti-social behaviour. It has 
made clear that it does not wish to see an increase in possession proceedings, 
accepting both that it more often than not simply moves problem households on 
and that it has the potential to increase social exclusion. It has also emphasised the 
importance of alternatives to legal sanction. One idea formally backed by the 
government is the use of Acceptable Behaviour Contracts and Parenting Contracts. 
These documents are legally unenforceable. Instead, they set out the 
responsibilities expected of an offender or his or her parents in an attempt to focus 
their minds upon the problems they are causing. They are often extremely 
successful,33 and avoid the need to resort to legal sanctions. It has also pushed for 
greater rehabilitation. Perhaps the best known example of a resettlement 
programme is the Dundee Families Project, which has recently been commended 
explicitly by the Home Secretary. The project houses dysfunctional families at risk 
of eviction and provides them with a full range of support services. In a recent 
32 Home Office, Draft guidance on policies and procedures (London: HMSO, 2003). 
33 See for example S Bullock and S Jones, Acceptable behaviour contracts: tackling anti-social behaviour in 
the London Borough of Islington (London: HMSO, 2004). 
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report it has been judged a considerable success34 and a similar scheme has been 
recently set up by Manchester City Council. 
One interesting component of the government's rehabilitative strategies is the 
creation of a series of mandatory orders imposing support on certain vulnerable 
categories of individual. Parenting orders implemented by the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 and recently created individual support orders35 imposed by a court as 
part of ASBO proceedings, demand positive obligations on either a parent or a 
child to receive support from agencies to deal with their parenting skills or 
problem behaviour. Breach of either order is punished by a fine. Whether forcing 
an individual to receive such help will ensure the necessary co-operation with 
support agencies is debatable, although early signs suggest that the orders have 
proved surprisingly successful.36 The human rights implications of these orders are 
extremely interesting, but beyond the scope of this paper. In any case, the 
parenting order has recently been judged compliant with the Human Rights Act 
1998 by the Court of Appeal.37 
Finally, there are likely to be benefits from the increasing emphasis upon 
inter-agency working. For instance, section 1 of the CDA 1998 imposes a 
procedural obligation on social landlords to consult other local agencies before 
applying for an anti-social behaviour order. The unexpected consequence of this 
obligation, according to a recent report on the use of ASBQ,38 has been the 
development of a problem-solving approach to the problems of anti-social 
behaviour enabling the crafting of preventative solutions that avoid the need for 
resort to use of the order. The report suggests that bringing together various 
support agencies often highlights the previous absence of co-ordinated help for 
perpetrators. In the case of registered social landlords in particular, who are 
otherwise outside the "loop" of local authority governance, this process is arguably 
34 J Dillane et al, Evaluation of the Dundee Families Project, Final Report (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 
2001). 
35 CDA 1998, s IAA as amended by ss 322 and 323 ofthe Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
36 C Henricson, Government and Parenting (London: JRF, 2003). 
37 R (on the application of M) v Inner London Crown Court [2003] EWHC 30 I. 
38 Campbell, above n I 
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invaluable in bringing anti-social behaviour to the attention of relevant support 
agencies. 39 
Yet whilst the attention of government has refocused upon addressing the 
underlying causes of anti-social behaviour, it is unclear to what extent it is truly 
committed to this approach. First, there has been little organised attempt by 
government to ensure the transmission of best practice.40 Second, for social 
housing managers to engage in meaningful preventative and rehabilitative action 
to tackle the root causes of anti-social behaviour they need available to them the 
necessary resources. However, no provision for financial support to social 
landlords has been made to ensure that this can occur. In addition, whilst the 
government has accepted that eviction should be used with caution, it has 
demanded simultaneously that landlords instead make increased use of 
injunctions and ASBOs. Recent guidance on the ASBO is particularly interesting, 
illustrating the progressive function creep undergone by the mechanism. The 
ASBO was originally presented as a response to "criminal or sub-criminal" anti-
social behaviour. This suggested a focus upon serious intimidatory behaviour. 
However, guidance notes have subsequently failed to mention this standard and 
instead include a broad range of low-level conduct: prostitution, graffiti, smoking 
or drinking whilst underage, begging and noise nuisance as acceptable targets of 
the order.41 
There are worrying signs also of a changing attitude within government as to 
the appropriate point at which legal intervention can be justifiably resorted to. On 
the one hand, the government appears to advocate prevention above sanction, 
reserving the latter when all other methods fail. As it states in Respect and 
Responsibility: "much of our framework aims to prevent anti-social behaviour; and 
39 However, the consultation requirement does not oblige consulting groups to reach a consensus as to the 
appropriateness of an order. 
4
° C Hunter and J Nixon, Social Landlords' Responses to Neighbour Nuisance and Anti-Social Behaviour: 
From the Negligible to the Holistic?' (200 1) 27( 4) Local Government Studies 89-104. 
41 Home Office, A Guide to Anti-Social Behaviour Orders and Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (London: 
HMSO, 2002). In fact, the flexibility of the ASBO has resulted in some bizarre applications of the mechanism 
by local agencies far beyond their original remit. They have been used to prohibit a farmer from allowing his 
pigs to roam beyond his land, in response to the illegal flyposting of a major record label and to stop a young 
person from sitting on the top deck of a bus. 
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where influencing, supporting and negotiation fail we need the right powers to take 
effect swiftly to ensure compliance and to protect the broader community" .42 This 
suggests an admirably cautious approach to the use of sanctions, demanding that 
otl1er alternatives should be explored first: law as "last resort". However, whilst 
eviction is to be used sparingly, government has recently advocated earlier use of 
injunctions and ASBOs to "nip anti-social conduct in the bud". In particular, whilst 
draft guidance on use of the anti-social behaviour order suggested that other forms 
of response likely to be appropriate to deal with lower-level problems, such as 
mediation, should be pursued before applying for an order, the most recent 
document is at pains to emphasise that the ASBO in particular should not be seen 
as a tool of last resort.43 Such guidance once again threatens to undermine the 
encouragement of early support services. 
In any case, whilst the government has shown a (relatively) more circumspect 
understanding of anti-social behaviour in recent months, the success of a holistic 
approach depends wholly upon a concomitant ideological change amongst social 
landlords. Burney, however, argues that the continued superficial political rhetoric 
of punitivism, pushed perhaps as a vote-winning tool, may well continue to ensure 
a punitive approach by housing managers.44 At this stage, much must still be done 
to effect change in working practices. Hunter and Nixon have recently carried out 
important empirical work on the practical management of anti-social behaviour by 
social landlords. Whilst the majority of social landlords have taken on 
responsibility for dealing with anti-social behaviour their approach is 
predominantly reactive rather than holistic.45 Action is only taken after complaint 
and whilst legal action is usually reserved for the most serious cases it tends to 
extend to eviction alone. The research also noted that social landlords were 
42 Home Office, above n 5, para 2.43. My italics. 
43 Home Office, above n 5, p 9. 
44 Burney, above n 2. 
45 Hunter and Nixon, above n 40 (drawing upon Scott and Parkey's classification of minimalist, traditional 
and innovative approaches: S Scott and H Parkey, 'Myths and realities: anti-social behaviour in Scotland' 
( 1998) 13(3) Housing Studies 325). 
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themselves adamant that they see legal sanctions as a last resort.46 However, closer 
analysis found that in fact very few in practice referred households to support 
agencies or even ensured that they were visited by a housing officer before 
proceeding with legal action. 
3. Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to identify the limitations of the punitive approach to 
public protection advocated by central government rhetoric and increasingly 
implemented by social landlords. Management of anti-social behaviour through 
discipline and exclusion, whilst of value in certain situations involving extreme 
bad behaviour, is an often inappropriate and ultimately unsustainable solution to 
the problem. Instead, it is vital that social landlords are encouraged to adopt a 
holistic approach that tackles the causes as well as the symptoms of such conduct. 
There are signs that beyond the hysterical populism the government is moving 
towards a more circumspect policy. However, the continued emphasis upon the 
anti-social behaviour order as some sort of panacea has serious implications for the 
future. 
46 C Hunter and T Mullen, Legal Remedies for Neighbour Nuisance: Comparing Scottish and English 
Approaches (York: York Publishing Service, 1998). 
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Chapter 6 
CONSIDERING THE WELFARE OF THE PERPETRATOR (2): 
THE LEGAL TOOLS 
Chapter 5 explored the political criticisms of the punitive, moralistic 
approach taken by the government and social landlords towards the 
management of anti-social behaviour. It noted, however, that beneath the 
rhetoric there are signs of a more rounded understanding of the problem, which 
accepts both the limitation of legal sanctions as a source of sustainable public 
protection and their capacity to increase social exclusion. 
Chapters 6 and 7 now take a legal perspective. They explore whether, and 
to what extent, such welfarist considerations have been incorporated into the 
legal processes regulating social landlords' management tools. This chapter 
looks first at the structure of the tools themselves. It notes in particular moves 
by the Court of Appeal in possession proceedings under the assured and secure 
tenancy regimes to restrict the broad discretion under the Housing Acts 
traditionally available to trial judges to assess the effect of eviction on secure 
and assured tenants and their households. It then looks at whether welfare 
considerations can be incorporated into the framework of the introductory and 
demoted tenancy regimes and anti-social behaviour injunctions and orders. 
1. The Court of Appeal and possession proceedings: interpreting 
'reasonableness' 
Social landlords wishing to gain possession of a home let on a secure or 
assured tenancy on the grounds of nuisance behaviour by members of the 
household must comply with the identical statutory processes contained in the 
1985 or 1988 Housing Acts. A landlord cannot evict a tenant without a court 
order. Although the court must first ensure itself that the definitional element 
has been satisfied, the fundamental question is whether it is 'reasonable' for the 
judge to grant a possession order in the circumstances. Even if the court decides 
112 
that it is reasonable it can still choose to suspend the possession order on 
terms .I 
The traditional test for reasonableness in possession proceedings was set 
out by Lord Green MR in Cumming v Dawson.2 Whether it is reasonable to make 
a possession order is to be judged, taking account of all relevant circumstances 
as they exist at the date of the hearing, in a broad commonsense way giving 
such weight as the judge thinks right to the various factors relevant to the 
situation.3 A judge is given the freedom to decide upon a just balance between 
the interests of both landlord and tenant, and the public.4 In cases involving 
nuisance or annoyance to neighbours, the judge must explicitly take into 
consideration the interests of those affected by the behaviour.s This extremely 
broad judicial discretion, which enables the county court to ensure that injustice 
is avoided in each particular case, reflects political acceptance of the adversarial 
nature of the landlord-tenant relationship and the need to protect tenants from 
unscrupulous or arbitrary eviction. 
The effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the operation of the 
reasonableness requirement was recently assessed by the Court of Appeal. In 
Lambeth LBC v Howard,6 the Court of Appeal was asked to consider the impact 
of Article 8 of the Convention on the granting of possession under Ground 2. 
Sedley LJ confirmed in that case that an eviction of a residential occupier would 
always fall within Article 8(1).7 Justification of that interference under Article 
8(2) should therefore feature as part of the discretion afforded to the court, as a 
public body, in adjudicating upon the reasonableness of granting possession in 
a particular case. The court must decide whether eviction is in accordance with 
the law (as is almost always the case) and, more importantly, necessary in a 
democratic society to achieve a legitimate aim. In Howard Sedley LJ assumed 
that the relevant aims in the context of eviction for anti-social behaviour were 
1 HA 1988, s 9; HA 1985, s 85(1 ). 
2 [1942] 2 AllER 653. 
3 Ibid., per Lord Greene MR at 655. 
4 London Borough of Enfield v McKeon (1986) 18 HLR 330. 
5 Waking BC v Bistram (1993) 27 HLR 1; Darlington BC v Sterling (1996) 29 HLR 309. This 
consideration now has a statutory foundation: Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, s 16. 
6 (2001) 33 HLR 58. See too Gallagher v Castle Vale Action Trust Ltd (2001) 33 HLR 72. 
7 However, note the recent decision of the House of Lords in Qazi [2003] UKHL 43 which limits the 
applicability of Article 8 when the tenant has no proprietary or contractual right to remain in his or her 
home. 
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the prevention of disorder or crime and the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. In the case of the latter he referred specifically to "one of the 
most important freedoms and one of the most important rights in modern 
urban society, albeit that neither is spelt out in the Convention, freedom from 
fear and the right to live in peace". 8 
However, after incorporating Article 8 into the reasonableness standard, 
Sedley LJ then suggested that the practical effect of compliance with the 1998 
Act will be immaterial: 
"As this court has said more than once, there is nothing in Article 8, or in 
the associated jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 
which should carry county courts to materially different outcomes from 
those that they have been arriving at for many years when deciding 
whether it is reasonable to make an outright or a suspended or no 
possession order. Nevertheless ... it can do no harm, and may often do a 
great deal of good, if the exercise is approached for what it is, an 
application of the principle of proportionality."9 
Two important issues arise from this construction of the reasonableness 
requirement. First, it should be noted that one's 'home' according to the 
Convention is a concept autonomous of any underlying property or contractual 
interest.lO As such all members of the household, not simply the tenant, will 
have their Article 8 rights infringed on eviction. Second, whilst not confirmed 
by ratio it is almost certain that the 1998 Act takes horizontal effect.11 The court 
as a public body for the purpose of the Act must apply its discretion under the 
reasonableness requirement in line with the Convention, whether or not the 
landlord is itself deemed a public body. Thus registered social landlords and 
other housing associations (together with private landlords) are indirectly 
subject to the Convention. 
Under normal conditions the broad discretion afforded to the county court 
through the reasonableness ground provided a fairly acceptable system of 
scrutiny. The judge in possession proceedings acted as an independent arbiter 
8 [2001] EWCA Civ 468 at [32]. 
9 Ibid at [31]. 
10 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43. 
11 See for instance the dicta of Sedley LJ to this effect in Gallagher v Castle Vale Action Trust Ltd [200 1] 
EWCA Civ 944 at [44]. 
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with the power to assess fully the merits of the application for possession, able 
to take into consideration all the circumstances of the case and ensure that the 
needs of the landlord, tenant and in the case of nuisance behaviour other 
residents, were appropriately balanced. The perceived threat of anti-social 
behaviour, however, has fundamentally altered the approach to the concept 
taken by the courts. In a series of cases from the mid-1990s, notably as the crime 
control function of social landlords really began to take off, the Court of Appeal 
overturned a series of county court decisions refusing possession orders in 
cases of extremely serious neighbour nuisance in which the potential negative 
effect of eviction on the tenant or other members of the household was held to 
outweigh the impact of the behaviour on the victims. 
The Court of Appeal has traditionally made it clear that it is loathe to 
interfere with a trial judge's assessment of the reasonableness of a possession 
order. There are only three reasons why it will do so: if the judge takes into 
account irrelevant considerations, fails to take into account relevant 
considerations or reaches a conclusion that is so misguided as to be 'palpably 
wrong'. In each case these factors were used by the Court to overturn the 
original decision. However, more importantly it took the opportunity to 
restructure the reasonableness requirement, narrowing its focus through the 
rejection of certain considerations as irrelevant, to ensure a primary emphasis 
upon public protection rather than the needs of the perpetrator. 
It is important to assess these developments in the context of the Court of 
Appeal's general attitude towards the reasonableness requirement in the 
context of anti-social behaviour. There can be little doubt that the Court is well-
aware of the serious impact a refusal to order possession can have. In West Kent 
Housing Association v Davies12 Robert Walker LJ, in constructing his reasons for 
allowing the appeal against the trial judge's decision not to order possession, 
said: 
"it seems to me that the judge seriously underestimated the effect both on 
the neighbours of Mr and Mrs Davies in Lime Road and other parts of the 
estate and on the Housing Association itself of the message that is given if 
serious breaches--and these were very serious breaches--occur and the 
12 (1999)31 HLR415. 
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court, on the matter being taken to it, makes no order against tenants who 
are found to have committed those breaches. The Housing Association 
has, it seems, been doing its best to improve the quality of life for those 
living on this estate. To take a matter like this to court calls for 
considerable effort and determination on the part of a socially responsible 
landlord, in marshalling a case, and in obtaining witnesses who are 
prepared to give evidence despite the possibility of intimidation. It cannot 
to my mind be right that the court should not recognise the seriousness of 
a case of this sort."13 
The excerpt illustrates an appreciation on the part of the Court of the 
implications for social landlords of a failed application for relief, as examined in 
Chapter 4. In particular it notes the possibility of devaluation of the general 
deterrent effect of terms in tenancy agreements prohibiting anti-social 
behaviour, and the difficulty in securing the co-operation of residents as 
witnesses in future applications, if a court does not order possession. The 
decisions that follow should therefore be viewed in this context: as attempts to 
limit the uncertainty of applications for possession for serious anti-social 
behaviour, and thereby increase landlords' capacity to protect the public 
through eviction, by restricting the opportunity for a tenant to put forward 
mitigating circumstances in his or her defence. 
(a) The decision in Mousah: a presumption in favour of social landlords? 
Perhaps the most well-known ruling on the application of reasonableness 
in nuisance cases is that of Bristol Cihj Council v Mousah.14 Mr. Mousah, a 
paranoid schizophrenic, had allowed his house to be used for the sale and 
consumption of crack cocaine in direct contravention of a term of his tenancy 
agreement. The property had been subject to a series of police raids and 
numerous people had been arrested. The council sought possession of the 
property under Ground 1, Schedule 2 of the Housing Act 1985 (breach of the 
tenancy agreement). At trial the judge found that notwithstanding the serious 
breach of the agreement it was not reasonable to make an order for possession. 
Evidence was given by Mr Mousah' s consultant psychiatrist as to his 
schizophrenia. The psychiatrist said that the eviction would have a "negative 
13 Ibid. at 425. 
14 [I 997] 30 HLR 32. 
116 
influence on his mental health". On the basis of this the judge found, inter alia, 
that the public interest in not allowing the use of properties for drug dealing 
was outweighed by the public interest in keeping someone off the streets whose 
illness might cause him to become dangerous, both to himself and others. 
The Court of Appeal overturned the original decision as, inter alia, 
'palpably wrong' and held that it was indeed reasonable to evict the 
defendant.15 In the view of Beldam LJ, the principle a trial judge should follow 
in such circumstances is as follows: 
II the public interest, in my view, is best served by making it abundantly 
clear to those who have the advantage of public housing benefits that, if 
they commit serious offences at the premises in breach of condition, save 
in exceptional cases, an order for possession will be made. The order will 
assist the housing authority who, under section 21 of the [Housing Act 
1985], has the duty to manage the housing stock and have the obligation to 
manage, regulate and control allocations of their houses, for the benefit of 
the public. In my view the public interest would be best served by the 
appellant being able in a case such as this to relet the premises to someone 
who will not use them for peddling crack cocaine."16 
Beldam LJ concluded, however, that there were no such II exceptional 
circumstances" in this case as the judge had misunderstood the evidence about 
Mr Mousah' s mental health: there was no evidence that he would be a danger 
to the public or himself if he was evicted. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Mousah creates a presumption in 
favour of possession in cases involving certain serious acts of anti-social 
behaviour. It is now the task of the defendant to provide the court with 
evidence of II exceptional circumstances" giving rise to mitigation. Thus the 
threshold for acceptance of mitigating factors has been raised considerably. The 
objectives of the Court of Appeal were clearly directed towards more effective 
public protection. Indeed, the quotation from Beldam LJ' s judgment, above, 
15 Arguably, the decision in Mousah could have been justified on far clearer grounds. No mention was 
made in the case of section 8 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. This provision creates a criminal offence 
committed by anyone concerned in the management of any premises who knowingly permits or suffers, 
inter alia, the supply of a controlled drug on those premises. Surely it is always reasonable to evict a 
tenant engaging in such behaviour in order to avoid your own criminal liability? Of course, the offence is 
itself controversial given the practical difficulties in running 'dry-houses' for addicts. See, for example, R 
v Brock (John Terrence) [200 1] Crim LR 320, in which two managers of a supported housing scheme 
were prosecuted under section 8 for the drug-dealing going on with their knowledge within their 
establishment. 
16 [1997] 30 HLR 32 at 38. 
117 
highlights both disciplinary and exclusionary rationales: the Mousah 
presumption will act as a clear sign to others that such conduct will not be 
tolerated whilst ensuring that the perpetrator is removed from the 
neighbourhood. 
However, the practical applicability of the Mousah decision is questionable. 
What constitutes a II serious offence" or an II exceptional circumstance"? In 
Mousah, the judges were unpersuaded by the evidence that Mr Mousah' s 
schizophrenia would be exacerbated by eviction.17 It is therefore entirely 
reasonable to imagine that cogent and compelling reasons why possession 
would have particularly serious consequences for the defendant could still 
satisfy the Mousah test. Further, it is unclear from the judgment whether it is 
necessary that conduct should be in contravention of a specific term of the 
tenancy agreement. In Canterbury Cihj Council v LowelB the defendant household 
had engaged in a prolonged harassment of a neighbouring family involving 
verbal abuse and the assault of the tenant's daughter outside her school. 
However, Kay LJ was adamant that the Mousah decision was inapplicable on 
the facts. He suggested instead that the decision was limited to serious criminal 
offences in breach of an actual term of the tenancy agreement. Drug-dealing 
and racial harassment are both examples that come to mind. Nevertheless, the 
ruling in Mousah illustrates the desire of the Court of Appeal to curtail the 
discretion of the county court to consider the welfare of the perpetrator in 
favour of greater certainty of outcome for social landlords. 
(b) Eviction as a last resort: considering alternative remedies 
The government has made it clear that it does not wish to see an increase 
in the use of eviction by social landlords in response to nuisance behaviour, and 
that possession should be seen as a last resort, since it understands that this 
"remedy" is unlikely to provide a lasting solution for neighbourhoods affected 
by anti-social behaviour and will likely increase the social exclusion of evicted 
households. Instead, the government tentatively supports greater preventative 
17 Though compare the judgment in Croydon LBC v Moody [1998] EWCA Civ 1683, discussed below, in 
which it was confirmed that respect should be accorded to the evidence provided by expert witnesses of a 
defendant's mental illness. 
18 (2001) 33 HLR 583. 
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and rehabilitative efforts, but in reality hopes for more use of injunctions and 
ASBOs. The question, however, is whether it is open to the county court in 
possession proceedings to assess the relative merits of alternative remedies as 
part of its own discretion. 
It is now established authority that the suitability of alternative remedies is 
an irrelevant consideration when deciding upon the reasonableness of a 
possession order. The issue arose most recently in Ne'locastle City Council v 
Morrison. 19 Mrs. Morrison was a secure tenant of premises owned by the 
Council and lived in the premises with her three sons. The main ground for 
possession was Ground 2, under which the Council relied on a long history of 
anti-social behaviour on the part of her household. This offending conduct, 
which mainly involved her two eldest sons, had continued for almost five years 
and was described by the trial judge as a II reign of terror". It involved assaults 
on neighbours using fists, shovel handles, metal bars and knives, witness 
intimidation, threats to kill, throwing bricks and stones, starting fires, verbal 
abuse and criminal damage. The allegations were not contested by Mrs. 
Morrison who effectively conceded the breaches of the tenancy agreement and 
the grounds for making a possession order. 
Whilst the trial judge accepted that the behaviour of the defendant's sons 
was 11 appalling", he held that possession would be unreasonable. His reasons 
showed an appreciation of the limitations of eviction as a source of public 
protection. Eviction, he argued, would prove an ineffective remedy as the sons 
would inevitably remain in the neighbourhood. He suggested instead that in 
the particular circumstances alternative remedies, for example an injunction, 
would provide a preferable solution, enabling the matter to be dealt with in situ, 
and targeting the children specifically. 
However, these considerations were judged irrelevant by the Court of 
Appeal. In doing so the Court relied on its earlier decision in Sheffield City 
Council v Jepson2D in which Ralph Gibson LJ had held that, although the 
authority could have obtained an injunction to restrain persistent and deliberate 
breaches of the defendant's tenancy agreement rather than seeking possession 
19 [2000] L & TR 333. 
20 (1993) 25 HLR 299. 
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"he saw no reason why a council should be required or expected to take that 
course" .21 May LJ, providing the sole judgment in Morrison, concluded: 
"[if] it was not reasonable to make a possession order because Allan would 
be able to continue his destructive and unlawful conduct nevertheless ... 
[t]hat would rightly be seen as a licence to continue the unacceptable 
conduct, as a failure to address the legitimate concerns of the 
neighbourhood, and a failure to give proper effect to the terms of the 
tenancy agreement and the Parliamentary intention underlying the 
Grounds of Schedule 2 relied upon".22 
He held further that the availability of alternative remedies, better suited as a 
remedy for the community was irrelevant as "[i]t is in the public interest that 
necessary and reasonable conditions in tenancy agreements of occupiers of 
public housing should be enforced fairly and effectively".23 
The reasons given by the Court of Appeal are questionable on a number of 
grounds. First, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Jepson, accepted in 
Morrison, that there was no reason why a landlord should be expected to use 
alternative remedies is at odds with contemporary developments in the 
management of anti-social behaviour. The government believes that eviction 
should remain a "last resort" in response to anti-social behaviour. Landlords 
now have a wealth of alternative remedies; demotion, injunctions and anti-
social behaviour orders, with which to respond to anti-social behaviour without 
recourse to eviction. In particular, as we have seen, the government has a 
preference for injunctions and ASBOs. 
Second, the reasoning of May LJ m Morrison is curious. This passage 
presents a number of concerns, none of which are particularly justified. It is 
unclear why refusal to grant possession when eviction would not provide a 
suitable remedy, in preference of an alternative sanction of greater efficacy, 
should be seen as a licence of that conduct and a failure to respond to the 
concerns of the council and the community. Nor is it clear why the judge 
believed that consideration of alternative measures would undermine respect 
21 ibid. at 305. 
22 [2000] L & TR 333 at 344. 
23 ibid. 
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for the tenancy agreement. An injunction or ASBO is itself a strong response to 
a breach of an anti-social behaviour term or the statutory nuisance grounds. 
It can be argued further that the authority in Morrison is in conflict with 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The inefficacy of eviction in 
actually bringing an end to anti-social conduct, and the availability to social 
landlords of alternative, arguably less drastic and potentially more effective 
mechanisms with which to respond to anti-social behaviour are surely 
important in deciding whether possession is a necessary and proportionate way 
in which to prevent crime and disorder or protect the rights and freedoms of 
those affected under Article 8.24 Indeed, in a Court of Appeal judgment not 
directly concerned with the use of alternative remedies but with the 
appropriateness of vicarious liability of a tenant for his or her household,25 Lord 
Justice Sedley suggested explicitly that the proportionality of eviction under 
Article 8 does indeed involve an assessment of alternative and less drastic 
remedies available to a landlord.26 
On the other hand, there are two arguments evident in the decisions of the 
Court of Appeal, used to justify its refusal to allow assessment of the relative 
merits of alternative remedies. There is evidence first that the Court of Appeal 
is itself dubious as to the merits of injunctive powers relative to eviction in cases 
involving serious anti-social behaviour. It was held by Waller LJ in Canterbunj 
CC v Lowe,27 for example,28 that in cases involving serious harassment an 
injunction may not itself be enough to alleviate the fear caused by the 
perpetrator. In such cases eviction is the only solution that could satisfy those 
residents affected by the conduct. Second, one must remember the pressure on 
the Court, raised by Robert Walker LJ in West Kent HA v Davies, to ensure 
certainty of outcome in possession applications for anti-social behaviour so that 
the public is effectively protected. Interfering with the complex decision-
making involved in choosing from the range of possible responses to a 
24 Lambeth BC v Howard [2001] EWCA Civ 468. 
25 See below at section (d). 
26 Gallagher v Castle Vale HAT(2001) 33 HLR 72. 
27 (2001) 33 HLR 583. 
28 And confirmed by Potter LJ in New Charter Housing v Ashcroft [2004] EWCA Civ 310. 
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particular problem of anti-social behaviour would greatly increase the 
uncertainty experienced by social landlords. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted finally that a compromise of sorts has 
been reached by the Court of Appeal. In Canterbunj City Council v Lowe,29 the 
Court held that whilst the availability of an injunction is an irrelevant 
consideration when deciding upon the reasonableness of a possession order, it 
is relevant when deciding whether to suspend that order. If an injunction has 
already been imposed upon the defendant or his or her household and the 
behaviour of the perpetrator has improved30 or one could be imposed and the 
perpetrator would be likely to observe it, this could be grounds to suspend 
possession. 31 
(c) The potential impact of homelessness on vulnerable households 
The effects of homelessness upon evicted households can be severe. Not 
only perpetrators of anti-social behaviour but entire households can suffer the 
consequences of a possession order. As we have seen, it can also lead to 
permanent exclusion from social housing and disqualification from rehousing. 
Further, evicted households are often those most in need of such 
accommodation. The consequences for a perpetrator and his or her household 
of a possession order have always been relevant considerations under the 
reasonableness ground.32 However, a number of appeals have concentrated 
specifically upon the trial judge's refusal of a possession order where the 
household has clear priority need status, after predicting that a future 
application for rehousing under the homelessness legislation will fail on 
grounds of a finding of intentional homelessness.33 Because such a finding 
discharges the duty of a local housing authority to find settled accommodation 
for households in priority need, it will lead to homelessness for households that 
may be seriously affected by such an outcome. 
29 (2001) 33 HLR 583. 
30 As was the case in Lowe (2001) 33 HLR 583. 
31 C.f. New Charter Housing (North) v Ashcroft [2004] EWCA Civ 310, in which an appeal by the RSL 
against a suspended possession order was allowed on grounds that the judge had no reason to suppose that 
Mrs. Ashcroft would take the opportunity provided by the suspended order to control her son. 
32 Cummings v Dawson [1942] 2 AllER 653; Darlington BC v Sterling (1997) 29 HLR 309. 
33 Bristol CC v Mousah (1997) 30 HLR 32 (vulnerable person by reason of mental illness); Darlington 
BC v Sterling ( 1997) 29 HLR 309 (household containing children). 
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Once again, however, the Court of Appeal has stepped in and 
circumscribed this potential defence. It has been held that a court should not 
try, as the trial judges did in Bristol CC v Mousah and Darlington BC v Sterling, to 
second-guess the decisions of local authority homelessness officers: it is 
sufficient for the court to know that the applicant will be entitled to make an 
application as homeless, and that it will be dealt with properly. As Beldam LJ 
held in Mousah: 
"whilst [the trial judge] was perfectly entitled to consider the effect which 
an order for possession would have, it was wrong for him to become so 
involved with the possible outcome of an application by the respondent 
under [homelessness legislation]. Evidence had been given by the 
appropriate housing officer that, if the respondent applied, his application 
would be dealt with on its merits. That, in my view, was all that the Judge 
could properly take into account".34 
In addition, the Court of Appeal has rejected attempts by the lower courts in a 
number of cases to actively constrain the administration of the homelessness 
legislation by granting possession only on condition that the household is 
rehoused. In Darlington BC v Sterling, for example, the tenant's 13 year-old son 
had been guilty of a range of serious anti-social behaviour including assaults 
and threats with knives. The Court of Appeal held, however, that even where 
the tenant has children this does not mean that it is unreasonable to order 
possession unless the court is satisfied that alternative accommodation will be 
provided. Nor does the county court have the power to require a local authority 
to provide rehousing proposals as part of the possession process. 35 
The Court of Appeal justified this development in two ways. On the one 
hand it highlighted protectionist concerns, noting the difficulties inherent in an 
approach by which the more badly behaved a tenant is, the more likely it is to 
be unreasonable to evict him or her because of the increased chance that he or 
she will be rendered intentionally homeless.36 However, it argued additionally 
34 ( 1997) 30 HLR 32 at 39. 
35 Watford BC v Simpson (2000) 32 HLR 901. 
36 C. f. Barnet BC v Derek Lincoln [2004] EWCA Civ 823 in which the Court of Appeal did not deem as 
irrelevant an assessment by the trial judge that it was likely that the defendant would be found 
intentionally homeless. However, in that case the appeal was against a decision to order immediate 
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that in any case it would be inappropriate to allow the judicial function to incur 
upon the administrative function of local authorities in deciding future 
homelessness applications.37 
Yet there is still considerable uncertainty in this area of the law as certain 
Court of Appeal judges remain unpersuaded by the restriction on their 
discretion. In particular, Lord Justice Evans stated in Croydon BC v Moody: 
"I, for my part, remain unconvinced that the judge should, as a matter of 
law, disregard the fact that the tenant, if he is evicted, will be liable to be 
treated as intentionally homeless and, secondly, what his fate in fact will 
be, whether a cardboard box (as my Lord has called it) or otherwise. The 
headnote in City of Bristol v Mousah reads: "The court should not, 
however, attempt to predetermine the possible outcome of any application 
which may be made by the defendant to the local authority as a homeless 
person in the event of an order being made: ... ". Whether it follows from 
that that the court should disregard altogether the question whether there 
will be a roof over the tenant's head is another matter."3B 
The reasoning of Evans LJ in Moody clearly illustrates the difficulty inherent in 
avoiding consideration of future homelessness applications. It highlights the 
restrictiveness in differentiating the effect of possession upon a household 
(which can be considered) from the result of an application to be rehoused by 
the local authority (which cannot). Without an assessment of the latter, the 
former is emptied of real meaning, limited perhaps to the impact of the process 
of eviction upon the household. 
However, in the case of Lewisham BC v Akinsola,39 Sedley LJ argued that in 
certain circumstances the outcome of a homelessness application will be so self-
evident that it can be considered by the court. As he held: 
"I am content to accept that if the case is at one of the two poles that I have 
described (that is to say cases in which an application for rehousing as 
homeless will manifestly succeed or not succeed) then there is no reason 
why the judge should not take that fact, because fact it will be, into account 
as part of the balance of factors by which he assesses the reasonableness of 
possession for persistent nuisance behaviour. Thus the Court was not intent upon undermining the 
original decision as in the other cases. 
37 See Otton L1 in Mousah ( 1997) 30 HLR 32 at 40, who wished to avoid a situation in which courts 
might find themselves "eliding the judicial and administrative function". 
38 (1999) 31 HLR 738. 
39 (2000) 32 HLR 414. 
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the possession order. But if all that the evidence shows is that there would 
be, on a fresh application, an issue for the local authority to decide, then 
this court has no power to make a pre-emptive or prefigurative decision 
for the purpose of gauging whether it is reasonable for it to make a 
possession order."40 
Sedley LT' s approach seeks to limit the extent to which consideration of a 
homelessness application can be carried out. However, it is questionable 
whether it is ever possible for a court to conclude with certainty that an 
application for rehousing will "manifestly succeed or not succeed". The only 
situation in which this might be the case would be the no fault grounds for 
eviction. Under both the nuisance and breach of agreement grounds it would be 
impossible to argue that there was no chance that an individual would be 
deemed unintentionally homelessness given the value-laden nature of the 
conept. Further, this conclusion suggests that courts must still engage in an 
assessment of the outcome of a hypothetical homelessness application at the 
possession stage in order to isolate whether that application will 'manifestly 
succeed'. Thus it must still pre-empt the decision-making of the local authority. 
Further support for a return to consideration of the outcome of an 
application for rehousing can be found in the recent case of Gallagher v Castle 
Vale HAT,41 in which Sedley LJ confirmed that following the judgment of the 
European Convention in Chapman v UK,42 "the impact of an eviction order on 
the tenant's individual circumstances is necessarily a relevant consideration" 
with respect to the proportionality of possession under Article 8.43 The question 
of rehousing under the homelessness legislation is clearly relevant to the 
"impact" of an order. Thus the refusal of the Court of Appeal to consider the 
outcome of an application arguably sits in tension with the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court. 
In conclusion, the Court of Appeal was not only keenly aware of the 
consequences for effective public protection of consideration of future 
applications for rehousing, but the illegitimacy of judicial intrusion upon the 
administrative decision-making systems of local authorities. However, how can 
40 Ibid. 
41 (2001) 33 HLR 72. 
42 (2001) 33 EHRR 18. 
43 [2001] EWCA Civ 944 at [49]. 
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a judge constructively take into account the future housing situation of a tenant 
without making some kind of assessment of the outcome of an application to 
the local housing authority? The Court of Appeal it seems has emptied 
consideration of the impact of homelessness on vulnerable households of any 
real meaning. Evans LJ' s suggestion that the Mousah ruling still enables 
consideration of the future housing status of the household is dubious. 
However, with respect to Sedley LJ' s judgment in Akinsola, too, any attempt to 
identify whether a particular set of facts means that a future application will 
'manifestly succeed or not succeed' is still engaging in inappropriate 
administrative decision-making. 
(d) Tenants' liability for the bad behaviour of their household 
Since the modifications of the nuisance grounds for eviction enacted by the 
Housing Act 1996, possession proceedings may be brought against a tenant of 
social housing not only for their own bad behaviour but that of others residing 
in or visiting the premises. This legislative structure simultaneously promotes 
both protectionist objectives set out in Chapter 2. First, the extension of 
vicarious liability can be seen as an attempt to "responsibilize" social tenants 
and utilise their informal control over other members of their household, 
promoting management through discipline beyond the state.44 Additionally, 
however, it seeks to ensure that a landlord is able to exclude a household and 
consequently provide relief for an affected community, even when the 
perpetrator of bad behaviour is not the tenant. If only the anti-social behaviour 
of an individual in a contractual relationship with the landlord could give rise 
to a right to possession, the community affected by the conduct of a dependent 
or associate operating from the home would be unable to effectively protect the 
victims through eviction. 
Resort to vicarious liability of tenants in possession proceedings is 
associated in practice with one particular category of householder. Both the 
cases that have come before the Court of Appeal and academic research 
illustrate that such proceedings are disproportionately brought against 
44 D Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
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households headed by a single female whose dependent children or partners 
are the perpetrators of the anti-social behaviour.45 This form of liability can 
therefore be seen as a component of the increasing responsibility expected of 
parents for their children by the state.46 
Whilst this form of vicarious liability has the potential to intensify the 
power of eviction as a tool of social control, it has also proved an area of 
controversy before the courts. Concern has arisen in particular when possession 
proceedings are brought against a tenant for the behaviour of a dependent that 
she is clearly incapable of controlling. In three important appellate cases such 
defendants have argued that possession should always be refused in such a 
situation because the tenant is not personally at fault for the anti-social 
behaviour. In Kensington & Chelsea Royal BC v Simmonds47 Mrs. Simmonds, a 
single parent living in a council maisonette, appealed against a decision to grant 
the local authority a suspended possession order in respect of her flat after her 
teenaged son was found to have caused annoyance and offence to neighbours 
amounting to a breach of the tenancy agreement. In Portsmouth CC ·u Bryanf4B an 
elderly tenant living with her teenage grandchildren was the subject of 
possession proceedings for their serious anti-social behaviour. And in Gallagher 
v Castle Vale HAT,49 Mrs. Gallagher had been left by her husband to look after 
her errant daughter, who had engaged in serious nuisance behaviour around 
the Castle Vale estate with her boyfriend. 
In each case, it was argued that the tenant had not acquiesced in the 
offending conduct. Indeed, Mrs. Simmonds had tried and failed to control her 
sons, whilst Mrs. Bryant and Mrs. Gallagher were also clearly incapable of 
taking action to restrain the behaviour of their respective children. However, 
the appeals were all refused by the Court of Appeal. It pointed out, rightfully, 
that Ground 2 made absolutely no reference to the need for fault on the part of 
the tenant. More importantly, however, it held that to interpret the statute in 
45 J Nixon and C Hunter, 'Taking the blame and losing the home: women and anti-social behaviour' 
(2001) 23(4) JSWFL 395. 
46 See for example the criminal liability of a parent for a child's failure to attend school (Education Act 
1996, s444), or the development of parenting orders and contracts (e.g. Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, 
Part 3 ). 
47 (1997) 29 HLR 507. 
48 (2000) 32 HLR 906. 
49 [2001] EWCA Civ 944. 
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this way would undermine the effective protection of the community. As Simon 
Brown LJ said in Bryant: 
"As to the justice of the position, it must be remembered that not only are 
the interests of the tenant and her family here at stake; so too are the 
interests of their neighbours. It would in my judgment be quite intolerable 
if they were to be held necessarily deprived of all possibility of relief in 
these cases, merely because some ineffectual tenant next door was 
incapable of controlling his or her household."SO 
Thus the Court made clear that effective public protection demanded in such 
circumstances that even those tenants without personal involvement in 
offending conduct should not be excluded from liability. Although the personal 
blame of the tenant was a relevant consideration as to the reasonableness of a 
possession order, it was not decisive of an application for relie£.51 Simon Brown 
LJ held that to decide otherwise would be contrary to all common sense and 
justice. This authority, establishing the blamelessness of a tenant as merely a 
relevant consideration when assessing reasonableness, has done little to prevent 
the eviction of such households. Every one of the Court of Appeal decisions 
upheld or imposed possession orders on these women-headed households. It 
appears, therefore, that the protectionist concerns of the Court have consistently 
trumped the lack of personal responsibility for the behaviour of the 
perpetrators on the part of the tenant. 
What is particularly interesting, however, is that the judgments of the 
Court of Appeal also support the earlier contention of this thesis that public 
protection through punitive sanctions has been justified through resort to 
moralistic assessments of targeted individuals.52 In this case, Nixon and Hunter 
point out that the Court of Appeal appears to have further justified its approach 
by passing judgement upon the women subject to proceedings: operating as a 
result of a convergence between the moral discourse associated with both anti-
social behaviour and the stigmatisation of 'lone mothers' blamed for 
delinquency amongst young people.53 The Court of Appeal too appears to have 
50 (2000) 32 HLR 906 at 912. 
51 Newcastle CC v Morrison [2000] L & TR 333 at 342 per May LJ. 
52 See Chapter 5. 
53 Nixon and Hunter, above 45. 
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adopted a punitive tone. In particular, Simon Brown LJ referred in Bryant to the 
need to ensure that a remedy for the community through possession is not 
precluded because "a cowardly and ineffectual wife or mother cmmot prevent 
her husband or family from intimidating the neighbourhood and making their 
neighbours' lives a misery".54 
Yet whilst there is evidence that the Court of Appeal has passed moral 
judgement on some of these women, blaming them for their inability to control 
their household, in other cases there has been explicit recognition of the 
difficulties faced by the tenant. In Newcastle CC v Morrison, for example, the 
judge reminded the court that the defendant "is a single parent with a small son 
to house and provide for and one sympathises at a personal level with a mother 
who is unable to control one or both of two rampaging, destructive, 
intimidating and, at times, dangerous teenage sons" .ss However, the judge still 
went on to order possession of the property, to ensure relief for those affected 
by the anti-social behaviour. On balance then, it is submitted that whilst there 
are signs that moral judgements have shaped the decisions of the court, the 
ultimate objective is not punishment but the securing of protection for the 
community through eviction, which will always outweigh other considerations 
irrespective of the degree of perceived fault of the tenant. 
Possession proceedings are therefore currently stacked against the 
blameless tenant. However, it should be noted finally that although the majority 
may have consistently prioritised public protection in these cases, there has 
been a murmur of dissent from the bench. Statements by Lord Justice Sedley in 
the cases of Bn;ant and Gallagher have sought to argue that the ability of a court 
to evict in circumstances in which a tenant is entirely blameless is contrary to 
justice, particularly on human rights grounds. It is to this particular challenge to 
the structure of nuisance grounds that we now turn. 
In Bryant, the earlier decision, Sedley LJ clearly placed considerable 
importance upon the negative impact on an innocent occupier of what he 
deemed a "penal provision". As he pointed out: "The loss of one's home is after 
all not even something which a criminal court can impose by way of sentence, 
54 (2000) 32 HLR 906 at 910. 
55 [2000] L & TR 333 at 343. 
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let alone on a basis of strict liability."56 Further, he explicitly criticised the moral 
judgement of Court in Simmonds and Bryant that the tenants were in fact 
blameworthy because of their inability to effectively control their children: that 
the court was "acting as a moral censor of inadequate parenting" .57 However, it 
is notable that his Lordship did not confront the primary argument of the 
majorities in the Court that in such circumstances the relief for the community 
through eviction of the household must be prioritised and as such did not 
justify his decision in the light of this issue. 
He went on to point out that although the nuisance ground itself did not 
as a matter of statutory interpretation preclude the eviction of a blameless 
tenant, it would be quite possible to incorporate this rule into the 
reasonableness requirement, which he then went on to do. He stated: 
The rigour of this provision, which in its second limb may be independent 
of any fault on the tenant's part, is mitigated by the requirement of section 
84(2) that no possession order may be made unless the court considers it 
reasonable to do so. It may very well be unreasonable to make even a 
suspended order against somebody who will be powerless to rectify the 
situation and it will almost certainly be unreasonable to make an outright 
order against such a person."58 
It should be noted that this passage does not completely preclude the eviction 
of a 'blameless' tenant without the capacity to control her household. What it 
does suggest is an extremely weighty presumption (that it would be 'almost 
certainly unreasonable' to order full possession) in favour of the tenant in such 
circumstances. This is of course a far more drastic conclusion than the 
majority's belief that blamelessness would provide merely a 'relevant 
consideration' in favour of a refusal. 
Lord Justice Sedley noted in BnJant that the provisions of Human Rights 
Act 1998 were not yet in force. However, he suggested that in a future case a 
decision in such circumstances might be further affected by the obligation 
imposed on courts by section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to interpret 
legislation as far as possible with respect to human rights. As we have seen the 
56 (2000) 32 HLR 906 at 915. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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judgment in Howard has ensured that the requirement of proportionality adds 
little to judicial discretion here and, as such, the rights of the community would 
still be likely to take precedence. However, Sedley LJ got his opportunity to 
comment on the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 upon the vicarious 
liability of a tenant in Gallagher v Castle Vale HAT.59 He stated, once again obiter, 
as follows: 
"It has not been necessary to address the question whether Ground 2 of 
Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985, by in some circumstances rendering a 
tenant liable to eviction because of a visitor's conduct, creates a strict 
liability incompatible with the Convention. It may be that the question 
need never arise so long as, in a case like tl1e present, the reasonableness of 
making an order is conditioned by the extent to which the tenant has it 
within her power to stop or control the presence or activity of her visitors. 
If no order for possession, certainly no outright order, may be made 
without regard to the question of participation or acquiescence on the 
tenant's part, there will in practical reality be no strict liability to contend 
witl1." 60 
What is clear from this passage is that reasonableness should be assessed 
according to the extent to which the tenant is capable of controlling the 
behaviour: an apparently identical conclusion to that reached by the majority 
who argued that fault should form a 'relevant consideration'. However, what is 
less obvious is whether ultimately Sedley LJ used the Human Rights Act here to 
go beyond his 'weighty presumption' in Bn;ant and guarantee a tenant full 
protection from eviction for the behaviour of their households if she could be 
found entirely blameless through lack of capacity to control the perpetrator. It is 
submitted that indeed this is what the passage seems to suggest. Only by 
precluding an outright order for possession in the absence of any 'participation 
or acquiescence' on the part of the tenant could a court avoid entirely the 
question of strict liability arising incompatibly with the European Convention, 
as envisaged by his Lordship. 
Interestingly, Sedley LJ further supported his argument by emphasising in 
Bn;ant that in such circumstances the availability of alternative remedies may 
well affect the appropriateness of possession as they would impose a sanction 
59 [2001] EWCA Civ 944. 
60 Ibid., at [52]. 
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upon the perpetrator alone rather than an entire household indiscriminately, as 
was discussed above. He stated: "there are, after all, other legal expedients, not 
least under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, by which those guilty of 
anti-social conduct can be directly punished or restrained" .61 Although Sedley 
LJ mentioned the Harassment Act specifically the individualized remedies 
currently available to executive agencies include ASBOs and housing 
injunctions in addition to criminal prosecution under the 1997 Act. He 
supported his conclusion with reference to Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights which had not yet come into force via the 
Human Rights Act 1998, suggesting that if the landlord is capable of using more 
targeted sanctions it may well not be proportionate to grant a possession order 
given the harm it would cause other members of the household, all of whom 
will suffer interference of their Article 8 rights on eviction.62 
Lord Justice Sedley clearly reached his dissenting opinion on grounds of 
legal principle. He was concerned to ensure that personal responsibility of a 
tenant should form the basis of a possession order because of his reluctance to 
countenance strict liability. However, his reasoning accords indirectly with the 
holistic approach to anti-social behaviour discussed in Chapter 5. The women in 
these cases arguably required support from the state not punishment, given 
their lack of capacity to control their errant household. As we saw eviction is 
unlikely to provide sustainable protection without tackling, in this case, the 
parenting skills of the tenant. The research does expose the reactive approach of 
landlords themselves. Shockingly, in two-thirds of the cases examined by Nixon 
and Hunter, the landlords did not visit the tenant prior to seeking possession of 
the home and in seven out of ten cases at no stage sought to bring support 
agencies into play to try and resolve their parenting difficulties. 63 However, the 
majority of the Court of Appeal failed to appreciate the limited value of 
possession in providing long term solutions for these troubled families. It is 
unclear whether the Court of Appeal will sanction Sedley LJ' s approach. Until 
61 (2000) 32 HLR 906 at 919. 
62 See Lambeth LBC v Howard (200 l) 33 HLR 58. 
63 Nixon and Hunter, above 45. 
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then the Court of Appeal, and trial judges, will continue to be able to evict this 
particularly vulnerable class of household with worrying ease. 
(e) The future: restructuring the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal 
Whilst on the one hand continuing to emphasise that the decisions of trial 
judges in possession proceedings should rarely be interfered with, the Court of 
Appeal has in practice meddled considerably with the judicial decision-making 
process. This section has highlighted the extent to which it has overturned first 
instance decisions by excluding considerations relating to the welfare of the 
perpetrator or his household. However, it has also engaged in substantive 
scrutiny of the lower courts by deeming many original decisions 'palpably 
wrong' for failing to place enough weight upon the need for public protection.64 
There are signs that this substantive scrutiny may become more frequent 
in future cases. In Castle Vale HAT v Gallagher Sedley LJ held that it was open to 
him to exercise full discretion on the facts as established by the trial judge. He 
stated: 
"Section 77(6) of the County Courts Act 1984 does not in its terms exclude 
the possibility of an appeal on the question of reasonableness. What are 
not appealable, by virtue of it, are the judge's findings on the primary facts 
relevant to that judgment. It seems to me that, taking the primary facts as 
found by the judge below, the intrinsic reasonableness of granting or 
withholding a possession order, or of suspending or not suspending such 
an order, and not merely its public law rationality, will be open to this 
court in a proper case. By a proper case I mean not a marginal case but an 
erroneous appraisal of reasonableness whether in favour of or against the 
granting of a possession order."65 
Concern that trial judges have failed to grant possession orders in cases of 
serious anti-social behaviour appears to have encouraged the Court of Appeal 
to provide itself with greater power to reject decisions in favour of anti-social 
households. What constitutes an 'erroneous appraisal of reasonableness' as 
compared to a 'marginal case' is open to question, though it appears to 
countenance a lesser requirement than that the original decision is 'palpably 
64 See Bristol CC v Mousah [ 1997] 30 HLR 32. 
65 [2001] EWCA Civ 944 at [39]. 
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wrong'. It thus seems to pave the way for a more intrusive appellate 
jurisdiction. 
2. Introductory and demoted tenancies 
As we saw in Chapter 2, the introductory tenancy regime following the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in McLellan now enables possible challenges to 
a landlord's decision to evict under Article 8 of the European Convention to be 
made through judicial review on adjournment of possession proceedings. This 
process will inevitably extend also to the demoted tenancy. This opens up the 
decision-making of a council landlord, but not as yet an RSL, to an 'anxious 
scrutiny' of its decision to seek possession for anti-social behaviour by the High 
Court. Although this does not amount to a rehearing of the merits of that 
decision, and a defendant must gain permission from the county court before 
proceeding to judicial review, it may well provide an opportunity to challenge 
the decision as disproportionate given the effect eviction will have on the 
household. 
3. Anti-social behaviour orders and injunctions 
Both the anti-social behaviour order and injunction are discretionary forms 
of relief. If the statutory requirements are satisfied a court may, rather than 
must, grant either remedy. Arguably, this residual discretion provides potential 
scope for mitigating pleas enabling the court to refocus attention towards the 
needs of the perpetrator and refuse an order on grounds of the effect that it will 
have upon him. The role of this residual discretion in the context of a section 
187B injunction to restrain planning breaches under the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1990 was recently considered by the House of Lords in the case of 
South Bucks DC v Porter,66 and it is submitted that a number of important 
considerations can be drawn from that decision. 
In Porter the House of Lords refused primarily to accept the argument of 
the claimant local authorities that in order not to impinge upon their 
administrative planning role the residual discretion of the court could only be 
66 [2003] UKHL 26. 
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exercised if the decision to apply for the injunction was Wednesbury reasonable. 
Instead, they concluded that the jurisdiction of the court, "inherent in the 
concept of an injunction", was an 'original' rather than 'supervisory' 
jurisdiction and therefore the court "may but need not grant [it], depending on 
its judgment of all the circumstances".67 However, this discretion was not 
unfettered and must be "exercised with due regard to the purpose for which the 
power was conferred". This does appear to provide the necessary scope for the 
court to assess the interests of the defendant as well as the primary purpose of 
an ASBO or injunction, which is of course to ensure the protection of the public 
through restraint of anti-social behaviour. 
However, their Lordships then confirmed that in ordering an injunction a 
court does not contemplate that it will be disobeyed: "apprehension that a party 
may disobey an order should not deter the court from making an order 
otherwise appropriate: there is not one law for the law-abiding and another for 
the lawless and truculent" .68 This principle problematically limits the use that a 
defendant to an application for an injunction or ASBO might make of the 
residual discretion of the court. The most likely plea is that the effect of a 
potential punishment on breach, particularly criminal punishment, may be 
unjustifiably severe. However, this is apparently a consideration that the court 
is unable to take into account. Furthermore, this refusal to acknowledge the 
consequences of a potential breach also limits the opportunity for a defendant 
to argue that alternative methods of tackling anti-social behaviour would be 
more appropriate than an injunction or ASBO. If the court is unable to consider 
the impact of breach, a defendant cannot logically argue that an injunction or 
ASBO is a worse approach to take than any other more holistic approach which 
does not place the defendant at risk of punishment on breach. 
However, the anti-social behaviour order provides a defendant with 
another route, beyond residual discretion, by which he might argue for 
consideration of alternative remedies. A judge may only grant an order if he is 
satisfied that it is "necessary" to protect others from further anti-social conduct. 
Further, judges may only impose restrictions upon the defendant which they 
67 Ibid. at [28]. 
68 Ibid. at [32]. 
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are satisfied are also necessary to achieve this objective. It is arguable that the 
concept of necessity might be harnessed to support the use of an ASBO as a last 
resort. The dictionary definition of necessity is 'absolutely essential'. This 
suggests the absence of any other alternative means by which to bring the 
conduct to an end. As Reid argues, "how can an order be necessary if every 
other method to prevent the behaviour has not been exhausted?"69 Thus, one 
might expect that it would be open to defence counsel to argue that a social 
landlord seeking the remedy should first show that it had attempted to use 
other less drastic measures to resolve the problem. However, this approach 
does not accord with the government's own guidance on the use of the orders 
which makes clear that social landlords should not rely on ASBOs as a last 
resort, but are free to use them to nip problems in the bud.7° Indeed, Reid goes 
on to suggest that in practice the courts will adopt a "reasonableness" test to 
avoid such a strict threshold.71 
4. Conclusions 
Chapter 5 assessed the legal tools available to social landlords to manage 
anti-social behaviour against the backdrop of the welfarist critique of this 
punitive approach to the problem. The critique highlighted the limited capacity 
of disciplinary and exclusionary techniques of social control in ensuring 
sustainable protection of the residents of vulnerable neighbourhoods and the 
long term exacerbation of social exclusion it threatens. This chapter, however, 
changed the perspective from politics to law, and asked: to what extent can the 
welfare of a perpetrator of anti-social behaviour provide a defence in 
applications for a particular form of relief? 
Though the reasonableness requirement in proceedings for possession of 
an assured or secure tenancy has the capacity to incorporate such 
considerations, it has been narrowed considerably through successive decisions 
by the Court of Appeal. As such, whilst the protection of the public has been 
69 M Reid, 'Anti-social behaviour orders: some current issues" (2002) 24(2) JSWFL 205. 
70 See Chapter 5. 
71 Although drawing on European jurisprudence he suggests that necessity under the ECHR does not 
mean 'indispensible' but is more strict than 'reasonable': Handyside v UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737 at [48] 
and Olsson v Sweden (1989) 11 EHRR 259 at 286. 
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emphasised formally through the new structured discretion introduced by the 
Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, a judge was already able to refuse possession in 
'exceptional circumstances' in cases involving serious conduct under the 
Mousah presumption; was preventing from considering alternative remedies 
and could not engage in any assessment of the outcome of future applications 
to the council for rehousing. Although subject to the criticism of Sedley LJ, there 
is also no defence if a tenant is not at fault for the behaviour of his or her 
household. 
There has not been the same amount of litigation over the operation of 
judicial discretion in the case of the introductory and demoted tenancies and 
injunctive powers. However, this thesis has made a few preliminary 
observations. The Cochrane/ McLellan procedure has now opened the door to 
assessments of the compliance of a particular decision to evict an introductory 
tenant with the European Convention, and although not a rehearing on the 
merits and subject to considerable procedural hurdles it may provide a setting 
within which a defendant can put forward mitigating arguments. There are 
other difficulties with ASBOs and injunctions. The impact on a defendant of a 
future breach, particularly criminal liability under an ASBO, cannot be 
considered as part of the residual discretion afforded to a court. What is less 
clear is whether this discretion will be used by the court to assess the 
appropriateness of alternative remedies, although this is unlikely to be 
supported by the Court of Appeal which recognises the need for certainty of 
outcome for social landlords when bringing legal proceedings. However, one 
possible route for welfarist considerations is the necessity requirement 
underpinning an application for an ASBO, which arguably demands that an 
order is granted only after consideration of other, less drastic solutions. 
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Chapter 7 
CONSIDERING THE WELlF ARE OF THE PERPETRATOR (3): 
THE INTERFACE WITH "WELFARIST" LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 
The previous chapter assessed generally the extent to which the legal 
infrastructure regulating possession proceedings, injunctions and ASBOs 
enables the courts to accept the mitigating circumstances of defendants, thereby 
tempering the protectionist objectives of the tools. This chapter, however, 
examines the interface between these tools and other legal instruments 
designed to secure the welfare of certain categories of particularly vulnerable 
individual. It explores in particular important recent conflicts that have arisen 
in the courts between public protection and duties owed towards, first, the 
mentally ill and, second, children. 
1. Public protection and the mentally-ill 
In May 2003 the Social Exclusion Unit engaged in a major consultation on 
Mental Health and Social Exclusion.l Its subsequent report sought to establish 
reasons for, and solutions to, the particular exclusion experienced by the 
mentally impaired. Centrally, the report emphasises the stigma and 
discrimination experienced by people with mental health problems and the 
difficulties they face in accessing basic services, often exacerbating their 
symptoms. 
Housing problems are highlighted as a fundamental issue in the 
document, under the heading 'Getting the basics right'. Those with 'serious and 
enduring' mental health problems are now predominantly housed in 
mainstream accommodation following the closure of long-stay psychiatric 
hospitals. They are one and a half times more likely to find themselves living in 
rented accommodation and around nine per cent are accepted by local housing 
authorities in England as being in priority need under homelessness legislation; 
1 SEU, Mental health and social exclusion: consultation document (London: ODPM, 2003); SEU, Mental 
health and social exclusion: Social Exclusion Unit report (London: ODPM, 2004). 
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a figure that has continued to increase since 1997.2 The mentally ill are therefore 
a clear concern for social housing managers. 
The report's overall housing policy is to ensure that renters are helped to 
secure appropriate accommodation and supported in sustaining their tenancies: 
"decent and stable housing is critical to providing a sense of security" .3 The 
Action Plan appended to the report advocates greater provision of support for 
the mentally ill within the Choice-based Lettings programme to allow them to 
make appropriate choices of accommodation. In the case of stability, it focuses 
entirely upon the instability arising from the risk of eviction for non-payment of 
rent experienced by the one in four mentally ill tenants, given that rent arrears 
are behind 90 per cent of possession cases. 
However, it is interesting to note that at no point in the report is mention 
made of the conflict between supporting the mentally-ill and the government's 
anti-social behaviour agenda. Yet this was a central issue for certain consultees,4 
concerned that the prevalence of mental illness and other mitigating factors 
amongst those targeted with legal sanctions for their anti-social behaviour 
might exacerbate the social exclusion of these groups. In particular the 
increased use of eviction could lead to even greater homelessness amongst 
those already highly susceptible to this problem. There was also concern that 
the government's punitive, moralistic rhetoric, and associated advocacy of 
blame and censure, could lead to further stigmatisation of mental impairment. 
Indeed, as was established above, the role of mental illness as a causal factor of 
anti-social behaviour illustrates the clear limitations of the Labour 
government's thesis that mere disrespect alone is to blame for anti-social 
behaviour. 
Social housing managers face serious dilemmas in balancing the needs of 
the mentally ill with those living around them who are potentially affected by 
their behaviour. Whilst it is obviously vital that they avoid acting upon the 
mere prejudice of other residents, conduct engaged in by an individual because 
of a mental disability can seriously impact upon the quality of life of others 
2 Ibid, Chapter 8, para 5. 
3 Ibid., Chapter 8, para 1. 
4 Mind, Mental Health and Social Exclusion: the Mind response (Mind, September 2003). 
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regardless as to whether blame can be attached to that person. Nonetheless, the 
application of the legal tools available to social landlords to the mentally ill 
starkly illustrates the proposition that a punitive approach is of limited 
potential in securing public protection and can exacerbate their social exclusion. 
Eviction may remove a tenant from the local area and thus alleviate the effects 
on his neighbours, but the consequent upheaval could increase his anti-social 
symptoms and pass on more difficult problems to both other agencies and other 
neighbourhoods. Injunctions and ASBOs, on the other hand, rely upon the 
rational evaluation of, and response to, the serious consequences on breach. Yet 
rational choice theory, whilst understandable in the context of simple 
disrespect, is of questionable value when trying to change the behaviour of 
those labouring under mental health problems. 
The following sections take a closer look at consideration of mental illness 
by the courts. Although involving a judicial development rather than an 
interface with welfarist legislation, first is an assessment of the extent to which 
expert witness statements in defence of possession proceedings have been 
accepted by the courts. Second, however, the unexpected impact of the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 on the control by landlords of the behaviour 
of their tenants is explored. 
(a) The role of' care and control' professionals in Moodt! 
It appears that welfare considerations have had some effect on the 
operation of reasonableness in possession proceedings involving mentally ill 
defendants, as can be seen in the case of Croydon LBC v Moody. 5 The claimant 
council sought to evict the defendant, Mr. Moody, from his secure tenancy for 
breach of covenants prohibiting him from causing nuisance, annoyance or 
offence to his neighbours. During the course of the trial, evidence was 
presented to the judge in the form of a psychiatrist's report and oral evidence 
that the defendant was suffering from a complex personality disorder. The 
psychiatrist had noted that possession could result in the exacerbation of the 
illness, which was itself likely to be susceptible to treatment. 
5 [1998] EWCA Civ 1683. 
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However, the evidence was disregarded by the court. The trial judge 
found it unsatisfactory on the basis that the psychiatrist could not have formed 
an opinion of the defendant after only one meeting. The judge, further, 
remained personally unconvinced that the defendant was suffering from any 
form of mental illness. His judgment concluded: 
"Whether the behaviour is deliberate - I have no reason to doubt that it is 
deliberate - and the intention behind the behaviour - the intention in my 
judgment is to get his own way in respect of anything which concerns him 
and the opinions and feelings of other people are irrelevant" .6 
After noting that the defendant had "made life quite intolerable" for his 
neighbours and that they were entitled to protection, he granted a possession 
order on the grounds that it would not be unreasonable to do so. 
The defendant appealed on the basis that the judge was wrong to 
disregard expert evidence relating to his mental health which could have 
explained his anti-social behaviour. Allowing the appeal and ordering a retrial 
on the issue of reasonableness, the Court of Appeal held that the judge had 
been wrong to disregard the evidence of the psychiatrist who had undoubtedly 
formed an opinion as to the defendant's condition, and to conclude that there 
was no medical explanation for the defendant's behaviour? In considering 
whether it was reasonable to grant an order to facilitate the eviction of the 
defendant, the judge should have had regard to evidence that the defendant's 
condition was susceptible to treatment. 
The decision in Moody secures the position of the professional expert in 
possession proceedings. It enables such a witness to provide the court with an 
assessment of the welfare needs of the mentally ill which in that particular case 
had been sidelined in favour of the judge's own (moral) perceptions of the 
defendant's character. As such, the place of 'care and control' discourses in 
possession proceedings has been affirmed: a development to be welcomed. 
6 Ibid at [10]. 
7 Cf Bristol CC v Mousah ( 1997) 30 HLR 32 per Thorpe LJ. The trial judge, relying on expert evidence, 
refused to order possession on the ground, inter alia, that Mr. Mousah had schizophrenia which could be 
made worse by eviction. This evidence was rejected by the Court of Appeal on balance, given a statement 
by Mousah himself that he had suffered from schizophrenia in the past and doubt was cast also on the 
reliability of the witness' oral testimony. 
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(b) Section 22 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995: Brazier and Romano 
The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 was enacted to provide disabled 
individuals with protection against discrimination on grounds of their 
condition; in particular, discrimination in employment and in accessing goods 
and services. Section 22(3)(c) of that Act states that it is unlawful for a person 
managing any premises to discriminate against a disabled person occupying 
those premises by evicting the disabled person, or subjecting him to any other 
detriment. By section 24(1) an individual discriminates against a disabled 
person if (a) for a reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he 
treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat others to whom that 
reason does or would not apply; and (b) he cannot show that the treatment in 
question is justified. Treatment can be justified, however, if in the opinion of the 
manager of the premises the treatment, inter alia, is necessary in order not to 
endanger the health or safety of any person (which may include that of the 
disabled person) and it is reasonable, in all the circumstances of the case, for 
him to hold that opinion.s 
Surprisingly it was not until March 2003, eight years after the passing of 
the 1995 Act, that the possible consequence of the provision for landlords 
seeking to evict a disabled tenant was considered by the courts. In North Devon 
Homes Limited v Brazier9 the High Court was required to reconcile the discretion 
to grant a possession order for anti-social behaviour with the protections 
afforded by the 1995 Act. Christine Brazier was found by the court to have 
caused considerable distress to her neighbours as a direct result of a chronic 
mental illness. It was accepted by both parties that she was clearly a disabled 
person for the purposes of the 1995 Act given the presence of a "mental 
impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability 
to carry out normal day-to-day activities" .10 It was therefore argued by the 
8 
ss 24(2) and 24(3 )(a) 
9 [2003] L&TR 26. 
10 DDA 1995, s I (I) and Schedule I. See also Disability Discrimination (Meaning of Disability) 
Regulations 1996 and Guidance on matters to be taking into account in determining questions relating to 
the definition of disability issued by the Secretary of State pursuant to powers conferred by s 3, DDA 
1995 and DRC, Code of Practice on Rights of Access, Goods, Facilities, Services and Premises, May 
2002. 
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defendant that under section 22(3)(c) it was illegal to discriminate against her 
by evicting her from her home and, consequently, that it was unreasonable to 
evict her under the Housing Act 1988. 
Although the trial judge found that the claimant's decision to evict was 
unlawful under the 1995 Act, he held that it was nonetheless reasonable to 
order possession of the property. The defendant appealed to the High Court. In 
arguing that tl1e eviction complied with section 22(3)(c), North Devon Homes 
first contended that it had not treated the appellant less favourably than it 
would "others" without disability who behaved in the same way. The court 
held, following the leading decision of Clark v Novacold Ltd.,ll that as Ms. 
Brazier's behaviour was caused by her disability it should not be counted as an 
attribute of others for the purpose of comparison. The defendant need only 
show that the unfavourable treatment of the landlord was a response to 
conduct resulting from the disability rather than the fact of the disability per se. 
The landlord then sought to convince the court that eviction was in any 
case justified according to the grounds contained in sections 24(2) and 24(3)(a). 
It argued to this end that it was of the opinion that eviction was necessary in 
order not to endanger the health or safety of any person, and that it was 
reasonable given all the circumstances of the case to hold that opinion. 
Importantly, David Steel J suggested that to endanger health and safety Ms. 
Brazier would have to constitute an "actual physical risk" to her neighbours.12 
He concluded, however, that there was no indication that North Devon Homes 
were of the opinion that this was the case, nor that it reasonable to reach such a 
conclusion from the facts. 
The landlord's conduct in bringing the application was thus unlawful by 
virtue of the 1995 Act. However, whilst the trial judge had accepted this fact, he 
further held that this did not in itself preclude the making of a possession order 
and that in the particular circumstances it was reasonable to do so, given the 
need to protect the tenants affected by Ms. Brazier's conduct. Ultimately, he 
concluded that the 1995 Act should not be allowed to override the discretion of 
the court under the Housing Act 1988. The High Court disagreed. It was indeed 
II [1999] ICR 951. 
12 [2003] L&TR 26 at [21]. 
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also unreasonable to grant a possession order which promoted an unlawful act 
by the claimants, unless that decision could be legitimated under section 24 of 
the 1995 Act: as David Steel J concluded in his judgment, "the 1995 Act 
furnishes its own code for justified eviction which requires a higher 
threshold" .13 It was this Act, rather than the Housing Act 1988, that established 
the necessary restrictions on interference with the defendant's right to respect 
for her home under Article 8 and as such the 1988 Act must be read in 
accordance with it under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
The Brazier litigation came as a considerable shock to social landlords who 
had apparently failed to appreciate the impact of the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 on housing legislation before this point.l4 However, the trial judge's 
reluctance to allow the rights of a mentally ill tenant under discrimination law 
to trump the discretion of the court provided for by the Housing Acts illustrates 
the unwelcome tension this threshold has created with the contemporary 
protectionist approach to eviction. The Housing Acts provide broad discretion 
to the courts to balance the competing interests of landlords, tenants and those 
affected by anti-social behaviour taking into account all the circumstances of the 
case. The 1995 Act, which is not obviously designed to respond to situations of 
neighbour nuisance, appears instead to draw a bright line restricting the 
exercise of this discretion, requiring evidence supporting a reasonable belief in 
the necessity of eviction to protect others from an actual physical risk. 
The interface between the Acts was scrutinised at greater length by the 
Court of Appeal in the dual cases of Manchester Cihj Council v Romano and 
Samari.l5 The council sought to evict tenants because of anti-social behaviour. In 
one case the problem was noise nuisance including children's music and DIY at 
anti-social hours, in the other, harassment of neighbours including threats of 
violence. In each case the tenants again raised the 1995 Act as a defence. Each of 
the tenants was suffering from a disability by way of mental impairment, said 
13 Ibid. at [24]. 
14 In the Romano case discussed below, Brooke LJ explained that the Court of Appeal were "told by very 
experienced leading counsel that it was the publicity given to [the Brazier] judgement in March 2003 
which attracted general attention for the first time to the possible need for a court to take the 1995 Act 
into account when assessing the reasonableness of making a possession order": [2004] EWCA Civ 834 at 
[19]. 
15 [2004] EWCA Civ 834. 
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to be causal of their behaviour. However, in both cases the Court of Appeal, 
whilst approving the construction of section 22 adopted in Brazier, held that the 
evictions were justified on the grounds of danger to health and safety to 
neighbours. 
Of greater import, however, were the general conclusions drawn by the 
Court about the practical legitimacy of the Disability Discrimination Act in the 
context of housing management. The Court was clearly concerned that as 
"policy-driven modern legislation which has not been subjected to rigorous 
scrutiny",16 the 1995 Act had the potential to create serious, unforeseen and 
unwarranted problems for landlords. It was concerned in particular that the Act 
extended not only to residential properties but to business tenancies; that a 
tenant could prevent possession for rent arrears if he could establish that non-
payment was the consequence of his mental disability and that private 
landlords might be found guilty of causing detriment to a tenant even when 
seeking possession on a mandatory ground under the Housing Act 1988.17 The 
court also confirmed that a social landlord can be guilty of discrimination under 
the 1995 Act even if it is unaware that he or she is mentally ill. It concluded: 
"Unless Parliament takes rapid remedial action ... the courts may be 
confronted with a deluge of cases in which disabled tenants are resisting 
possession proceedings by these ... means .... Parliament ought to review 
this legislation at an early date. ... [I]t can lead to absurd and unfair 
consequences ... "18 
More importantly, the Court of Appeal specifically emphasised the particular 
difficulties faced by a social landlord seeking to tackle anti-social behaviour. It 
noted that local authorities and RSLs are now obliged to draw up policies in 
relation to ASB under 218A of the Housing Act 1996, and that courts are 
statutorily bound to have regard to the effect of anti-social behaviour on other 
residents. However, the demands imposed by the Act could prevent the 
effective protection of neighbours from the nuisance behaviour of mentally ill 
tenants in cases where the health and safety of others is not in danger. 
16 Ibid., at [67]. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., at [68] and [121]. 
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The Court of Appeal was also concerned that the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 has consequences, not simply for possession proceedings but other 
legal remedies available to social landlords to respond to anti-social tenants. 
Section 22(3)(c) actually states, in full, that "[i]t is unlawful for a person 
managing any premises to discriminate against a disabled person occupying 
those premises by evicting the disabled person, or subjecting him to any other 
detriment." The Court noted that "other detriment" would likely include other 
tools available to a social landlord to tackle anti-social behaviour, including 
housing injunctions and ASBOs. Thus they may find their powers to deal with a 
mentally ill anti-social tenant further circumscribed. 
The court suggested, in particular, that if a landlord obtains an injunction 
restraining a mentally disabled tenant from anti-social behaviour it will not be 
able to enforce that injunction by committal proceedings unless it can establish 
to the criminal standard of proof that it held an opinion on one of the matters 
specified in section 24(3) of the Act and that it was reasonable in all the 
circumstances of the case for it to hold that opinion. It is arguable that a housing 
injunction or an anti-social behaviour order, in itself, particularly involving 
exclusion from public spaces, would constitute 'detriment' to the tenant or a 
member of his or her household. Furthermore, one can easily foresee difficulties 
thrown up by the introductory tenancy regime. Subject to the completion of an 
internal appeal, the court is obliged to order possession of an introductory 
tenancy. Presumably, it would be left to the judicial review procedure 
established in Cochrane and McLellan to hold the landlord's decision to evict 
illegal according to the 1995 Act. 
However, the concerns of the Court have been effectively resolved in 
practice through an example of restrictive statutory interpretation. In Brazier, 
David Steel J held that in order for a social landlord to justify an application for 
possession as necessary in order to prevent the endangerment of the health and 
safety of others, it would have to satisfy itself that the tenant presented 'an 
actual physical risk' to members of the public. In Romano, Brooke LJ 
reconfigured this standard. Claiming to interpret the 1995 Act in compliance 
with the Article 8 rights of the defendants' neighbours, he adopted instead the 
146 
World Health Organisation definition of health: 'A state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease and 
infirmity'.19 By adopting such a low threshold, the Court of Appeal has 
considerably restricted the impact of the 1995 Act. Continuous tiredness from 
frequent loss of sleep, depression sufficient to require medical treatment, and 
stress on relationships, are all likely to entitle the landlord to conclude that 
eviction is justified (although trivial risks to health will have to be disregarded). 
Thus, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 has unexpectedly 
reconfigured the balance that a social landlord can strike between public 
protection and its welfare obligations towards the mentally ill. However, whilst 
Brazier incorporated into the crime control function of social landlords a far 
higher standard of care requiring threats of physical harm to others rather than 
the broad notion of nuisance instituted by the Housing Acts, the Court of 
Appeal in Romano has effectively neutralised the provision. Clearly the choice of 
the WHO definition was a deliberate attempt by the Court, dissatisfied by the 
1995 Act as whole, to provide social landlords with maximum flexibility to 
decide on the most appropriate balance between the interests of a mentally ill 
tenant and those affected by his or her behaviour. In that respect it represents 
the priority of public protection over the welfare rights of the mentally-ill. 
Whether the decision should be treated as an unjustifiable rejection by the 
judiciary of the clear will of the legislature, or a necessary response to an over-
inclusive and unworkable statute, is uncertain. 
It should be noted nevertheless that the 1995 Act still places important 
demands on social landlords. Housing officers will need to adopt a more 
proactive approach to mental illness given that evidence of the requisite 
opinion to justification will need to be provided and, furthermore, that the 
landlord may still be acting unlawfully when unaware of the tenant's condition. 
Indeed, the Court did recognise that the need to ascertain whether the eviction 
is justified under the 1995 Act might have positive consequences for the 
practices of social landlords: 
19 Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946). 
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"This judgment shows that landlords whose tenants hold secure or 
assured tenancies must consider the position carefully before they decide 
to serve a notice seeking possession or to embark on possession 
proceedings against a tenant who is or might be mentally impaired. This is 
likely to compel a local housing authority to liaise more closely with the 
local social services authority at an earlier stage of their consideration of a 
problem that might lead to an eviction than appears to be the case with 
many authorities, to judge from some of the papers the DRC [Disability 
Rights Commission] placed before the court. To remove someone from 
their home may be a traumatic thing to do in the case of many who are not 
mentally impaired. It may be even more traumatic for the mentally 
impaired."20 
Draft guidance on the preparation of policies and procedures under the section 
218A duty now explicitly warns social landlords of the need to take into 
consideration their obligations under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. 
2. Protection of children; protection from children? 
Throughout the 20th century the law, typified by section 44(1) of the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989, 
has consistently prioritised the welfare of the child. It is an established 
approach underpinned by numerous international treaties. For example, Article 
3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child demands that all 
actions concerning a child should take account of his or her best interests. So too 
the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights which provides that: 
(1) Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary 
for their well-being. 
(2) In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities 
or private institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary 
consideration. 
Obligations are owed not only to the community affected by the behaviour of a 
child, but to the child herself. 
This has clear consequences for the prioritisation by government of public 
protection. Children are a central focus of the fears and consequent initiatives 
associated with the problem of anti-social behaviour. The "feral" teenager 
20 [2004] EWCA Civ 834 at [117]. 
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engaging in reigns of terror - joy-riding, graffiti and intimidation - has caught 
the imagination of both the public and the government itself. The effect, it is 
submitted, is a political development from a focus on the protection of children 
to protection from children. Revealingly, whilst the then Labour government in 
1968 published a White Paper entitled Children in Trouble,21 the current 
government instead entitled its own policy document on the reform of youth 
justice No More Excuses.22 Furthermore, Section 37 of the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 states that '[i]t shall be the principal aim of the youth justice system to 
prevent offending by children and young persons'.23 
A swathe of powers are now employed to tackle anti-social behaviour by 
children: child curfews, the dispersal of groups from public spaces, the 
extension of Fixed Penalty Notices (FPNs) to sixteen to eighteen year olds, child 
safety orders and parenting orders are all directed to this aim. And of course, 
the anti-social behaviour order explicitly extends to any defendant over the age 
of ten, and predominantly targets young people. The National Children's 
Bureau has expressed concern that the government's approach to anti-social 
behaviour will further stigmatise children as trouble makers.24 Indeed as noted 
in Chapter 5 more and more children targeted by ASBOs have been brought 
within the criminal justice system. Public protection has ultimately been 
prioritised over the welfare principle. Whilst the legal foundations of the law 
relating to children have, both internationally and domestically, focused upon 
the interests and well-being of young people, the government's crime and 
disorder agenda, in particular that concerning anti-social behaviour, has sought 
to refocus upon those affected by their conduct. 
In recent months, however, challenges have been mounted to the 
operation of the anti-social behaviour order on the grounds that those seeking 
the remedy against children have failed to take into proper consideration the 
welfare of the youth defendant as well as that of the community. There are 
three aspects to this litigation: the need to pursue the 'best interests' of all 
21 (1968) Cmnd 360 I. 
22 (1997) Cm 3 809. 
23 My italics. 
24 
"Children will lose out under anti-social behaviour proposals, says NCB", 12 March 2003 contained in 
House of Commons, The Anti-social Behaviour Bill: Research Paper 03/34 (London: HMSO, 2003). 
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young defendants; the provision for anonymity of minors under the Children 
and Young Persons Act 1933 and the particular obligation of local authorities 
towards children under the Children Act 1989. 
(a) The "best interests" of children 
In R (on the application of Kenny and M) v Leeds Magistrates' Court?5 the 
defendant Luke Kenny and 65 others had been made subject to interim anti-
social behaviour orders under section 1 D of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 as 
part of West Yorkshire Police's blitz of drug-dealing in and around the Little 
London area of Leeds. Kenny was seven days from his 18th birthday when his 
order was granted by Leeds Magistrates Court. Section 1 D requires that before 
granting an ASBO the court must be satisfied that it is "just" to make the order. 
Kenny argued that in considering whether this was so, the court must 
have regard to the principle that the best interests of the child are a primary 
consideration. He relied upon the consideration of the duty on public bodies to 
have regard to the principles embodied in the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and Article 24 of the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights undertaken by Munby J in R (Howard League for Penal 
Reform) v Secretan; of State for the Home Department26 in the context of those 
under 18 detained in Young Offender Institutions. Munby J held in that case 
that whilst youth justice required the striking of a balance between the 
competing interests of the particular child and the community, the court must 
always have regard to the principle that the best interests of the child are a 
primary consideration in line with those international instruments. Owen L in 
the Kenny case, accepted this reasoning and held that it applied to an 
application for an interim order.27 
Whether the priority of the best interests of child defendants must also 
apply when a court exercises its discretion in proceedings for a full ASBO is 
questionable. The concept of 'justice' incorporated into proceedings for an 
interim ASBO is broad enough to countenance consideration of the welfare of a 
25 [2003] EWHC 2963. 
26 [2002] EWHC 2497. 
27 [2003] EWHC 2963 at [42]. 
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defendant. However, as we have seen the requirement that the order and its 
particular terms must be necessary to protect others seems to restrict 
consideration of the impact on the individual offender. Of course the court has 
a residual discretion to refuse an order even when all the requirements are 
fulfilled. However, it is unlikely that it will make use of this discretion in 
conflict with the explicit protectionist objectives of the ASBO, both in terms of 
political discourse and legal structure. 
The judgment has implications for other legal tools employed by social 
landlords. The anti-social behaviour injunction does not have a necessity 
requirement, but rests entirely upon the residual discretion of the court. As 
such, it is open to the court to incorporate best interests considerations into its 
assessment of the suitability of the remedy in the particular circumstances. In 
the case of possession proceedings for nuisance conduct under the assured and 
secure regimes the best interests of a child in possession proceedings for 
nuisance conduct should figure as part of the reasonableness requirement. 
The extension of the "best interests" principle to such proceedings 
suggests a clear movement away from protectionism. However, the impact in 
practice of the principle in these proceedings is likely to be negligible. Far from 
being determinative of an application, a primary consideration is a low 
standard, providing only additional weight to the impact of a remedy upon the 
minor.28 Furthermore, as we continue to see the courts constantly seek to 
emphasise the importance of the rights of those affected by anti-social 
behaviour, often highlighting their own Article 8 rights.29 The best interests of 
the child are a primary consideration rather than the primary consideration. It is 
therefore more than likely that although considered, the best interests of the 
child will be held to be outweighed by the equal primacy of the interests of the 
community affected by anti-social conduct. 
(b) Anonymity of children and proceedings for anti-social behaviour orders 
28 Compare for example the demand that a child's welfare is the "paramount consideration" ins 1(l)(a) of 
the Children Act 1989. The term has been defined by the courts as meaning that the welfare of the child is 
the sole consideration of the court. The interests of other adults and other children are not relevant if they 
are affected by anti-social behaviour, but only if they might affect the welfare of the child in question: J v 
C [ 1970] AC 668 and Lord Hobhouse in Dawson v Wearmouth [ 1999] I FLR 1167. 
29 See, for example, McCann [2002] UKHL 39 and Howard (2001) 33 HLR 58. 
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The Children and Young Persons Act 1933 seeks to protect the welfare of 
children in a variety of situations. As part of this objective it provides for the 
anonymity of those under eighteen involved in legal proceedings. Section 49 
demands that child defendants in proceedings in youth courts enjoy automatic 
anonymity, although section 49(4A) provides a power to overturn this 
presumption in the public interest. However, this provision has been seen by 
the government as at odds with the effective use of anti-social behaviour orders. 
Government guidance on the order explicitly advocates the identification of the 
perpetrator as part of a post-application media strategy.3o This approach is 
justified on two grounds. First, identification has practical surveillance benefits 
as the local population can police potential breaches of the order. Second, it 
reassures the public that something is being done about anti-social behaviour 
and deters future offending. 
As such, the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 has revoked section 49 for the 
purpose of proceedings for a section 1C anti-social behaviour order brought in a 
youth court. Instead, all applications for anti-social behaviour orders are 
governed by section 39 of the CYPA 1933, which allows courts the power to 
prohibit the publication of identifying information in newspapers in certain 
circumstances. 
In T v St Albans Crown Court,31 Elias J considered the principles a court 
should follow when deciding upon the appropriateness of a section 39 order 
with respect to proceedings for an anti-social behaviour order. Refusing to 
accept the argument of defence counsel that given the practical importance of 
identifying those young people subject to ASBOs there should be a 
presumption against a section 39 order, the judge held that a balance should be 
struck on a case-by-case basis between the following considerations drawn 
from the decision of Simon Brown LJ in R v Worcester Crown Court ex parte B:32 
(i) whether there are good reasons for naming the defendant; 
(ii) the age of the offender and the potential damage of public 
identification of a young person as a criminal; 
30 Home Office, Guidance on the use of ASBOs and anti-social behaviour contracts (London: 1-lMSO, 
2004), p 50. 
31 [2002] EWHC 1129. 
32 [2000] I Cr App R II . 
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(iii) the duty on the court to have regard to the welfare of the child 
or young person by virtue of section 44 of the 1933 Act; 
(iv) the deterrent effect in naming the defendant in the context of 
his punishment; 
(v) the "strong public interest" in open justice; 
(vi) that each factor may be given different weight at various stages 
of proceedings and that, in particular, there may be greater 
justification for naming a defendant that has actually been found 
guilty and punished; 
(vii) that an appeal has been made may be a material consideration. 
Thus the court is expected to weigh the public interest in disclosure against the 
welfare implications for the defendant as it sees fit. However, Elias J added that 
the fact that the remedy sought is an anti-social behaviour order "reinforces, 
and in some cases may strongly reinforce" the importance of disclosure in the 
public interest. In doing so he noted, first, the relevance of the information to 
effective policing of the order and, second, that the public has a particular 
interest in knowing details of a mechanism designed specifically to protect 
them. 
The High Court in R (on the application of Keating) v Knowsley MBC33 has 
recently revisited section 39 orders in the context of applications for interim 
ASBOs.34 This time, defence counsel argued that a presumption should be made 
in favour of a section 39 order. Given that the interim proceedings do not 
constitute a conclusive finding of guilt, the presumption of innocence required 
the applicant to show "good and compelling reasons" why it should not be 
made in order to prevent the disclosure of as yet unproved allegations. 
However, Harrison J dismissed this argument too. Whilst noting that the sixth 
principle in T v St. Albans Crown Court put weight upon whether offences had 
been proved, the absence of such proof was simply a 'very important 
consideration' to balance against the public interest in publicising anti-social 
behaviour orders. 
The conclusion of the court in Keating is difficult to square not only with 
the structure of the interim order but the reasoning of the Court of Appeal 
when assessing its compatibility with the Human Rights Act 1998 in M. The 
33 [2004] EWHC 1933. 
34 [2004] EWHC 1933. 
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interim order was found not to entail the determination of a defendant's civil 
rights and obligations and as such did not engage the right to a fair trial 
provided by Article 6 because it did not constitute a full hearing on the merits 
of the decision, even though a defendant can still be prosecuted for breach. 
Furthermore, if he is a minor he will probably find his name and picture 
circulated by the police and media without yet having enjoyed a full hearing 
before a court and, in the case of an interim order without notice, having had 
any warning that proceedings were being taken against him. 
The two objectives put forward by the government and Elias J in T as 
justification for the lifting of anonymity are questionable in such circumstances. 
Reassurance of the public that action has been taken seems of low importance 
when a successful result in the subsequent full hearing will ensure ultimately 
that the public is informed. It is submitted that this consideration should be 
entirely ignored in assessing whether anonymity is required. On the other 
hand, the practical role of the public in policing the ASBO is potentially 
important. However, one can agree with defence counsel in Keating that the 
agency bringing the application for interim relief must clearly show why it is 
unable to provide the necessary policing capacity to effectively enforce the 
order. Rather than simply balancing this consideration in the abstract, as Elias J 
seems to suggest, 'clear and compelling reasons' should be required. 
(c) Duties in conflict: children in local authority care and use of the ASBO 
The crime control function of local government, once informal and 
negligible, has increased exponentially in recent years. Early legal powers were 
limited to its housing management function, but under the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 authorities have gained formal parity with the police within Crime 
and Reduction Strategic Partnerships, and the power to impose a raft of legal 
sanctions upon both recalcitrant tenants and non-tenants far beyond those 
available to social landlords. The prioritisation of crime control now expected of 
authorities is made clear by section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
which imposes a duty on every council "to exercise its various functions with 
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due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on, and the need 
to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and disorder in its area". 
Yet with crime control now such an important local authority function, it 
seems inevitable that conflicts are set to arise between the protection of 
communities and the welfarist responsibilities of councils towards vulnerable 
perpetrators. We have noted that housing departments operate according to 
protectionist discourses. Further, they view the perpetrators of anti-social 
behaviour in simple moral terms. Administratively then, whilst many housing 
departments are intent on the effective protection of communities from anti-
social conduct and seek to blame perpetrators, they can find themselves 
working in tension with the welfarist culture of social services which focuses 
upon the needs of the perpetrator. Indeed, in a recent report on the use of the 
anti-social behaviour order, Campbell noted that social services have tended to 
adopt an antagonistic position during consultation, seeking to prevent the use 
of eviction or other remedies at all costs. In particular, competing cultures are 
likely to exist within unitary authorities with responsibility for both housing 
and social services.3s 
Once such administrative conflict was highlighted by Richards J in R (AB 
& SB) v Nottingham City Counci[.36 SB was a child with severe behavioural and 
emotional problems. He was also a "child in need" for the purpose of section 17 
of the Children Act 198937 and as such the council was under a general duty to 
"safeguard and promote the welfare" of the child by providing "a range and 
level of services appropriate to [his] needs".38 However, he had also engaged in 
offending behaviour including charges of robbery, theft and ABH and, as such, 
was additionally subject to proceedings for an anti-social behaviour order. It 
was contended by the claimants that the council had unjustifiably departed 
35 S Campbell, A review of anti-social behaviour orders (London: HMSO, 2002). Compare, however, the 
research of Hunter et al, Neighbour Nuisance, Social Landlords and the Law (London: CIH/JRF, 2000), 
which suggests that the instigation of possession proceedings is often the only way in which housing 
departments can gain the attention of social services. 
36 [2001] EWHC Admin 235. 
37 A child is in need if (a) he is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or to have the opportunity of achieving or 
maintaining, a reasonable standard of health or development without the provision for him of services by 
a local authority; (b) his health or development is likely to be significantly impaired, or further impaired, 
without the provision for him of such services; or (c) he is disabled. 
38 See the important case of R (on the application of G) v London Borough of Barnet [2003] UKHL 57 for 
decision that section 17( 1) constitutes a "target duty" rather than a specific duty enforceable in private 
law. 
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from the relevant guidance which had been issued pursuant to the Local 
Authority Social Services Act 1970 s. 7(1) in relation to the duty of a local 
authority to carry out a full and proper assessment of children in need and their 
families. Judicial review was granted by the High Court. As part of his 
judgment, Richards J added: 
"I have to say that I am left with the impression that the defendant has 
concentrated unduly on the anti-social behaviour order proceedings and 
insufficiently on the discharge of its duty, in particular under section 17 of 
the Children Act, to assess SB's needs and to make provision for them. No 
doubt that focus has been the result of SB' s very serious behavioural 
problems, but those problems cannot excuse failure to comply with the 
section 17 duty" _39 
The case illustrates the administrative conflicts that can arise in practice within 
local authorities between the public protection objectives of the anti-social 
behaviour order and their welfarist obligations towards children in need. 
However, these concerns do not extend merely to administrative conflicts. 
The greater difficulty arises when legal duties arising from the welfarist role of 
councils towards perpetrators of anti-social behaviour conflict with their 
recently developed crime control functions, and threaten to preclude entirely 
the use of legal sanctions to protect others from the offending conduct. An 
example of such a situation recently identified in practice is that of an ASBO 
sought by a local authority to control the conduct of a child in its care. By virtue 
of section 31 of the Children Act 1989 a local authority can apply to the High 
Court for a care order in respect of children receiving inadequate care or even 
abuse from their parents.40 When charged with the care of a child a local 
authority is given parental responsibility for the child and is under a general 
duty to safeguard and promote his or her welfare through the provision of 
services.41 Further, it is under additional duties including that under section 
22(4), which requires the authority, before making any decision affecting the 
child, to ascertain the "wishes and feelings" of the child and any person who is 
39 [2001] EWHC Admin 235 at [48]. 
40 See further Herring, Family Law (London: Longman, 2004). 
41 Children Act 1989, s 33(3)(a) and s 22(3). 
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not a parent of his but who has parental responsibility for him and any other 
person whose wishes and feelings the authority consider to be relevant. 
Given their problems these children are often likely to engage in anti-social 
behaviour. The tension between the duties of a local authority towards a child 
in care and the use of an ASBO to control the behaviour of that child has been 
considered in the High Court in R (on the application of M) v Sheffield Magistrates' 
Court. 42 M, aged 15, was made subject in 1996 to a care order issued under 
section 31 of the Children Act 1989. Parental responsibility was from that point 
shared between his mother and Sheffield City Council. M subsequently 
engaged in a catalogue of criminal offences and lesser anti-social behaviour. In 
October 2003 the housing department of the council issued him with a 
summons for an anti-social behaviour order in response to a catalogue of 
serious offences. At the hearing for tl1e order, the council further sought an 
interim order which was issued by the judge. 
The social worker with parental responsibility for M was unconvinced that 
an ASBO was appropriate. However, the court heard evidence of a series of 
examples leading up to the issuing of summons of the ASBO panel and social 
services failing to maintain a professional distance. First, in February 2003 a 
case conference of the ASBO panel of the council took place to discuss whether 
to proceed with an ASBO against M. This meeting was attended by the social 
worker charged with parental responsibility for M under the care order. 
Second, the ASBO panel sought out a report from social services as to the 
appropriateness of an order. However, this was completed on a pro forma used 
by the panel. Third, at a meeting with M' s solicitors, M' s new social worker was 
represented by the in-house lawyer with responsibility for authority's ASBO 
application. The social worker refused at this point to act as a witness for M 
because his first responsibility was towards the local authority as applicant. 
Judicial review was sought for guidance as to how the interests of a child in 
care could be protected when the authority responsible for the child 1s care made 
an application for an anti-social behaviour order against that child and for a 
42 [2004] EWHC 1830. 
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ruling as to whether it was appropriate to apply for an interim ASBO in the 
circumstances. 
Newman J was clear that the provisions of section 1 of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 and the duties of a local authority to a child in its care 
entailed an inherent conflict of interests. He also noted that guidance on the use 
of anti-social behaviour orders had failed to appreciate such a conflict. Whilst 
the purpose of the ASBO is to protect the community from repeated anti-social 
conduct, the 1989 Act focused entirely upon the welfare of the perpetrator. He 
suggested that the imposition of an order may well deter the defendant and to 
that extent benefit him or her. However, this "limited potential for symmetry" 
between the two statutory regimes was undermined by the fact that the 
practical implication for a child was the possibility of hefty criminal sanctions 
on breach of an order. As he stated: "[a]ny parent, whether natural or statutory, 
and no matter how determined to bring discipline to bear on a child, would 
hesitate to place their child at risk of detention in custody" .43 
He concluded, however, that he was satisfied that the Children Act 1989 
did not go so far as to preclude a local authority from making an application 
under the Crime and Disorder Act against a child in its care, though this was 
obiter dicta given that defence counsel chose not to pursue that line of reasoning. 
Instead he simply suggested that "to negative one statutory power in favour of 
another, whilst theoretically a legal possibility, would be a conclusion of last 
resort, where compatibility can be met by the adoption of appropriate measures 
and procedures" .44 Although conceding that the court was unable to provide 
detailed measures and procedures required to avoid such conflicts, he then 
went on to provide broad guidance by which a local authority might satisfy its 
duties under the 1989 Act. 
Newman J first pointed out that the local authority had clearly failed to 
satisfy its duty under section 22(4). A decision to apply for an ASBO is a 
"decision" within the meaning of the section. To satisfy its requirements, a 
written report on the conclusions of the statutory consultation to which section 
22(4) gives rise must be compiled independently by the social worker 
43 Ibid at [44]. 
44 Ibid at [47]. 
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responsible for discharging care duties for the child in question, and presented 
to the authority on behalf of the child. Those officers seeking the ASBO should 
then consider the material when considering whether it is necessary to apply 
for the order before proceeding to making an application to the court. If, having 
seen the full report the "lead" section decides to apply for an ASBO, that 
decision must be communicated to all concerned. The relevant social worker 
should not participate in the decision to apply for an ASBO to guarantee their 
independence. 
Centrally, once the decision has been taken to apply for an ASBO there 
should be no contact on the issue between the ASBO team and the social 
services section without the consent of the child's solicitor. Finally, only in 
exceptional circumstances should a court make an order or an interim order 
against a child in care without someone present from social services, which 
should also provide witnesses if requested by the defence. However, Newman J 
felt unable to detail what procedures should be followed where social services, 
after detailed consideration with the child and relevant persons, actually wishes 
to support an ASBO application. 
Newman J, whilst attempting to establish procedures to avoid such an 
eventuality, left the door open to a finding that the provisions of the Children 
Act 1989 were inherently incompatible with the imposition by a local authority 
of an anti-social behaviour order upon a child in its care. Indeed, he had made 
explicit his own difficulty envisaging those with parental responsibility for a 
child ever deeming it appropriate to place him or her under threat of serious 
criminal sanctions. The procedures he advocated seek only to craft a provisional 
'chinese wall' between the department applying for an order (in this case, 
housing) and social services. As we have seen, social services in this particular 
case failed to maintain an appropriate professional distance from the ASBO 
application, and the guidance does go some way towards ensuring better 
administrative practice within local government. However, what it does not do 
is provide a solution to the possibility of an intrinsic legal conflict between 
section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Children Act 1989. 
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If the 1989 Act duty were to take precedence, what could a local authority 
do? In fact, as Newman J noted, section 22(6) of the Children Act provides the 
following solution: 
"If it appears to a local authority that it is necessary, for the purposes of 
protecting members of the public from serious injury, to exercise their 
powers with respect to a child whom they are looking after in a manner 
which may not be consistent with their duties under this section they may 
do so". 
Given that the 1989 Act provides its own formal threshold at which a local 
authority may absolve itself of its duties towards a child in care, it may be 
found that in fact an authority is only legally able to engage in proceedings for 
an anti-social behaviour order for a child in its care in such circumstances. If so, 
the Children Act 1989 will have unexpectedly replaced the low standard of anti-
social behaviour required for an ASBO under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
with a far higher threshold: the risk of serious injury to a member of the public. 
As with section 22(1)(c) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, welfarist 
legislation may once again restrict the broad discretion originally afforded to a 
local authority to protect the public. 
What form would a challenge under the Children Act 1989 take? It is 
submitted that as with a challenge to the decision to seek possession of an 
introductory tenancy a defendant will seek to present it as public law defence to 
the proceedings under the rule in Winder v Wandsworth. 45 In practice, if an 
application for an anti-social behaviour order with respect to a child in care is 
brought by the local authority, resolution of the conflict between section 1 of the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Children Act 1989 may have to take place 
through a temporary stay of proceedings and referral to the High Court for 
judicial review of the authority's decision, given that neither the magistrates' 
court or the county court has the power to exercise judicial review. 
Once again, this duty has implications for applications for other 
protectionist remedies by local housing authorities. For instance, a tenant may 
find themselves subject to possession proceedings for the conduct of a child in 
local authority care living with them. A child in care need not necessarily be 
45 [1985] AC 461. 
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accommodated by the local authority. The child in M, for example, was living 
with his grandmother at the time of the ASBO application. A tenant under a 
secure tenancy may well be able to argue that eviction of the child will be a 
breach of its duty under sections 33(3)(a) and 22(3) of the 1989 Act. Further, this 
could form the basis of a challenge in public law through the Cochrane/ McLellan 
procedure under an introductory tenancy or the similar process under a 
demoted tenancy. 
3. Conclusions 
The greatest potential for welfarist discourses to permeate into court 
proceedings has been the interface with independent welfarist legal 
instruments. The potential effect of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 on 
the power of a social landlord to evict mentally ill tenants sent shockwaves 
through the social housing sector when first identified in Brazier. However, 
section 22(1)(c) was quickly neutralised by the Court of Appeal in Romano in 
order to secure maximum flexibility for housing managers facing the difficult 
task of balancing the competing interests of such tenants and those affected by 
their behaviour. For children, a weak form of the welfare principle has been 
incorporated into judicial decision-making for an anti-social behaviour order, 
but the supposed key importance of identification of minors to ensure the 
effective policing of ASBOs has ensured that young people are increasingly 
susceptible to 'naming and shaming'. One important but unresolved question, 
finally, is the compatibility of a local authority's duty towards a child in its care 
and an application to impose an ASBO upon that child. 
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SOME FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
The crime conh·ol function of social housing managers has evolved 
considerably over the last decade. Whilst originally developed at a local level 
by a relatively small number of local authority landlords, the entire social 
housing sector has now been harnessed by the present government as a formal 
component of its strategy to tackle anti-social behaviour. The presumed 
solution for the problems of the deprived neighbourhoods within which many 
of these landlords operate (and, incidentally, a likely vote-winner for the 
government) is increased punitivism through disciplinary and exclusionary 
techniques of social control. Public protection is now the dominant discourse of 
housing management and has shaped the expanding range of legal tools 
developed for that purpose. This thesis has sought to identify some of the 
conflicts and tensions the emphasis on protectionism has created. 
First, the due process rights of defendants have been successively reduced. 
The development and expansion of the internal review procedure is an assault 
upon the hard-won security of tenure of social tenants. However, whilst 
expected to increase the speed and certainty of relief for victims and the 
protection of vulnerable witnesses, these objectives have been curbed somewhat 
by public law and human rights challenges. The ASBO, presented by 
government as its preferred response to anti-social behaviour, has caused 
considerable controversy for its unprincipled manipulation of the civil-criminal 
distinction, although a political alliance between the government and the House 
of Lords has ensured its survival. 
Second, the combination of public protection and moral discourses 
currently dominant in housing policy has drawn attention away from the needs 
of often vulnerable perpetrators and their households. Without addressing the 
causal factors giving rise to anti-social behaviour it will be impossible to achieve 
sustainable solutions for affected neighbourhoods. At the "micro" level, the 
legal tools do not in themselves provide wide discretion to the courts to 
consider the mitigating circumstances of defendants. Indeed, the 
reasonableness standard for eviction from an assured or secure tenancy has 
been deliberately constricted by the Court of Appeal in pursuit of more 
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effective public protection. However, the interface of these tools with other 
"welfarist" legislation, most notably the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and 
the Children Act 1989, has imposed some unexpected restrictions on the actions 
of social landlords. 
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